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PREFACE 
A disaster, by definition, is an unscheduled, overwhelming event 
that causes death, injury, and extensive property damage. Nevertheless, 
there are things that are known about disasters and their impacts, even 
when the knowledge of when and where a disaster will hit is not known. 
Given this knowledge, there are actions that can be taken before, 
duri ng, and after a di saster to reduce human hardshi p and property 
damage. The premi se of thi s proj ect is that by look i ng at community 
recovery in an organized way, human hardships can be minimized. 
For four years, the project team has studied and documented how 
cities in the process of recovering from disaster do, in fact, 
accomplish the recovery. The focus of the research is on local 
governmenta 1 interact i on and i ntergovernmenta 1 processes duri ng the 
recovery period. To date, knowledge of the role of community officials 
in recovery and postdisaster mitigation activities has been limited. An 
essential part of this research was the onsite observations and case 
studies of 14 recovering communities in the United Stutes. 
Greater experiential knowledge about the recovery process, 
inc"luding the mitigation activities during that period, should have 
several pract i ca 1 benefit s. We th ink that iJract i ca 1 knowl edge about 
recovery willI) help local officials manage recovery more efficiently; 
2) improve the ability to predict the relative ease or difficulty that a 
community will have in recovering from a major disaster; and 3) enhance 
understanding of how and why communities choose to take mitigative steps 
after a disaster. Improving the ability to predict the relative ease of 
community recovery also should be helpful to officials at other levels 
of government in determining the type and amount of assistance and 
resources to be provided to a disaster-affected locality. Although all 
iii 
of the case studies and analysis completed to date are of United States 
communities, we think this new oryaniziny framework provides a good 
fi rst step for researchers interested in the recovery process in other 
societal settinys. 
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RECOVERY 
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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades in the United States, local capability to 
deal with and recover from major natural 
Communiti es do recover, even if slowly 
di sasters has improved. 
and painfully in some 
instances. Although no communities hvae been "lost" 
public officials occasionally decide to relocate all 
community to avoid the likelihood of another disaster. 
i nvo1 untarily, 
or part of a 
About 15 years ago, Allen Barton summarized what little research 
existed at that time about the disaster recovery process. One pattern 
he noted was that, "Local government is unable to cope with the overload 
of problems and is replaced by an improvised emergency government such 
as a Citizens' Committee, or by authorities from state or national 
agencies" (1969, p. 284). More recently, however, local governments 
have not been rendered i neffect i ve nor suppl anted by either pub 1 i c or 
pri vate organi zat ions. I n recent years, both the growi ng abil ity of 
1 oca I pub Ii c offi ci a 1 s. and the experi ence and resources of emergency 
management personnel at the state and federal 1 eve Is, have contri buted 
to community ability to recover from a major natural disaster. 
Since 1980, the year this recovery research began, there have been 
more than 100 major disasters in the United States, and the federal 
yovernment has expended more than $4 bi 11 i on for reI i ef and recovery. 
It should be noted that these numbers include only major events (natural 
and human-caused) for which a Presidential Declaration of a disaster or 
emergency was issued. Other events had significant impacts on locales 
they affected, but did not meet the eligibility requirements for a 
declaration of a major disaster. 
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In federal fiscal years 1980 through 1984, 109 disasters and 15 
emergencies merited a Presidential Declaration. The 109 disasters 
affected 703 counties seriously. In that four-year period, the dollar 
amount obligated by FEMA for those major disasters and emergencies was 
$1.8 billion. That total includes amounts spent for Public Assistance, 
Temporary Housing, Disaster Unemployment Assistance, and Individual and 
Family Grants. In addition, other federal agencies, including the Small 
Business Administration and Farmers Home Administration, spent $2.7 
billion on disaster aid. The total federal assistance came to $4.4 
billion in federal fiscal years 1980-84.* 
Clearly then, since the federal government has a sizable investment 
in community relief and recovery, it is important to know not only where 
the money went, but how the recovery proceeded in places where tens of 
mill ions of doll ars were spent. Further, it is instructive to know 
whether the money makes a difference. Knowledge about community 
recovery could improve the process and, possibly, reduce the time and 
costs of local recovery. 
Previous Research 
In the past decade, persons representing many disciplines have 
written on various aspects of recovery from natural disasters. Many 
reports have never been publ i shed, and others have presented results 
that mayor may not be duplicated. Relatively few researchers have 
studied more than a Single event and, hence, are not able to generalize 
about a variety of cases. A number of major themes occur in the natural 
di saster 1 i terature and on the agenda at maj or meetings of natural 
hazards and disaster researchers. A review of the agenda topics at the 
*The data came from individual summary reports on declared 
disasters and emergencies prepared each fiscal year by FEMA. 
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University of Colorado's Natural Hazards Research and Applications 
Workshops in July of 1983 and '84 reveals a concern with: 1) disaster 
phases, and 2) functions and effects. The phases include hazard 
mitigation (e.g., flood plain and coastal management), preparedness 
activities, response activities, and recovery (human and community). 
The funct ions and effects i nvo 1 ve ass imil at i on of research and 
technology into practice, planning and implementation processes, and 
disaster impacts. 
Researchers and public officials continue to grapple with the same 
fundamental problems--how to understand better and to cope more 
effectively with the four major phases of disasters and with the effects 
of major disasters. With respect to the four phases, the recovery phase 
appears to be the least researched and the most poorly understood. This 
is especially true of the long-term recovery period at the community 
level. Far more has been done to investigate and understand family and 
individual recovery; for examples, see Bolin (1982) and Bates (1982). 
Similarly, a review of published natural disaster and hazards 
research shows that in the 1 ast several years, researchers have paid 
very little attention to the sociopolitical aspects of the long-term 
recovery process. Of greatest interest here are those analyses of the 
pub 1 i c admi ni strat i on aspects of community recovery and of the local 
economic impact of major natural di sasters. Among the earl ier 
pub 1 i cat ions most pertinent to thi s proj ect are Dacy and Kunreuther 
(1969), Haas et al. (1977), Friesema et al. (1979), and Wright et al. 
(1979). Some individual community recovery experiences have been 
documented in Geipel (1982), and French et al. (1984), but few 
comprehensive analyses of the long-term recovery process have been made. 
Of the 38 monographs published by the Natural Hazards Research and 
Applications Information Center in the last decade, only one deals with 
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community recovery after natural disaster: Haas, Kates and Bowden IS 
Reconstruction Following Disaster, published in 1977. The volume grew 
out of research on the recovery processes in Managua, Nicaragua, after 
the yreat earthquake, and Rapi d City, South Dakota, after the fl ood 
there. Secondary analyses were made of recovery in San Francisco and 
Anchorage after earthquakes. 
Haas et al. described the recovery process and identified the 
mitigation opportunities during the recovery period: 
Disaster recovery is ordered, knowable, and 
predictable. The central issues and decisions are value 
choices that yive varying emphasis to the early return to 
norma 1 cy, the reduct i on of future vul nerabil ity, or 
opportunities for improved effiCiency, equity, and amenity. 
uver-ambi t i ous pl ans to accompli sh these goals tend to be 
counterproductive. Major opportunities to improve the 
reconstruction process lie in early recognition of overlooked 
problems, people, functions, and areas; the reduction of 
uncertainty about the future for those who 1 ive and work in 
the city; and the preparation for reconstruction before the 
disaster comes (p. xxvi). 
The model of recovery activity timing depicted by Haas et al. 
(referred to as "the wave chart" by I oca I offi cia lsi n more than one 
community where we interviewed) did not always accurately reflect the 
experi ences of the communit i es we stud i ed. The start dates of the 
restoration and reconstruction phases were di fferent from those 
spec ifi ed in Haas et a 1 ., for instance. Thi s study made no effort to 
measure the amount of time each phase might take, or to examine the Haas 
et al. finding that there was a logarithmic progression in the duration 
of each phase. Finally, the researchers did not discern the seven basic 
reconstruction issues or the sequence and linkages among them cited by 
Haas et al., on p. 45, in any of the places we studied. Haas et al. may 
have been suggesting that some logically follow others--and sometimes 
they do--but our research showed that issues frequently crop up in 
simultaneous or illogical sequences. 
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For example, in Coalinga, California, the recovery activities began 
almost immediately, because on May 3, 1983, vi rtually all the buildings 
that were not seismic-resistant were leveled by the earthquake. It was 
a case of "instant mitigation" since uninhabitable buildings looked that 
way. In the case of fl ood or· tornado-damaged properties, many more 
structures look sound than actually are. A contrast in recovery timing 
was the situation in January of 1983, when several California counties 
(including Marin and Santa Cruz) suffered heavy rains that caused 
floods, landslides and debris flows. For many weeks after the 
Presidential Disaster Declaration was issued, mudslides and debris flows 
continued periodically; consequently, road and debris clearance went on 
for months. At the same time debris removal was going on, so were some 
recovery planning efforts. Recovery usually begins after response 
activities are nearly completed, but the amount of time needed for those 
activities depends in part on the nature of the disaster agent, the 
extent of the damages, and the avail abi Ii ty of resources (human and 
material). 
The work of Friesema et al. (1979) addresses the long-term 
community recovery process, but raises some basic methodological 
quest ions about measuri ng recovery. The group set out to study the 
long-range economic and social impacts of natural disasters on four 
communities, USing aggregate indicators of community patterns available 
for along peri ad of time. I n each case, the di saster had occurred at 
1 east a decade pri or to thei r study. Fri esema' s bas i c method was "to 
gather time series data on various types of community performances for 
at least 10 years on either side of the disaster" (p. 16). The data 
were gathered primarily from secondary sources. 
Friesema's team struggled with quantitative measures: "If the 
prob 1 ems assoc i ated wi th fi ndi ng adequate comparati ve measures of the 
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severi ty of di sasters have seemed formi dab 1 e, the problems of gett i ng 
reasonab ly accurate measures of the comparative amount of external 
recovery assistance coming into communities following disasters has 
proved to be almost intractable" (p. 164). Since Friesema relied on 
data that was 1) primarily from secondary sources, 2) limited primarily 
to economi c impacts, 3) about ten years 01 d, and 4) from on ly four 
communities, that study was of limited usefulness to the project 
described here. Nevertheless, Friesema's painful experiences with 
quantitative measures served as a warning to our research team. 
A second study headed by Wright (1979) determined natural disaster 
impacts by comparing census data from 1960 with those from 1970 on the 
number of housing units in areas that did and did not have a natural 
di saster. Aga in, thei r aggregate data-gatheri ng and decade-long time 
peri od made thi s study of 1 imited useful ness to thi s research project. 
Further, the approach used by Wright et al. cannot deal with the dynamic 
changes that are crucial to a measurement of disaster effects on 
economic growth and other local processes. 
Wright's team reported that their quantitative approach, "is free 
and clear of some of the deficiencies of case studies" (p. 17). One of 
thei r fi ndi ngs--contrary to what we found in our study--was: "The 
implication is that the most serious impact of recovery problems will 
occur in small towns and rural or semi-rural communities--and, 
interest i ngl y enough, the case study 1 i terature provi des some support 
for this viewpoint" (p. 205). Our case study results did not show that 
sma 11 or rural communities had more diffi culty recoveri ng than others 
(see Chapter IV). 
The Friesema et al. (1979) study of communities after natural 
disasters states: 
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By and large, it appears to us that the American society 
and pol ity has become so knit together and the economy so 
integrated by the mid-20th century that most of the economic 
costs of natural disasters are externalized to the larger, 
carrying society. It has occurred because local 
institutions have been economically, socially and politically 
integrated into the national society (p. 178). 
Nevertheless, the focus on community impacts using aggregate indicators 
may mask severe personal impacts upon victims and others in the 
community. If communities are able to externalize many of the 
consequences and costs of natural di sasters, as it appears they can, 
that is not to say that there aren't consequences and costs. We have, 
in fact, found a variety of impacts on local public management and 
finances resulting from a major natural disaster. However, our focus 
was the first 12 to 24 months after a major disaster. 
A few more recent studies of recovery also should be mentioned. In 
the article, "Lake Elsinore Disaster: The 'Slings and Arrows of 
Outrageous Fortune' ," Sandra Sutphen reviews a single recovery example 
using the Haas et ale (1977) book for her analytical model. Sutphen's 
work (1983) supported the basic observation of blocks of recovery 
activities, but did not reinforce the clear-cut sequence (or ebb and 
flow) of recovery period actions shown in the Haas et ale model of 
recovery activity. Robert Geipel, author of Disaster and 
Reconstruction: The Friuli (Italy) Earthquake of 1976 (1982), also 
studied one recovery example from which he derived his model. Geipel 
discusses the demographic and societal aspects of recovery, addressing 
mainly the social geography of the reconstruction process. 
In "Recovery foll owi ng the South Ita 1 i an Earthquake, November 
198U: Two Contrasting Examples," Frances D'Souza contrasts the ability 
of two small communities to assimilate relief and manage their 
recovery. D'Souza (1982) notes the importance of indigenous leadership 
as a major contributor to local recovery. She cites the Year I report 
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of this project, among other sources, in her analysis of the differing 
capabi I it i es of the two Ital i an communi ties to recover. 
The model or organi zi ng framework offered as a result of thi s 
research proJ ect is not ent ire 1 y a new one. The framework presented 
(see Figure II-I) is arranged to allow researchers and practitioners to 
make sense of the recovery process and to act on it. Add it i ona 1 
actionable propositions are provided in Chapters III and IV. 
Project Summary 
This study was designed to contribute to the base of knowledge 
about long-term recovery and to produce an anal yt i ca 1 framework for 
future studies of the recovery process. From 1980-84, the project team 
conducted empirical studies of communities recovering from natural 
disasters. 
An extensive review of the existing disaster recovery 1 iterature 
revealed the need for more information on local public decision making 
duri ng long-term recovery. The proj ect sta ff dec i ded to use the case 
study method to gather this information. A series of site visits of 
places recently struck by disasters was scheduled in order to interview 
key decision makers and to analyze local public planning and management 
processes, and intergovernmental relations. Provisions were made to 
monitor and assess key public policies and actions aimed at recovery--
including the consideration of significant new mitigation measures and 
efforts at community betterment. 
The first six case studies were completed in August of 1981; five 
more case studies were completed in November of 1982. Six additional 
case studies were done in 1983 (three new, three revisits), as was an 
analytical framework for the recovery process. This monograph 
incorporates all the case studies, presents the analysis of all 14 
cases, and suggests a model of the recovery process. 
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Research D~s i gn 
The selection of case study sites was based on such criteria as the 
nature of the disaster, geographic location, size, social and economic 
characteristics, local interest in the event and in the recovery 
process, and repl icabi I ity of mitigation or recovery activities. To 
select the sample sites, the staff went through a series of steps: 
1) Screen presidential Disaster Declarations since 1977 for 
all natural disasters within continental U.S. 
2) Categorize each by incident type. 
3) Rank by dollar volume of damage (all were multimillion-
dollar disasters). 
4) Identify by state and locality to obtain ge09raphic 
distribution. 
5) Examine distribution to assure coverage of Atlantic, 
Gulf, and Pacific coasts, as well as inland locations. 
6) Screen to assure documentation as to extent of disaster 
and recovery undertaken. 
7) Screen to assure willin9ness of locality to participate 
in the study research and ayree to interviews of local 
officials. 
8) Examine disasters in different locations, but in same 
time frame. 
9) Examine effect of same disaster on adjacent locations. 
10) Consider travel budget limitations. 
11) Consider elapsed time since disaster (interview public 
officials still in office to ensure more accurate 
recall) • 
Before the field interviews were conducted, the staff reviewed the 
fi I es mai ntai ned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for 
details about the declaration process, initial damage estimates, and 
federal/state a9reements for each disaster site. Other secondary 
information--such as dem09raphic data, copies of municipal budgets, and 
special reports on the sites--was gathered as well. In terms of 
specific disaster agents represented, the 14 examples cover four 
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riverine floods; three flood/mudslide events; two tornadoes; one 
hurricane; two winter, coastal storms; one earthquake; and one dam 
break/fl ood. 
Next, a structured guide called a Field Report Outline (see 
Appendix AI was prepared for use by field team members in conducting the 
on-s i te i ntervi ews. Only six persons participated in the two-person 
teams used in the course of the 14 studies, which made it relatively 
easy to ensure uniformity in the individual case reports and to 
fac 11 itate the cornpdrat i ve anal ys is of the experi ences. The teams spent 
roughly four days in each community conducting interviews. In addition 
to documenting the disaster incident and the local response and recovery 
efforts, the researchers paid particular attention to local 
consideration of mitigation measures and to efforts at community 
betterment. 
After the individual case studies were written up, a copy of each 
of the descriptions was sent to the community described for review of 
factual accuracy. The chief executive and staff in each place had the 
opportunity to offer corrections and comments to the resedrch team. 
Three localities, each a place of significant activity that could 
not be captured in a sin~le trip, were visited twice. In some 
communities, the complex web of decisions by many parties could not be 
understood in a few days; in others, only time revealed the outcome of 
some decisions. In short, a full appreciation of the many dimensions of 
the recovery process could not be captured with just one cross-sectional 
view. 
In order to aggregate the findings and to generalize from them, an 
analytiC framework was needed. Previously completed recovery research 
was of relatively little help because of differences in aggregation, and 
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because none dealt with the rol e of key I oca I persons in the recovery 
decision-making process, a consideration important to this project. 
One of the analysis tools proposed was a mOdified version of 
pattern recognition, a variation of discriminant analysis. The project 
staff worked with Allan J. Lichtman, a professor at American University 
in Washi ngton, who has pi oneered the use of pattern recogniti on for 
social science applications. Difficulties arose around determining 
.. effect i ve recovery." We t ri ed many ways to measure recovery as an 
outcome, but it may be better conceptual i zed as a process. Other 
researchers, such as F ri esema et a 1. and Wri ght et a1., have used 
recovery as a dependent variable, but the difficulties are great and the 
results questionable. 
As another possible approach, we decided to let local citizens and 
officials determine whether they were satisfied with the recovery in 
their locality. About 12 months after each disaster, a sampling of 
local pUblic officials, civic leaders, and citizens were asked to 
complete a questionnaire on their perceptions of local recovery. 
However, not too surprisingly, that effort did not yield consistent 
enough results to cont ri bute to an ana lyt i ca I framework. However, the 
questionnaire could, it was realized, be used to gain consensus about a 
local recovery strategy soon after a disaster occurred (see Appendix B). 
The team dec i ded that the rea I issue was not whether a community 
could recover or not (all have), but rather whether there are better or 
worse ways to go about recoveri ng. A fter severa I meet i ngs of the 
project team, it was decided that the qualitative data collected during 
field visits could not be analyzed by quantitative methods of analysis, 
and that we should stop procrustean attempts to do so. 
We had chosen to do case studies because they yield rich data, and 
we remained faithful to the case study technique. Robert Yin, who has 
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written extensively about the case study as a serious research strategy, 
has provided the followin~ definition (1984, p. 18): 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when 
the boundari es between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used. 
In discussing the frequent complaint about case studies--the difficulty 
of generalizing from one case to another--Yin states (1984, p. 42): 
The problem lies in the very notion of generalizing to 
otller case studies in the first place. Instead, an analyst 
should try to generalize findings to 'theory,' analogous to 
the way a scientist generalizes from experimental results to 
theory (note that the scient i st does not attempt to sel ect 
'representative' experiments). 
Recovery is an ongoing process and, therefore, difficult to measure 
once and have that suffice. Nevertheless, an explanatory, organizing 
framework can be provi ded with respect to long-term recovery. In 
Chapter II we present such a framework, based on analyses of the 14 case 
studies. A first step in the analysis was preparing an array of 44 
variables (clustered under ten categories) that appeared to affect the 
recovery process. From analysis of independent variables, and from 
additional field work in 1983-84 (including second visits to three 
recoverin~ communities), we arrived at the new organizing framework. 
Chapters III and IV describe in detail the dynamics of the recovery 
process and influences on the effectiveness of recovery. 
Finally, we wanted not only to describe our findings, but also to 
present them in such a way that they would be of practical assistance to 
public administrators. In Chapter V, we have used "Actionable 
Propositions" as a means of offering guidance, advice, and prescriptive 
information to local officials. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE LOCAL RECOVERY PROCESS 
The long-term recovery process involves the repair or 
reconstruction of buildings and structures, the evaluation of existing 
building codes and land use regulations, and implementation of 
mitigation measures, both structural and nonstructural. Also included 
in this process are the planning and administrative activities entailed 
in i dent ifyi ng and securi ng the resources necessary to accompl i sh the 
above tasks. Recovery encompasses all domains of community life. 
Framework 
A description of some recovery activities in each main area of 
community life is provided below: 
• Residential--the repa i r or reconstruct i on of houses; the 
repair or replacement of home furnishings, cars and 
trucks; the settling of insurance claims for damage to 
persona 1 property; and the permanent resettl i ng of 
displaced residents. 
• Business--the repair or reconstruction of economically 
viable commercial, industrial, and retail establishments; 
and the return of retail sales, business-related tax 
revenues, and employment to predisaster levels. 
• Public services and facilities--the resumption of water, 
sewer, electric, telephone and other basic services; the 
restoration of public transportation, parks, and 
recreational areas; the repair or reconstruction of public 
sidewalks, schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics, police 
stations, fire houses, and other municipal buildings; and 
progress on community projects that were planned or under 
construction prior to the disaster. 
• General population--the return of certain social 
indicators (such as birth, death, and crime rates; 
alcoholism, child and spouse abuse; and welfare payments) 
to at least predisaster levels; and the implementation of 
other programs designed to restore or improve the quality 
of 1 i fe for local residents. 
• Mitigation--measures to reduce future losses such as the 
preparation or reV1Slon of a disaster plan; the 
constructi on of 1 evees, di kes, breakwaters, and ri prap; 
the implementation of projects such as the relocation of 
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persons 1 i vi ng in hi gh-ri sk areas; the purchase of 
disaster-related insurance; and the passage of land use 
ordinances and building codes. 
All of these domains generally compete for a fixed number of 
dollars available for recovery activities. Decisions about allocations 
among domai ns (whether exp 1 i c it or not) are part of a strategy for 
recovery. In recent years, however, federal and state disaster 
ass i stance has been such that recovery does not refer to community 
survival in the basic sense. There are, in fact, no ghost towns in the 
United States as a result of a natural disaster in recent times. Some 
communities have decided to relocate in part because of fear of future 
hazards, but that has been a calculated decision rather than an 
involuntary predicament. 
F ri esema et a 1. (1979) and others have invest i gated some of the 
economic aspects of the quality of life before and after a disaster, but 
to date many questions remain about the economic impact of a disaster on 
communities in the United States. If a community with a declining local 
economy has a disaster, has it recovered if it restores a quality of 
life that is lower than before the disaster, but higher than what it 
woul d have been had the disaster not occurred? These and related 
economic questions require additional study. 
In addition, availability of funds and allocation of them, another 
i nfl uence on the recovery process is pl anni ng for the recovery process 
in advance of having the actual experience. Public officials (and 
others) can affect recovery process, with respect to speed, consumption 
of resource, and prevai ling agenda, through the control of resources. 
Public officials can learn from the experiences of others; they can 
learn how to prepare, how to move through the administrative processes 
more quickly, how to deal more effectively with the various levels of 
government usually involved in the postdisaster phase, and how to 
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control the demands for scarce or strained resources. State and federal 
officials can see to it that existing policies and regulations are not 
impeding the recovery process at the local level. 
Fiyure 11-1 shows the elements of recovery, and the relationships 
among them. The number of independent variables that were suspected to 
a ffect the recovery process are enormous. The pre 1 i mi na ry anal ys is of 
the 14 case studies led to the identification and isolation of 44 
separate variables, which we clustered under ten major categories, that 
may play a role in the recovery process. Nevertheless, once we 
constructed the organizing framework,* we were able to show the 
interaction among the key variables. 
The contextual setting of the disaster-stricken community is found 
at the bottom of Figure II-I. The center of Figure 11-1 shows the three 
prinCipal elements of the recovery process. Finally, the outcomes of 
the recovery processes are seen at the top. 
Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Context 
After a major disaster--an event large and damaging enough to 
warrant receiviny a Presidential Disaster Declaration--local officials 
qui ckl y become i nvo 1 ved ina compl ex web of i ntergovernmenta 1 
relationships while making the public policy choices that affect the 
future of the communi ty. In the 1 ast decade or so, the amount of 
federal assistance provided to local governments following disasters has 
increased, and with assistance comes increased interaction among 
officials at all levels of government. Because of the cons i derab 1 e 
involvement of other levels of government in a disaster that is 
*This framework was inspired in part by a model described by Dennis 
Mileti in his recent work on organizational response to earthquake 
prediction (1983). 
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FIGURE II-I 
ELEMENTS OF THE RECOVERY PROCESS 
[ COMMUNITY RECOVERY I 
C. KNO\~LEDGE OF WHAT TO DO 
-- Emergency r~gmt. Capabil i ty 
-- Hazard Specific Experience 
? ~ 
A. PERSONAL LEADERSHIP B. ABILITY TO ACT 
-- Pol itical ., -- Administrative ~ 
-- Administrative -- Technical 
-- Resources 
~OMMUNITY-BASED NEEDS AND DEMANDS FOR ACTIONS 
FEDERAL INFLUENCES AND CONDITIONS 
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essentially a localized event, the quality of intergovernmental 
relations has a major influence on the efficiency of the local recovery. 
Not only do intergovernmental relationships make recovery complex, 
but so do federal laws mandating certain tasks simultaneous with 
recovery. Recent federal pol i ci es and executi ve orders promote the 
integration or coordination of mitigation efforts with recovery. Other 
federal requirements, such as the 75% federal/25% local match for public 
assi stance, requi re local governments to assume yreater fi nancial and 
administrative responsibilities for recovery actions. Consequently, the 
i nteryovernmenta 1 context provi des both problems and opportunities for 
the exercise of local strategic choice. Local opinions of the 
i ntergovernmenta 1 context vari ed across the communities we studied. In 
only a few cases was there an overall favorable assessment (both of 
state and federal relationships). 
Each of the communities studied was in an area that had received a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration. The processes set in motion by the 
declaration, the assistance programs triggered, and the applicable 
federal regulations (for example, the National Flood Insurance Progr~m) 
established the administrative, political, and to some extent the 
economic context within which the recovery took place. Since local 
officials deal with a major disaster infrequently, they are relatively 
i nexperi enced compared with thei r }:ounterparts in federal and state 
government. Research has shown that local officials tend to be less 
concerned over disasters as a public policy issue than actors at other 
governmental levels (Thomas, 1976). In virtually all of the cases 
studied, local, state, and federal officials tended to have differing 
and sometimes competing perceptions of 1) their roles in recovery. 2) 
their priorities during recovery, 3) the importance of postdisaster 
mitigation efforts, and 4) the proper location of recovery planning and 
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decision making. Indeed, the cases we studied exhibited the continuum 
of relation types from cooperative to antagonistic. 
Local-State Context 
Typically, state government has a set of specified responsibilities 
as a partner in the federal/state agreement signed after a Presidential 
Disaster Declaration. Among them is the responsibility for hazard 
mitigation activities in the affected area, known informally as the 
Section 406 (of the FEMA regulations) requirement. States also play an 
important role in the disbursement of Individual Assistance Program 
payments and in other special programs and assistance triggered by a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration. Under state law, various state 
agencies have authority to provide programmatic and financial 
assistance. Each state's laws, executive orders, and regulations 
spec ify gubernatori a 1 and other state power regard i ng state assistance 
to localities (see Feigenbaum and Ford, 1984; National Governors' 
Association, 1978b). The state presence in a community is personified 
by the Governor's Authorized Representative, who works closely with the 
Federal Coordinating Office and others in the Disaster Assistance Center 
created immediately after a disaster is declared. 
Relations with state government officials varied widely among the 
sites we studied. Generally, the negative assessments of state 
relations by local government offi~ials stemmed from their perception of 
the state's inability to provide technical assistance or significant 
financial assistance. Additionally, the heavy local dependence on 
federal programs for funding led to a direct local/federal relationship, 
which was intensified when local officials wanted quick decisions and 
ready cash flow for major projects. Under such circumstances, the state 
often was perceived not only as a layer of government, but also one that 
does not yield substantial assistance. 
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Local-Federal Context 
Federa I di saster assi stance is provided under the Di saster ReI i ef 
Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288, which is implemented by the Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) following a Presidential 
Declaration of a "major disaster." FEMA administers grants to the 
states from the Pres i dent IS Di saster ReI i ef Fund, and di rectly 
coordinates disaster assistance functions of all federal agencies. Both 
assistance under Public Law 93-288 and payments by the National Flood 
Insurance Program (in flood disasters) are usually available, but each 
program has significant requi rements that must be met by met by local 
officials. 
In our study, we noticed that a certain amount of difficulty in 
federal/local interaction arose from local inexperience--for example, 
not knowing ahead of time the I imitations of individual and public 
assistance. By comparison, familiarity in normal times with the 
intricacies of various program requi rements--as well as benefits and 
limitations--paid off during the turmoil of the recovery phase for some 
of the communities studied. Great local displeasure was expressed in 
many cases over the requi rement for local 25% fund match for publ ic 
ass i stance, and over what 1 oca 1 offi cia 1 s vi ewed as the compl ex and 
onerous administrative process for payment of the public projects 
described in the Damage Survey Reports (DSRs). 
Even after receiving a presidential Disaster Declaration and 
identifying available federal programs, a community still may have 
difficulty in obtaining federal aid to assist with reconstruction. 
Prior to 1973, many federal agencies had categorical grant programs 
available to localities after a serious disaster. Since then, however, 
the block grant and 
discretionary federal 
revenue 
funding 
sharing programs 
available for 
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have left little 
long-range disaster 
recovery.* This circumstance has contributed to less favorable local 
perceptions of the federal role in recovery. 
Mitigation 
Mit i gat i on can be vi ewd as a sub-category of federal and state 
re 1 at ions by I oca 1 governments in that it means a diferent set of 
decision rules for local government, and it can have an effect on local 
choices. The need for mitigation plans may change the demand structure 
at the local level during the recovery period. For flood-related 
hazards, a special set of requirements exists for municipalities that 
participate in the National Flood Insurance Program. Implementing 
mitigative measures in the postdisaster period is often a complex 
exercise in intergovernmental relations. 
The correlation between previous disaster experience and mitigative 
actions is not as clear as might be expected. For example, one 
community in our study with a history of frequent coastal storms has 
paid minimal attention to mitigation, while another community subject to 
less frequent coastal storms has taken a number of significant, 
mitigative steps. Neither was there d clear correlation between size of 
a community and attention to mitigation: the smallest community in our 
study continuously engages in mitigation planning, although it is 
dependent on external resources to impl ement necessary measures. 
There are many determinants of whether significant mitigative 
measures wi 11 be taken. The locally determined presssures for (or 
against) mitigation should be considered part of the box in Figure 11-1 
marked "Community-based Needs and Demands for Act ion." Some of the 
determinants are as follows: 
*A Digest of Disaster Assistance Programs, useful to state and 
local government offi ci a 1 sin long range recovery and mit i gat ion 
efforts, is available from FEMA. 
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• Regional area--the prevailing way of doing things and the 
extent of conservatism are two i nfl uences on the local 
pub 1 i c att itude and posture toward external organi zat ions 
and other levels of government (especially federal). 
• Dependence vs. independence--some localities, especially 
sma 11 ones, are very dependent on techni ca 1 ass i stance or 
financial help from other levels of government and, 
apparently, will stay that way. Consequently, in times of 
an emergency, they rely heavily on state and federal 
assistance for a variety of needs. Others pride 
themselves on self-sufficiency or independence and do not 
want outside involvement (interference) in their 
affa irs. Either of these characteri st i cs carri ed to an 
extreme becomes a problem of its own for state and federal 
emergency servi ces personnel. These att i tudes of 
dependence or independence are not a function of resource 
availability only. 
• Perception--perceptual or attitudinal characteristics 
affect a locality's inclination to mitigate hazards. Not 
everyone perceives the repetitive, cyclical nature of 
certa in natural phenomena, or analyzes exi st i ng hazards 
and plans for mitigation of disasters likely to recur 
after one's term of office or lifetime ends. What 
constitutes mitigation, particularly knowledge of specific 
mitigation techniques and projects, is not clear to all 
decision makers. A local official may fully support the 
concept and process of recovery, but be unable to deal 
wi th mit i gat i on because of percei ved cost/benefit rat i os 
for different mitigation options. 
In the final analysis, when economic and development pressures 
outwei gh the percei ved benefi ts from miti gat ion, the former wi ns over 
the latter. Far more needs to be 1 earned about the i nteracti on of 
economic and development interests with other groups committed to 
mitigation at the local level. 
Bridging the Gaps 
To improve federal interagency cooperat i on after a disaster is 
declared, and to monitor mitigation activities, the Federal Interagency 
Hazard Mitigation Team (HMT) process was established in late 1980. 
After a presidentially declared flood disaster, the FEMA Regional 
Director appoints a team comprised of key federal agency representatives 
and representat i ves of state and 1 oca 1 governments. An HMT may make 
recommendations, but it has neither enforcement nor regulatory powers. 
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The HMT usually functions as a regional, interagency, and 
i ntergovernmenta 1 team. The teams were des i gned to promote a 
comprehensive approach to flood hazard mitigation during the post-flood 
recovery process. An interagency agreement requires that the team 
prepare a report within 15 days of a Presidential Disaster Declaration, 
that the mitigation activities recommended in the report emphasize 
nonstructural measures, and that federal agencies conform their recovery 
actions to the recommendations in the report to the fullest extent 
practicable. The activities of teams, including preparing the report 
required 15 days after the declaration date, have had a significant 
effect on the identification and implementation of mitigative measures 
at the city and county levels soon after a major flood-related disaster. 
The HMTs have had several secondary benefits, one of which has been 
to improve federal/state/local relations through the participation of 
state and 1 oca 1 representat i ves i n all HMTs. The second benefit is the 
prompt attention brought to bear by the 15-day deadl ine for the fi rst 
report; the HMT process fosters a sense of immed i acy for mi t i gat ion 
measures early in the recovery period. A third benefit is that the HMT 
process has led to the formation of a small cadre of experts on recovery 
and mitigation among the federal agencies usually involved in the 
aftermath of a local disaster. For example, in California, state 
officials have developed their own, informal interagency team. In all 
cases in this study at which an HMT was present, greater local interest 
and emphasis on flood hazard mitigation was obvious. 
Generally, public officials at all levels comment favorably on the 
HMT process. They cons i der it useful and effective because it 
encourages decision makers to pay prompt attention to mitigation during 
recovery. Local officials appreciated professional attention at an 
earl y date; state offi cia 1 s valued the formal mechani sm through whi ch 
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they can participate in mitigation planning; federal officials (other 
than FEMA officials) became better informed about disaster needs and 
programs, and hence, were more effective in delivering needed programs 
and services. 
Three Elements of Community Recovery 
In the center of Figure 11-1 are the three elements over which 
local officials have the most control. Local officials can affect 
community recovery directly through these categories of mode and 
action: leadership, ability to act, and knowledge. These three 
characteristics are in every community to some extent, can be 
manipulated (i.e., increased, decreased, purchased, hired, learned), 
interact with each other in pred i ctab I e ways, have an impact on the 
recovery process, and can be affected by local demands for actions. It 
is not necessary to wait until after a disaster occurs, however; many 
steps to improve community capacity for efficient recovery should be 
taken before disaster strikes. 
It is important to recognize that all three components appear to be 
necessary to ensure efficient community recovery--efficiency here 
meaniny greater speed and less cost in terms of personnel and material 
assistance. Leadership is an essential and almost sufficient condition 
of efficient recovery; abi lity to act must be paired with leadership to 
ensure an expeditious recovery; and knowledge of what to do is not 
essential initially, but can be extremely helpful once acquired. 
The above three conditi ons are combi ned with "demand" parameters 
(at local, state and federal levels) in an interactive fashion in Figure 
I I-I. The framework can be used to encourage publ ic officials to 
evaluate their communities regarding specific kinds of leadership, 
resources, and knowledge prior to a disaster. In addition, it can be 
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used by state and federal offi ci a 1 s to predi ct how easy or diffi cult a 
local recovery process is likely to be. If one or more key ingredients 
for an expeditious 1 oca 1 recovery appear to be mi ss i ng, then state or 
federal officials can take steps to supply it or aid the locality in 
acqui ri ng it. 
While the organizing framework appears to indicate a one-way 
process, in actuality the interactions are more cyclical. Under certain 
cond it ions, such as experi ence with the same di saster agent, I oca 1 
officials may be able to influence some of the dynamic factors outside 
their normal zone of control. For example, Fort Wayne officials (who 
knew about flood fightiny) were haviny extreme cash flow pressures, but 
were able to negotiate a special audit procedure with FEMA so they could 
proceed more quickly to receive federal reimbursements for local 
payout. Experienced and agyressive local leaders have, in fact, 
affected many of the external ayents (state, federal, private). After 
extremely large and hiyhly destructive events, such as Hurricane Camille 
(1969) and Hurricane Agnes (1972), many changes in federal laws, 
regulations, and policies were made in response to problems and 
complaints expressed by local and state officials about the federal 
disaster assistance programs and processes in effect at that time. 
Leadership 
Leadership is a much-studied field, from studies of presidential 
leadership to city governance. This report discusses what has been 
learned about leadership as it is formally and informally exercised in 
the field of emeryency management. 
More than a decade ago, Quarantell i and Dynes (1972) documented 
their perceptions of local public leadership and organization for 
disasters. Their observations are worth reviewing with respect to the 
local disaster recovery process: 
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Patterns of 1 eadershi p and of authori ty in di saster-
impacted communities are very complex. Their complexity, 
however, is usually misinterpreted as confusion and the 
panacea of strong leadership is frequently offered as a 
solution without understanding the nature of the problem. 
Perhaps the beginning of understanding is to start with the 
observation that almost all communities are not organized to 
cope with disasters. This is true even in localities with 
extensive pre-disaster planning since there is a considerable 
difference in arit i c i pat i ng problems and fac i ng them. What 
di sasters do is to create a seri es of new problems for the 
community and in dOing this, they necessitate new 
relationships among its parts. Disasters force the 
development of a new structure which reflects the current 
involvement of various parts of the community which, in turn, 
can make decisions for the community. 
The scope and complexity of involvement in disaster 
undercuts the possibilities of centralizing authority to a 
much greater extent than those possibil ities exist even in 
the pre-disaster patterns of American communities. 
The [emerging] structure, therefore, reflects the social 
realities of the situation rather than an artificial creation 
based on unrealistic notions of controlling and commanding 
the situation. Authority has to be earned, not imposed, and 
those who wish to impose it will seldom earn it. It is 
earned by those whose performance shows that they deserve it 
and it seldom comes to those who just claim it (pp. 29-30). 
More recently, Kartez (1984) studied the response of 26 local 
governments after the 1980 ash eruption of Mount St. Helens. His 
observat ions about 1 oca 1 response also refl ect emergent or "adapti ve" 
relationships to deal with the emergency situation: 
In their immediate responses, virtually all 
jurisdictions relied on existing functional lines of 
organization in public works, safety, and management 
departments, rather than the county-wide emergency and civil 
defnse offices encouraged by state and federal programs. 
About hal f reported no use whatsoever of a countywide, 
multijurisdictional plan, which is the usual centerpiece for 
state and federally funded preparedness programs (p. 10). 
Since the traditional, institutional arrangements for use in emergencies 
were not used or were not useful, many local officials used "adaptive 
strategies" in responding to the disaster: 
Local governments learned their way into these 
strategies during the heat of emergency, however, through a 
process that compressed problem recognition, experimentation, 
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evaluation, and implementation into less than a week. The 
process took place outside the institutional context in which 
emergency planning is organized under state and federal 
mandates. The local process of compact learning can be 
interpreted as a strong 1 esson in the behavi or of 
institutions under stress. The result was a form of rapid 
social learning among local personnel who realized the 
limitations of such institutions and conseuently altered 
their own management behavior (p. 17). 
Address i ng the i ntergovernmenta 1 aspect of the observed responses 
to the ashfall in the communities, Kartez states: 
••• The observations made of the local response to the 
eruption of Mount St. Helens suggest that current 
intergovernmental programs for preparedness planning are 
encouraging a two-tier system of plans. The first tier 
consists of the federally mandated nuclear response plans, 
which support the countywide planning and coordination 
model. The second tier comprises local procedures that 
develop out of adaptation to each jurisdiction's experience, 
potentials, and constraints. The first tier embodies an 
administrative view of the world; the second a cognitive view 
based on social learning. Learning about workable techniques 
and organizational approaches took place on the second level 
(p. 17). 
The two studies above address the response and short-term recovery 
phases primaril y; however, in the long-term recovery process, the need 
for site-specific, adaptive planning strategies is at least equally 
strong. Our observations were that the recovery planning process is 
virtually all second-tier decision making. We noted two aspects of 
leadership: 1) the presence of leadership itself (and the importance of 
it), and 2) the exercise of leadership (what was done and what 
resul ted) • 
We observed that certain leadership characteristics facilitate 
recovery; among them are: 
1) flexible, creative styles of problem solving and 
decision making (i .e., styles that allow for ad hoc 
behavior rather than a "by-the-book" mentality); 
2) a vision of what the community could and should be like; 
3) an ability to attract and motivate competent assistants; 
and 
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4) strong links to other decision makers, both in the 
public and private sectors. 
The strong linkages usually result from frequent communication, 
networking, and constituency building. Effective local leaders use 
thei r networks of contacts; buil d support for preferred courses of 
action; and create linkages with county, state, and federal officials as 
well as with business persons and others who can assist with recovery. 
We also observed that leadership is not necessarily a quality that 
comes with an office or position. Leadershi p can be exerci sed by 
someone elected or appointed; by someone well-established or newly 
emergent; or by a mayor, a city manager, a consultant, a city council 
member, a concerned citizen, or a business person. Further, leadership 
is not an element that is always limited to one person per disaster; the 
leadership characteristics important to recovery can be found in several 
individuals, each having a different role or set of responsibilities. 
For exampl e, an effect i ve 1 oca I 1 eader will stay in close contact wi th 
major business and civic leaders and include them in the key committees 
or task forces that make recovery decisions. 
Another characteri st i c of capable 1 eadershi pis the abi 1 ity to 
forge new rel ati onshi ps--with other 1 oca 1 or county agenci es, wi th the 
state, with federal agenc i es, and wi th pri vate sector 1 eaders. For 
example, the part-time mayor of the small town of Cardington, Ohio, 
managed to create a strong tie wi th the state agenci es that was the 
bas is for a remarkable recovery in the small city devastated by a 
tornado. Similarly, leaders in the small city of CoaJinga--an 
independent, rural community--worked more closely and successfully with 
Fresno County offi c i al s duri ng the post-earthquake peri od than at any 
previous time. 
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In communities where recovery was observed to progress rapidly and 
competently, community leaders exhibited vision. That is to say, they 
had a concept not only of what thei r community was at the time of the 
disaster, but also of what it should and could be in the future. When 
major systems and numerous structures in a community have been 
destroyed, local leaders that have an idea of what the community will be 
can better set goals for recovery and speed it along. 
We use the term "vision" to describe the ability to look ahead, 
make long-range plans, and gain consensus on adopting and implementing 
those plans. According to Kiechel (1985, p. 127), "A good chief 
executive has the ability to cast his [herJ mind forward to encompass 
the next ten or more years." 
Another hallmark of effective local public leaders is that they 
tune into what const i tuents want, and nei ther overest imate nor 
underestimate the extent of the effort desired by the community. 
Finally, the effective leader turns adversity into opportunity. Some of 
the local 1 eaders we observed saw the di saster as an opportunity to 
implement plans that previously may have only been "pipe dreams." A 
disaster may provide an opportunity to those who are assertive and know 
where they want to go with their community's development. 
Ability to Act 
Admi n is t rat i ve capab i 1 ity , techn i ca 1 know 1 edge, and resources 
(material and financial) determine the ability to carry out recovery 
over the long term. While leadership provides direction and motivation, 
the three sorts of resources enable the work to be done. Administrative 
capability refers to competent local public administrators, a smoothly 
funct i oni ng admi ni strat i ve system, and adequate methods of monitori ng 
and record keepi ng. Technical knowledge involves land use controls, 
enabling legislation for needed authorities to manaye recovery 
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activities, mutual aid agreements, and urban development plans and 
maps. Tangible resources include grant money, money from local taxes, 
municipal supplies, and equipment. Administrative resources have to do 
with personnel and fi nanci al management, materi al resources, and record 
keepi ng and other documentat ion. Techni ca 1 resources i ncl ude phys i cal 
planning and mapping capability; geologic, hydrologic, and analysis 
capability; land use controls (zoning, building codes, construction 
standards, subdivision requirements); enabling legislation (emergency 
authorities); and technical aspects of emergency preparedness (emergency 
operating center). 
Less tangible and harder to measure is local public capacity, which 
is the broader term for ability to act at the local level. Many volumes 
have been written on this subject, although virtually no attention has 
been paid to emergency and disaster settings (cf. McGowan and Stevens, 
1983; Warren and Aronson, 1981; Mead, 1979). 
Some or all of the resources mentioned above exist at all levels of 
government; consequently, one task of local officials (preferably, prior 
to a disaster) is to position the resources they do have effectively. 
For example, there should be current inventories of supplies and 
equipment likely to be needed, lists of organizations with earth-moving 
equi pment and four-wheel dri ve vehi c 1 es, and good methods of keepi ng 
detailed records on the need for major capital projects and of 
documenting expense connected with works projects. In addition, 
municipal officials should be working to enact enabling legislation for 
declaring and coping with an emergency or disaster. After the disaster, 
they should be prepared to obtain and use resources available from 
external sources. For instance, it is possible to borrow, buy, or 
otherwise acquire a specific competence if it is not present in existing 
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personnel. The importance of identifying and using outside resources is 
addressed more in later chapters. 
Knowledge 
The final element in the model is knowledge of emergency management 
in general, and hazard-specific knowledge in particular. Recovery 
proceeds more smoothly when the local officials know in advance 
1) what federal and state programs exist for the benefit of 
public and private sector disaster victims; 
2) what external resources are available; 
3) how to apply for a Presidential Disaster Declaration; 
and 
4) how a community applies for grants. 
After a major disaster, local officials are usually barraged with 
demands for assistance and services from individuals, existing groups, 
and newly emergent groups. When many sets of demands coalesce, that 
coalition may generate enough force to achieve the action desired. On 
the other hand, competing forces can cancel each other out, moderate 
pressure for a wide array of actions may not provide enough impetus for 
one action. Finally, significant pressure for no action, e.g., no 
mitigative action on a barrier island slated for residential 
development, may result in a laissez-faire outcome (cf. Hawley and Wirt, 
1968; Wolensky, 1985). This then is the local context in which local 
leadership operates. 
Leadershi iJ, resources, and knowl edge can be i nfl uenced by 
community-based demands for action, and many outcomes are possible. 
Residents of different communities have varying expectatio~s and 
preferences and, therefore, differing standards of what is acceptable in 
terms of leadership or of administrative capability. For example, in 
Marin County, where the socioeconomic status is probably higher than in 
any of the other communities studied, local residents had very high 
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levels of expectation from their elected and administrative officials. 
They pay high taxes, and generally they expect high performance from 
their public officials. More importantly, they elect and appoint 
officials capable of meeting their standards. After the 1983 disaster 
in Marin County, citizen groups pressured the county not only for 
recovery actions, but for improved emergency preparedness. Federal and 
state offi ci a 1 sal so made thei r requi rements and recommendat ions known 
in the postdisaster period, particularly via the federal Interagency 
Hazard Mitigation Team process. However, what stood out in Marin was 
the well-articulated and consistent community-based pressures for action 
and improvements regarding emergency management. This appears to have 
contributed to the notable competence Marin County showed in its 
recovery efforts. 
infrequently. 
It is unfortunate that these conditions occur so 
Leaders can shape the recovery agenda, but their actions ultimately 
reflect some prevai ling or dominant point of view in the community. An 
effective local leader neither overstates nor underestimates the will of 
the community's citizens. Most importnt, he/she responds promptly and 
effectively to reasonable community requests. 
The knowledge of what to do during and after a major disaster can 
be gotten through experience, learned, or hired. Since the first year 
of our field studies, we have noticed that experience is 
disproportionately influential. We noted that prior experience with the 
same or simi 1 ar di saster agent usually means that 1 oca 1 capabil ity is 
higher; organizational arrangements and coordination are in place; and 
seasoned local leaders are familiar with the Presidential Disaster 
Declaration process and resulting activities. In addition, we found 
that prior disaster experience tends to lead to learning and to 
application of mitigation measures. The earlier experience(s) provided 
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opportunities for local official s to meet the key decision makers at 
other yovernmental levels, and such contacts became very useful the next 
time outside assistance was needed. However, it is also true that in 
the absence of experience, there are ample chances to learn about 
recovery. Additionally, local officials must realize that they can 
retain the services of people who have both experience and knowledge. 
Regard i ng the interact i on among the three el ements, several case-
specific examples will be provided in the following chapters. We think 
that strong leadership contributes to a high level of available 
resources because strong 1 eaders work to get such resources. We also 
think that "knowledge" acquired prior to a disaster may encourage a 
community to upgrade its resources. Finally, strong leadership makes 
the acquisition of hazard-specific knowledge relatively easy because the 
important links to the proper external agents and essential 
organizations have already been established. As depicted in the 
framework, these dynamics pertain to communities of all sizes, and hold 
true for different disaster agents. 
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CHAPTER III 
HOW THE RECOVERY ACTUALLY HAPPENS* 
This Chapter explains how the elements and forces depicted in the 
recovery framework in Fi gure II I -1 interact to produce an outcome. 
Using specific community examples, the key elements identified in the 
previ ous Chapter wi 11 be e 1 uci dated and expanded. In addition, the 
tradeoffs made during the recovery period to implement major mitigation 
measures will be discussed. 
It may be, as some recent research has reported, that communi ty 
1 eve 1 recovery per se is vi rtua 11 y a gi ven, except after the most 
catastrophic of events (see Friesema et al., 1979; Wright et al., 
1979). Even so, the speed and qual ity of recovery for communities are 
maj or pol icy issues. To improve the speed and quality of recovery, 
1 oca 1 offi ci a 1 s must fi nd ways to 1) compete for scarce resources, 2) 
ensure more productive intergovernmental relationships in postdisaster 
recovery, and 3) better manage community-level decision making. With 
the diminishing level of external assistance that can be provided to any 
disaster-stricken community, a number of local officials in cases we 
studied systematically developed and exercised strategic choices to 
produce expeditious recovery and promote long-term mitigation (cf. 
Friend and Jessup, 1969; Mikulecky, 1980). 
The characteristics and actions found in the recovery processes of 
the 14 study jurisdictions have been organized around the three 
community elements described in Chapter II--leadership, ability to act, 
and knowledge. Those elements are affected by contextual factors, most 
*Some of the material in thi s chapter was incl uded in "Disaster 
Recovery and Hazard Mitigation: Bridging the Intergovernmental Gap." 
Claire B. Rubin and Daniel G. Barbee. Public Administration Review, 
December, 1984. 
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FIGURE IlI-l 
STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR GUIDING LOCAL RECOVERY 
Locally Driven Choices and 
Cha rac teri s ti cs 
A. Personal Leadershi p 
l~ 
J, 1\ 
1.l B. Abil ity to Act r 
C. Knowl edge of 
What To Do 
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Recovery and Mitigation 
Proportions and Outcomes 
notably state and federal influences and requirements, which are beyond 
local control for the most part. However, an emerging set of locally 
determi ned strategi c choi ces can gui de 1 oca 1 recovery (see Petak and 
Atkisson, 1(82). 
It should be noted that the presence of each of the three elements 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for recovery. Over the past 
four years, we have observed that these three elements collectively 
contribute positively to recovery. We have not been able to discern a 
determi ni st i c model, but it is apparent that varyi ng degrees of element 
presence leads to differential outcomes. We can state with some 
certainty that if element (A) is in place, there is a predisposition to 
exert pressure on element (B) which, in turn, leads to the acquisition 
of element (C). 
Personal Leadership 
An effective recovery results from local officials' abilities to 
uphold community values, and protect or expand the community's economic 
base. Upholding community values in the postdisaster setting was 
observed to be a difficult task. For example, in Coalinga during the 
recovery period there was a split between two politically active 
factions, each holding to and advocating a different ima~e of the 
Commun ity' s future. One fact i on was prochange, the other favored the 
status quo (see Petak and Atkisson, 1982; National Science Foundation, 
1980) • Unt i 1 a preva i 1 i ng agenda for the commun i ty emerged, both the 
quality and the speed of recovery were affected. Prior to the disaster 
the community lacked a set of agreed-upon goals, a comprehensive 
redevelopment plan, and adequate land use and building code ordinances, 
so the needs for these and other planning and development tools 
contributed to delays in the recovery process. 
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In several other cases, officials quickly assessed the community's 
va 1 ues and found ways to develop organi zati ons to advocate them or 
procedures to protect them. In Fort Wayne, a policy-level neighborhood 
advocacy unit was launched as part of the recovery effort almost before 
the flood waters subsided. The admi ni strati on of external pri vate 
assistance and some federal assistance for individuals was coordinated 
with the nei ghborhood servi ce unit. Thi s coordi nati on accel erated the 
distribution of assistance and made the local government appear more 
responsive to its citizens' needs. The same community quickly undertook 
a major recovery planning initiative, which representatives of other 
1 eve 1 s of government were compelled to consider. The result was an 
increased role for the community offi ci a 1 sin i ntergovernmenta 1 
coordination of the recovery process. More than half of the communities 
we studied or~anized less ambitious but similar ad hoc organizations; 
the effects of all were to increase the local influence over recovery, 
make it more consistent with community values, and expedite recoveries. 
Protecting the community's economic base is a major reason to act 
quickly if the base is threatened (see Foster, 1980; sutphen, 1983). 
Di saster recovery and economi c development activities have many 
parallels, but when community policy makers explicitly decide to 
integrate the two, the situation becomes complex. Exampl es with a 
positive outcome include Fort Wayne and Estes Park; one with a negative 
outcome (development with no disaster mitigation involved) was Corpus 
Christi. 
We found that communities with 1 eaders that have a vi s i on of the 
communi ty' s 1 ony- ran~e economi c development can be expected to fare 
better during recovery. Such communities usually have set goals and 
achieved consensus for them, made plans for modernization and change, 
have a network of interested persons, and have taken such prel imi nary 
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steps as formi ng an urban renewal authority. I n contrast, communities 
recover more slowly that are in a slow growth or declining phase of 
thei r ·1 ife cycl e wi thout action plans for development. 
In Salt Lake City, Fort Wayne, and Estes Park, the speed of 
recovery, and to a lesser degree its quality, was enhanced by the local 
~overnment's efforts to be responsive to businesses and to protect the 
existing economic base. 
professional to assist 
Fort Wayne hired an industrial development 
in attracting new businesses. Estes Park 
responded promptly and favorably to a private business group interested 
in promoting and developing the economic base of the area; an urban 
renewa 1 authority was qui ck ly created to 1 ead the revita 1 i zat i on of the 
central business district. 
Another important fi nd i ng from the case stud i es is that 1 oca 1 
officials knowledgeable not only about disaster assistance programs, but 
also major community and economic development programs have more 
strategi copt ions and are thus more able to obtai n i ntergovernmenta 1 
assistance. 
The 
reflects 
development 
the local 
Ability to Act 
and use of a strategic 
government's ability to 
approach to recovery 
act. Several of the 
communities studied rate very low in the categories of technical 
capability, resources, and organizational flexibility and 
adaptiveness. In the small mountain community of Grundy, where the 
local economy is based on coal mining, the combination of a lack of 
local technical knowledge and resources, lack of flexibility (for 
undertaking nonstructural mitigation), and a history of chronic flooding 
1 imi ted the town's abi 1 i ty to act to change thi ngs. The town's effort 
to obta in techni ca 1 capabil i ty and other resources needed to recover 
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from its 1 atest di saster was nei ther expedit i ous nor hi gh in quality. 
Now this town is very dependent on externally supplied technical 
ass i stance and resources. When it has another maj or fl ood, it can be 
expected to recover even more slowly and painfully than was true the 
1 ast time. 
In contrast, the city of Fort Wayne displayed a significantly 
greater ability and willingness to act and to utilize all technical 
capabilities and local resources following its last major flood. For 
instance, the city was able to assess the federal assistance available 
to it, and then effectively assign top-level policy and technical 
personne 1 • Fl exi bil ity, adapt i veness, and c reat i ve 1 eadershi p were key 
characteristics of Fort Wayne's recovery efforts. In addition, the city 
created its own local equivalent of the federal Coordinating Officer and 
federa 1 I nteragency Hazard Mit i gat i on Team. The strategi c choi ces made 
by local officials greatly enhanced the coordination among governmental 
officials and substantially shortened Fort Wayne's recovery period. 
The other dozen cases fall between these two, with the abi 1 ity to 
act generally conforming to the level of technical and administrative 
competence of the local government and resources available during normal 
times. In a few cases, such as Cardington, Ohio, it appears that a 
strategic political choice to develop a strong local-state relationship 
made up for relatively low local ability to act. We suspect that in 
places like Cardington, where an unusual set of ad hoc actions lead to 
reasonably effective recovery following one disaster, there may not be 
the same positive outcome after another disaster. 
Knowledge of What To Do 
In the 14 cases studied, local and other leaders varied widely in 
their disaster experience and knowledge. Generally, experience affects 
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strategic choices in two ways. First, experienced local officials tend 
to be more adept at short-term recovery management and the related 
administrative tasks such as documenting damages and disaster-related 
1 oca 1 expend i tures. In cases of ch roni c and frequent fl ood i ng, for 
examp 1 e, admi ni strat i ve arrangements were read il y changed to meet the 
specific needs of short-term recovery. 
Second, the case studies show that experience may expedite recovery 
from a second disaster caused by the same agent. However, frequent 
experi ence with only one disaster agent may reduce the community's 
willingness to develop longer-term recovery strategies that include 
relatively new or innovative mitigation efforts. Externally developed 
policies and programs, such as the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) and the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Teams, may expand or 
improve mit i gat ion choi ces. Nevertheless, s i yni fi cant in many of the 
locations we studied was the strength of economic interests working 
against certain types of mitigation efforts, frequently nonstructural 
flood hazard mitigation measures. 
The strategic importance of local official s' access to and 
utilization of recovery and mitigation information is demonstrated in 
several of the cases. Following the flood in Estes Park, the community 
hi red a former FEMA offi cia 1 as its Di saster Recovery Manager, thereby 
obtaining a wealth of information and knowledge about recovery and 
mitigation assistance sources. In Paris, Texas, following a devastating 
tornado, i mmedi ate recovery i nformat i on came from offi cia 1 s of Wi chita 
Fa 11 s, who had recent tornado recovery experi ence. One of the maj or 
instrumentalities of the recovery effort, Interfaith, Inc., was 
recommended by a Wichita Falls representative. 
Long-term recovery and mitigation information often is provided by 
the Hazard Mitigation Teams, other organizations such as county or state 
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offi ci a 1 s, and i nd i vi dual s such as a consul tant or contractor. Fort 
Wayne was able to obtin needed information by hiring an experienced 
professional grant writer. While there are advantages to having local 
public staffers with disaster recovery and mitigation knowledge, the 
lack of in-house experience and information can be offset by use of 
outside experts. 
Pol itical awareness and astuteness are factors that proved 
difficult to identify and isolate, but they may be the most critical 
ones for local officials. In those communities where the strategic 
choices were more acceptable to the various community interests, it was 
because the recovery/mitigation tradeoffs, costs, and benefits had been 
made known to citizens and bus i ness owners at the begi nni ng of the 
recovery effort. In addition, local public leaders displayed political 
savvy in presenting and implementing the options selected by the 
community. 
In Fort Wayne, a political choice was made to identify the 
mitigation and recovery values; they were included in the 14-item list 
of options. Expl icit consideration of the di fferent options gave Fort 
Wayne officials added leverage in negotiations with state and federal 
officials for recovery and mitigation assistance. 
Officials in Salt Lake City took a calculated chance when they used 
city streets as flood channels to avert damage to downtown commercial 
and other st ructures duri ny the heavy snowmelt and fl oodi ng in the 
spring of 1983. They estimate that by using streets as canals about 
$100 million in damages to private property were avoided. This 
strategic choice--which was carefully weighed by local officials--
accelerated recovery and clearly protected community economic values. 
As in Fort Wayne, Salt Lake City officials made strategic choices 
regarding the balancing of recovery and mitigation investments. These 
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cases suggest that in most postdisaster settings, both types of 
investments wi 11 be made; however, the tradeoffs between recovery from 
the present di saster and protect i ng the communi ty from the next event 
are important to consider. 
is politically important, 
choice--one that enhances 
The strategic determination of the tradeoff 
but we thi nk quite rare. To make thi s 
the long-term future security of the 
community--requires astute political and administrative leadership. The 
study of communities that recovered most expeditiously suggests that the 
commitment to mitigation is a sound one, particularly for communities 
chronically at risk. 
Guiding recovery the basis of a future image of the community 
rather than simply of near-term expediency appears to produce better 
long-term results. That it also appears to be politically costly for 
local leaders suggests that local leaders need help in guiding community 
recovery and mitigation, and a careful examination of state and federal 
policies and programs is warranted in order to be sure they help, not 
hi nder, effect i ve 1 oca 1 recovery. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO EFFECTIVE RECOVERY 
After our observations of the lessons the communities learned the 
hard way, it is possible to offer some "actionable propositions" to 
local public officials who have not (yet) had first-hand experience with 
a major disaster. Using the three key elements in the model presented 
earlier in Figure 11-1 as categories, we cast our findings in the form 
of what we hope are useful pointers. 
Most important for readers with responsibility 
management is to understand the controllable and 
for emergency 
non-controllable 
factors in disaster recovery. In Figure 11-1 there are three components 
that local officials can do something about: personal leadership, 
ability to act, and knowledge. The dynamic forces (the state, local and 
federal demands for acti on) are the contextual factors over whi ch one 
usually cannot exert direct control. However, some forces are 
predictable, as for example, the federal requirements attendant with a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration. They are, for the most part, the 
same for all communities and do not change over the course of the 
recovery peri od. 
In this chapter, we will describe each of the major elements needed 
for recovery, report on our findings after visiting 14 recovering 
communit i es, and note as propos it ions what we have di scerned from the 
actual disaster experiences of comunities and their leaders. 
Personal Leadership 
As we noted earlier, certain characteristics of good leadership 
facilitate recovery, for instance, flexible, creative styles of problem-
solving and decision making. The style that allows for ad hoc behavior 
(also known as adaptive behavior or emergent leadership), as contrasted 
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with a "by the book" mentality, is more effective in managing the 
. recovery process. 
Leadership Proposition #1 
Decide soon after a major disaster what you want to do and 
who you want to participate in the planning and 
implementation of the recovery. 
Loca 1 pub 1 i c offi cia 1 s who were clear about how they wanted to 
recover, who they wanted to hel p pl an and impl ement the recovery, and 
what mitigation measures they preferred to adapt during the recovery, 
fared best. The Chief Administrative Officer or his designee assumed a 
strong leadership role during the recovery in Marin County, Phoenix, and 
Estes Park; similarly, the Chief Executive Officer assumed a lead 
position in Salt Lake City, Fort Wayne, and Cardington. In all of those 
places, recovery was relatively expeditious. 
Some of the recoveri ng communities observed woul d have benefited 
from making the aforementioned decisions early in the recovery period 
and then acting upon them. Among those that did not decide what to do 
or organize as promptly as they might have were Hull, Scituate, and 
Coalinga. 
Soon after the disaster, determine if you and existing local staff 
have the requisite skills and the time to deal with federal officials 
and public assistance program requirements. Keep in mi nd that many 
routine activities must be continued during the recovery period. If the 
necessary skills and staff time are not available, move quickly to 
acqui re assi stance. Some advi ce follows based on the experi ence of 
severa 1 recoveri ng commun it i es: 
• You may be able to use the staff at another 1 eve 1 of 
government. Cardington, Ohio, a small town devastated by 
a tornado, was able to get considerable assistance from 
the State Office of Economic Development • 
• You may want to hire an outside consultant. Estes Park, a 
resort town struck by a huge flood during the peak of its 
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tourist season, hired an experienced person, a former FEMA 
official, to be the local disaster recovery manager. 
• You may want to revise the scope of work for an existing 
consultant. In Fort Wayne, Indiana, the mayor used a 
consultant who had disaster recovery experience but was on 
board for another project, reassigning him to flood 
recovery planning. 
It has been noted by many researchers that after a major disaster, 
local government is confronted with a tremendous overload of decision 
making and administrative work. The demands for local public leadership 
usually far outstrip the number of persons and capabilities available. 
It is essential to perform a prompt, realistic assessment of capacity 
and, if it is necessary to augment it, move quickly to do so. 
Leadership Proposition #2 
Since the quality of intergovernmental relations is of 
paramount importance to effi ci ent recovery, it is necessary 
to attend to the many intergovernmental activities entailed 
in recovery promptly and efficiently after a major disaster. 
The intergovernmental process is one that must be understood and 
appreciated by local leadership early in the postdisaster period, and 
then implemented by both executive and administrative staff. In 
essence, both 1 eadershi p and abil ity to act are i nvol ved. A 1 oca 1 
government's relation with state and federal emergency management 
official s tends to be fraught with tension and friction after a major 
catastrophe. Emotions run high, and reason does not always prevail when 
local public officials are highly stressed. 
The ability to understand and comply with the rules, procedures, 
and documentation required under a Presidential Disaster Declaration is 
a rare talent. Usually few personli at the local level have the talent, 
but both federal and state offi cia 1 s have more experi ence with the 
intricacies of this special arena of public administration. Maintaining 
federally acceptable records and managing the cash flow in the municipal 
budget can facilitate a community's recovery. 
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In the localities that recovered most successfully, local officials 
began immediately after the disaster to work closely with their governor 
and congress i ona 1 representat i ve, as well as with state and federal 
emergency management officials. A comprehensive approach, involving all 
levels of government, worked best. It is difficult to think about long-
term recovery while response activities are still going on, but it is 
essent i alto do so. Effective execut i on of i ntergovernmenta 1 programs 
during the recovery period was especially high in Estes Park, Marin 
County, Phoenix, and Cardington. In the smaller communities of Coalinga 
and Cardington, the county and state, respectively, served as important 
allies and intermediaries that assisted municipalities in their dealings 
with higher levels of government. 
Lack of an effective intergovernmental process slowed down the 
recovery process in Hull and Santa Cruz County. Initially, Santa Cruz 
County's recovery was troubled by intergovernmental problems, which 
included city/county problems as well as protracted county/federal 
disagreements. Santa Cruz County had, however, showed significant 
progress on many fronts when the team visited the second time, more than 
two years after the disaster. 
Leadership Proposition #3 
If you view a heavily damaged area as a site for "instant 
urban renewal," a broader perspective and a wider array of 
reconstruction options will be maintained during the recovery 
planning process. 
In an area newly cleared of existing structures, there may be 
opportunities to change land uses or to rebuild safer higher quality 
structures. In Estes Park, Colorado, shortly after the flood, a local 
business organization succeeded in enacting a long-simmering plan for a 
local urban renewal authority. That authori ty was i nvo 1 ved in the 
recovery decision making for the badly damaged central business 
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di stri ct. Consequently, the busi ness di stri ct reconstruction had a 
longer-term frame of reference and included several mit i gati on 
measures. Similarly, in Coalinga, a redevelopment agency was instituted 
to help restore the downtown area. When asked about pl ans for the 
redevelopment of the downtown area, the city manager commented: 
Well, fortunately, I have been here so long that I have 
many times thought about how we coul d redevelop. Actually, 
no matter what I thi nk, unless the property owners and the 
merchants and land-owners can sort out what could be 
done.[sic] I have often thought that when you are developing 
somethi ng, the fi rst techni que is to fi nd as many 
a lternati ves as you can, then you start di scardi ng 
(California Seismic Safety Commission, 1983). 
However, if the local public leaders linger too long over a "grand 
plan," some property owners may make their own decisions and rebuild as 
they please. After a disastrous tornado struck Xenia, Ohio, in 1974, 
lengthy discussions and elaborate plans for renewal of the central 
business district ultimately contributed to the failure of the proposed 
urban renewal plan. In Cardington, the lengthy planning process for a 
revitalized business center took longer than most business owners cared 
to wait. They proceeded to rebuil d without wait i ng for the pl an to be 
fi ni shed. 
Tremendous pressures are at work locally to restore everything 
quickly to its condition before the disaster. However, few 
neighborhoods are perfect, and settlement patterns, siting of commercial 
establishments, and road systems usually can be more efficient, or 
simply better. Further, to allow existing land uses and structures to 
"snap back" exactly as they were before the disaster may leave them 
equally vulnerable to the same or other hazards in the future. 
Community betterment shoul d be factored into the recovery process, but 
betterment plans must be decided upon quickly. 
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In reviewing the 14 recovering communities, it is difficult to 
'generalize about how they approached reconstruction because not all of 
the communities suffered high impact in one small area or in one sector 
(for example, commercial). In Marin County, the land- and mudslides 
were scattered widely in a large geographic area. Those communities in 
which the brunt of the damage was in the central business district 
(Coalinga, Cardington, Estes Park) had a focal point for recovery 
planning. Each of those places also sustained scattered residential 
damage, but one sector was the primary focus. 
A broader approach than just "put it back" was used in Estes Park, 
Phoenix, Coalinga, Fort Wayne, and Salt Lake City. Other communities 
either did not make any changes or preferred the laissez-faire 
approach. In Corpus Christi, for example, few opportunities to mitigate 
agai nst future hurri cane damage were taken in either North Beach or 
Padre Island. 
Leadership Proposition #4 
At the cOlllRunity level, V1Slon of what the cOIIIRunity could 
and should be after the disaster is an important attribute of 
effective leadership. 
Whenever the top elected or appointed local officials (or private 
sector leaders willing to accept public office) exhibited foresight 
about the future of the community, goal-setting and progress toward 
those goals were facilitated. Relatively few local leaders were able to 
combine the abi 1 ity to assess the community's val ues and desi res with 
their own foresight to provide effective leadership during the recovery 
period. Yet several dramatic examples were noted, e.g., the mayors of 
Salt Lake City, Cardington, and Fort Wayne. 
Leadership Proposition #5 
When strong, capable leadership is present, it increases the 
likelihood of getting more resources for repairing the 
damaged systems and structures in the cOlllRunity. 
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Municipalities or counties that are well managed in normal times, 
such as Marin County, Phoenix, and Estes Park, are more likely than not 
to rise to the special demands of disaster recovery. Places that were 
struggling or muddling along (such as Hull) were very much at a 
di sadvantage when they had to cope wi th massi ve demands for servi ces, 
funds, and other resources. Further, when strong leadership is present, 
a communi ty is more 1 i ke 1 y to have adequate emergency management and 
disaster specific knowledge. 
Abil ity to Act 
Management capacity is a dynamic process; we are referring to it as 
ability to act. 
Ability to Act Proposition #1 
The resources of the federal government are cri t i ca 1 to a 
successful recovery after a major natural disaster. 
In most cases of successful recovery, the state or federal 
government played an essential role in marshalling the resources 
necessary for 1 oca 1 recovery. Such resources are usually managed at the 
local level but they originate elsewhere. While it is useful to have 
state assistance, it is not essential to local recovery. However, no 
local government by itsel f has been able to make an expeditious and 
effective recovery from a major natural disaster. 
Three communities stand out in thei r abil ity to obtain and util i ze 
federal assistance: Estes Park, Grundy, and Fort Wayne. Marin County 
also was effective in seeking and obtaining federal assistance. It is 
i nteresti ng to note that the three top achi evers here are re 1 at i ve ly 
small communities. Only one place of the 14 studied--Cardington, Ohio--
had a very close and highly productive relationship with the state. Two 
other communities, Phoenix and Salt Lake City, worked compatibly with 
the state officials in overcoming one or more major local problems. A 
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few communities viewed the state only as an additional layer of 
-bureaucracy to go through. 
Ability to Act Proposition #2 
While some dependence on external resources is to be expected 
after a disaster, a heavy dependency on external resources 
(financial as well as specialized personnel) can cause a loss 
of local control and long delays. 
Small to medium-size communities that have sustained a high ratio 
of damage to existing structures and systems are most likely to become 
dependent on state and federal resources. However, by effectively 
asserting local leadership and organizing its administrative capability, 
a small community can maximi ze its control over its recovery and its 
future. 
Ability to Act Proposition #3 
local administrative and technical mechanisms, as well as 
resources, available before the disaster usually contribute 
significantly to an expeditious recovery effort. 
Examples administrative mechanisms include land use controls; 
building codes, inspection and enforcement procedures; mutual aid pacts; 
and standard contracting a~reements. Technical mechanisms include maps, 
and known zones of hi gh hazards (for exampl e, fl ood, 1 andsl i de, storm 
surge). In other words, a certain amount of general administrative and 
organizational preparedness will be of use even if a totally unexpected 
di saster shoul d occur. I f a northeastern United States community were 
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to be hit by a tornado, a relatively rare event for that locale, the 
availability of good local maps would aid in siting temporary housing in 
areas not subject to flooding or other hazards, in addition to being 
useful for the pri mary purpose of pl anni ng redevelopment. In Marin 
County, emergency exercises were oriented to an earthquake, thought to 
be the most likely event, but that preparedness paid off for a series of 
flood-induced mudslides and landslides. 
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Ability to Act Proposition #4 
There is great need for careful documentation of all 
disaster-related expenses and management of records regarding 
local damages and expenditures that are disaster-related. 
Keep receipts and records for all disaster-related expenses. Keep 
photographi c and other records of damaged publ i c infrastructure. A 
subsequent di saster may "change the 1 andscape," maki ng evi dence of an 
eligible project a thing of the past. Damage Survey Reports (DSRs) are 
usually a major bone of contention between local and federal 
officials. In short, good records are required by the federal agencies, 
and those records ultimately are the basis for obtaining money for 
recovery projects and programs. 
Ability to Act Proposition #5 
Administrative staff can call emergency management issues and 
needs to the attention of local public leaders. 
Marin County offers an interesting example of staff contributions 
to the county's ability to act: an active, aggressive county emergency 
manayement director initiated preparedness planning and regular 
exercises; he received support and reinforcement for these activities 
from the county manayer; and together they led the way for the county to 
acquire knowledge and capability for response and recovery. 
Ability to Act Proposition #6 
Although a city and a county may each possess emergency 
management capability. unless,they have worked out effective 
coordination with each other. they may not be able to respond 
to and recover from a widespread disaster. 
In 1983, the weakness in county emergency management capability and 
the lack of city/county coordination in Salt Lake City and County were 
problems. They were overcome to some extent during the flood-fighting 
period by ad hoc response and recovery actions. Our research team 
observed that a more permanent organizational arrangement would be 
needed for the anticipated snow melt and runoff expected in the spring 
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of 1984 and in subsequent years. In fact, closer coordination was 
worked out in early 1984, and the flood fight in the late spring of 1984 
went much smoother than it had the year before. 
When Santa Cruz County experi enced a seri es of f1 oods, mass i ve 
landslides and mudslides in 1982, the county emergency management 
oryanization was not prepared. It had not established plans for 
coordination with its municipal counterparts in the event of a 
d i aster. In the subsequent two years, however, the county government 
took many steps to improve not only emergency communications with its 
municipalities and its citizens, but also its ability to control land 
uses and its preparedness. 
Knowledge of What to Do 
This refers to knowledge about emergency management in general, and 
about the specific hazard or disaster agent in particular. Emergency 
management encompasses planning, training, and coordination 
activities. Some hazard-specific knowledge and skills are hazard 
analysis, information gathering, and mitigation and preparedness. Such 
knowledge can be acquired by experience, from education or training, or 
by hiring a knowledgeable person. 
Knowledge Proposition #1 
Local officials in communities with known hazards, or ones at 
chronic risk, should determine before a disaster what 
procedures. requi rements. and benefits are conta i ned in the 
state and federal di saster assi stance programs for response 
and recovery. 
Predisaster information available about the Presidential, Disaster 
Dec1 arat i on process, what it entail s and what it provi des, 1 eaves a 
great deal of room for improvement. Among the areas of greatest 
misunderstanding in localities that have been hit by major disasters are 
current and detailed knowledge of the Small Business Administration's 
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programs, and FEMA's assistance programs, particularly the Public 
Ass i stance Program whi ch requi res a 25% 1 oca 1 match for the repai rand 
restoration of public facilities. 
Communit i es that were very well informed were Mari n County, Estes 
Park, Phoenix, and Grundy. Two communities that seemed to have fared 
poorly in this regard were Cardington and Hull. Those communities where 
local officials commented "We'd never heard of FEMA before this disaster 
occurred" (Salt Lake City and Coal i nga) had a slower rate of recovery. 
All other communities studied fell in the middle or average range. 
Knowledge Proposition #2 
In addition to identifying sources of assistance. it is 
essential to request assistance and resources with as much 
specificity as possible. 
In the 20-county declaration of 1982 in California, Marin County 
requested and received help from the National Guard, but Santa Cruz 
County did not. After the snow melt in 1983 caused massive landslides 
along the Wasatch Front in Utah, the State Geologist's Office requested 
and received on-site assistance from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
with mapping and other activities. USGS provided several forms of 
assistance to the state for more than a year after the disaster. 
You must know who to ask, what to ask for, and under what 
authorities the federal agencies may provide assi stance, services, and 
personnel. Officials in the communities most Skilled at this technique 
relied on professional networking and personal contacts at previous 
places of employment. 
Knowledge Proposition #3 
There is a need for realistic preparedness plans for all 
phases of a di saster. Such plans must be broad. fl exi b 1 e, 
and workable. 
Many communities (Coalinga, Cardington) had a disaster that 
differed substantially from anything conceived of in their preparedness 
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P I an, so they chose not to use the pI an. Othe rs had a complete 1 y 
unexpected disaster (Marin County expected seismic activity along the 
San Andreas Fault instead of floods and muslides), but they used their 
preparedness plan. In Paris, Texas, there was no plan about how to deal 
with federally supplied temporary housing (trailers), so there were 
protracted difficulties in establishing acceptable temporary housing, 
and this in turn led to added anxieties for displaced residents during 
the recovery from a tornado. 
It is essential to get beyond a "paper plan" and to strengthen the 
community's preparedness. Informed, rehearsed offi cia I s and a useful 
set of guidance documents for use in an emergency are the goals, not a 
thick binder prepared mainly to fulfill a requirement but never before 
read by anyone. 
General Observations 
• The local perspective differs, often significantly, from that 
of county, state and federal officials. On occasion, there may even be 
wide variances in city and county perspectives; this was true in 
Coalinga due to the large geographic area involved, the city's relative 
isolation, and its economic base. It is important that researchers and 
persons providing assistance to disaster-stricken communities understand 
and respect local values, priorities, and preferences, even when monies 
are being provided by other levels of government. 
• That their community should and will recover is almost always 
the opinion of local officials and residents. Officials at higher 
levels of government may question whether the community should rebuild 
as it was or where it was. There are at least two explanations for this 
divergence. One is that local pride, vested interests, and investment 
may lead to an unquestioning desire to rebuild. A second possibility 
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for the divergence of views is that local officials and leaders may lack 
the objectivity and disaster experience to ascertain correctly the 
wisdom and safety of rebuilding as is. Since state and federal 
officials usually have more disaster experience, their perspective on 
rebuilding may be more objective. 
Coalinga provides an example of community in which the local people 
never seriously considered not rebuildiny their city, but public 
officials at higher levels of government and some disaster researchers 
did. Experts agreed that if the city rebuilt according to seismic-
resistant building code, the new structures could be expected to 
withstand future earthquakes. 
While we did not observe a community in which a clear and imminent 
danger persisted, the city of Valdez, Alaska, is an example of local 
decision making having to be countermanded. After the Alaska earthquake 
of 1964, federal officials ascertained that the coastal city of Valdez 
would be at chronic risk from future tsunamis (seismic sea waves), as 
well as from earthquakes. The community was forced to relocate by 
federal disaster officials, because they refused to contribute any 
disaster assistance funds to rebuilding structures on land known to be 
at continuing high risk. The entire small town was relocated to a new 
site several miles away from the original one. 
• Small towns often are not understood by researchers and public 
administrators who come from large, urban areas. These outsiders tend 
to underestimate the independence, tenacity, and abil ity of small town 
officials and citizens to cope. We observed more than once the 
unexpected capability and the resources of small towns. 
• Factual errors frequently appear in postdisaster reports. 
Soon after a maj or disaster, teams of researchers and offi cia 1 s from 
various levels of government go on-site to ascertain needs and document 
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problems. Most of these groups prepare and circulate their reports. We 
not iced that many reports by state agencies, resea rchers, and others 
that were prepared within the first few weeks or months after a disaster 
often had errors that never got corrected in later reports. However, 
many times first impressions are wrong impressions. We learned this 
lesson after we visited Santa Cruz County for a second time; many 
mitigation and recovery decisions had taken a long time, but eventually 
ones were made. 
We suspect that the erroneous information in the early status 
reports is 1 ess harmful to the munici pal ity than it is to out-of-town 
researchers and public officials, who may rely on those secondary 
sources. Nevertheless, communities sometimes get "type cast" wrongly 
early in the recovery process, and then that image is perpetuated. 
• We think the earthquake recovery process is slower than 
recovery from most other natura I di sasters. The reasons are that the 
relative infrequency causes lack of experience and knowledge about 
active seismic hazards, that less insurance coverage is likely to be in 
place for an earthquake than is true of a water-related disaster, and 
that there are added anxieties and delays in rebuilding because of 
aftershocks. 
• One of the difficulties of engaging in qualitative and 
behavioral analysis is that it is subject to errors or variations. Some 
of these errors or variations are factual, whi Ie others are 
perceptual. With the passage of time, perceptions change, recollections 
may change, and first impressions may prove to be wrong impressions. 
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CHAPTER V 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
• There is a need for greater understanding of how the 
dynamics of recovery differ in NFIP and non-NFIP 
conmunities. 
The recovery and postdisaster mitigation processes in flood-related 
di sasters are different from those in other di sasters because of the 
requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) on the 
community, the availability of flood insurnce, and the presence and 
i nfl uence of the federal Hazard Mit i gat i on Team (HMT). While we 
observed positive results from the efforts of the Hazard Mitigation Team 
process, no systematic eva 1 uat i on of the impcat of the HMTs has been 
completed to date. We have been told that the recovery process may be 
slower in communities that participate in the NFIP since program 
requirements tend to complicate and delay recovery decisions and 
fed~ral/local payments. We were not in a position in our study to 
follow up on this issue. Of the 14 communities we selected to study, 11 
had water-related disasters, but all 11 were NFIP participants so our 
sample of non-NFIP recoveries was too small to allow us to look for 
differences between the two groups. 
• More attention and more funds should be provided for 
recovery and less for response and immediate relief. 
In his study of family recovery after a disaster, Bolin (1982) 
stated: 
If reduced federal expenditures were a goal, our 
research suggests that emergency period services might be cut 
and an increasing emphasis placed on low interest loans, 
insurance and long-term support servi ces. Gi ven the 
atmosphere of the emergency peri od and that soc i a 1 support 
and altruism are prevalent values, cuts in federal aid might 
be 1 ess apparent than when the • • • recovery phases are 
underway. This is ••• based ••• on the value position 
that federal facil itation of long-term family recovery is 
desirable. 
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Bolin also recommended that "a strong federal role in post-disaster 
recovery should be maintained as the most effective way of maintaining 
reasonab 1 e 1 eve 1 s of equi ty in vi ct im access to recovery programs." 
Finally, he stated "There should be an increased emphasis on post-
emergency and program information dissemination" (1982, p. 259). 
Our own research suggests that far more attention should be paid to 
the recovery process, i ncl udi ng the extent to whi ch fundamental changes 
(such as in land use patterns or in building standards) are made and 
mitigation measures incorporated during that time period. 
• State and federal programs, regulations, and funding 
practi ces shoul d be reviewed and improved to facil Hate 
1 oca 1 recovery. 
Greater flexibility should be allowed by federal and state 
governments for local organizational arrangements. A more streamlined 
process for local officials to obtain economic and recovery planning 
assistance from other levels of government is needed. 
All levels of government should work on helping local governments 
know more precisely what is involved after obtaining a Presidential 
Disaster Declaration. More information about the declaration process 
should be made available before a major disaster occurs. These should 
be efforts to reduce the aspects of intergovernmental rel ations that 
contribute to the adversarial aspects of that relationship in the 
postdisaster setting. 
• No noticeable pattern of progress 
respect to the recovery process 
communities across the U.S. 
is discernable with 
as it goes on in 
One might assume that with each successive disaster and subsequent 
recovery, the experience and insights gained by officials at all levels 
of government woul d cont ri bute to more effi c i ent recoveri es in 
subsequent disasters. Unfortunately, there was little evidence to 
suggest that the lessons learned are being transferred from practitioner 
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to pract it i oner, or from researcher to pract it i oner. The exchange of 
information among the relatively few persons engaged in recovery 
research did appear to be coordinated. 
As the 1 ead federal agency, FEMA shoul d revi ew its experi ences in 
disaster-stricken areas, and work toward providing education and 
training for FEMA staff and other public officials. The federal 
coordinating officers are a rich resource for such an evaluation 
process. 
• Greater attention needs to be paid to the interactions and 
tradeoffs that go on between expeditious recovery and 
mitigation. 
Rubin and Barbee (1984) opened the debate on this topic in a recent 
journal article, but it warrants further attention. 
• Some additional areas that deserve closer attention in 
future studies are: 
1) city/county relationships (not only relationships 
among emergency management organizations, but general 
public management as well); 
2) the interaction of local public leaders and local 
business leaders, including the degree and timing of 
their coordination; 
3) variations in recovery rates in communities where 
damage is mainly to the public sector rather than to 
the private (residential and/or commercial) sectors; 
and 
4) the economi c and development pressures exerted duri ng 
the recovery period that militate against mitigation. 
• The actionable propositions set forth in Chapter IV, if 
restated, could become research hypotheses. 
The anal yt i ca 1 framework of the recovery process was deri ved from 
Uni ted States experi ences wi th natural di sasters. It remains to be 
applied to recovery experiences in other countries, if appropriate. It 
al so remai ns to be determi ned if thi s framework can be appl i ed to 
recovery from human-caused disasters. 
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PART TWO 
CASE STUDIES 
THE CASE STUDIES 
In terms of the specific disaster agent represented, the 14 
examples cover four riverine floods; three flood/mud slide events; two 
tornadoes; two wi nter coast a 1 storms; one hurri cane; one dam 
break/flood; and one earthquake. 
Eleven of the 14 cases were water-borne disasters and the 
communities were in the National Flood Insurance Program. The Hazard 
Mitigation Team process was not in effect at the time we completed the 
first six case studies. The differences in the duration and quality of 
recovery owing (1) to the requirements of the NFIP, and (2) to the 
presence and effect of the Hazard Mitigation Team in those local ities 
with a flood-related disaster remain to be explored in future studies. 
Community Nature of Disaster Date of Field Study 
Corpus Christi, TX hurricane 1980 
Scituate, MA winter coastal storm/blizzard 1980 
Hull, MA winter coastal storm/bl i zzard 1980 
Grundy, VA riverine fl ood 1981 
Pike County, KY ri veri ne fl ood 1981 
Phoenix, AZ riverine flood 1981 
Marin County, CA floods/mud slides 1982, 1984 
Santa Cruz County, CA floods/mud slides 1982, 1984 
Fort Wayne, IN riverine fl ood 1982, 1984 
Cardington, OH tornado 1982 
Paris, TX tornado 1982 
Estes Park, CO dam break/flood 1983 
Salt Lake City, UT snow melt/flood/landslides 1984 
Coalinya, CA earthquake 1984 
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CHAPTER VI 
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 
Background 
Corpus Christi is an attractive, moderate-sized 217,000 population) 
community located in southeastern Texas on the Gulf of Mexico. The 62nd 
largest city in the United States, Corpus Christi is the county seat for 
Nueces County and covers an area of 176 square mil es. Its economy is 
diversified, including major port faci lities (for petrochemical and 
related products), several military bases, and tourist and recreational 
activities. Local officials do not consider the city a resort 
community. 
Corpus Chri st i has a counci I-manager form of government, whose 
local appointed administrators are noted for longevity of service. At 
the time of the disaster, the city manager, city planner, city engineer, 
and assistant finance director had all held their respective positions 
for at least ten years, which means they were familiar with both 
Hurricane Celia (1970) and Hurricane Allen (1980). 
Gi ven its 1 ocat i on on the Gulf of Mexico, Corpus Chri st i is no 
stranger to coastal storms and hurricanes. The city has suffered from 
at least one major hurricane in each of the past several decades. 
Description of the Disaster 
Hurricane Allen, which filled the Gulf of Mexico on the satellite 
weather maps, made landfall south of Corpus Christi on August 9 and 10, 
1980. In addition to absorbing the impact of the hurricane, Corpus 
Christi and environs experienced flooding from rain run-off for several 
days after the hurri cane struck • Al so, several small tornados, whi ch 
were spawned by the hurricane, struck nearby. The governor asked for 
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federal disaster assistance and received a Presidential Disaster 
Declaration for nine counties. 
To understand the extent of the damage Hurricane Allen inflicted on 
Corpus Christi, consider the following: 
• Between $8 and $10 mill ion in overall damages were reported, 
with approximately $5 million to the bay front area (estimates 
cover munipal property only, not schools or homes). 
• Thirty homes were destroyed and 2,078 damaged in Corpus Christi 
(in all of Nueces County, 347 homes were destroyed and 2,808 
damaged) • 
• Three mobil e homes destroyed and 51 damaged, with the average 
amount of damage estimated at $3,000. 
• Forty-three businesses were destroyed and 118 damaged, with the 
average amount of damages estimated at $29,900. 
• The estimated damage to public and private schools was $200,000. 
• Unemployment reached 445 in Corpus Chri st i and 1,300 in Nueces 
County as a result of the hurricane. 
Over the years, the city has acquired a great deal of waterfront 
property, much of whi ch is currently used for green space or pub 1 i c 
beaches. The storm washed out or otherwise inflicted considerable 
damage to public parks dnd beachfront property, which was mainly 
undeveloped. Also, several municipally owned buildings located near the 
waterfront were damaged. 
The city has a policy that persons in the low-lying, bay front 
areas should evacuate when a hurricane warning is issued. Nevertheless, 
neither city official s nor the Nueces County Civil Defense Office ever 
recommended that the entire community evacuate. City policy does 
require that key municipal employees remain in the city and be available 
for duty during or immediately after the storm. 
Informal conversations with several persons who are not muni ci pa 1 
employees revealed that most persons chose to leave the city 
voluntarily. The consensus was that those who were in Hurricane Celia 
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in 1970, which was a direct hit on the city, did not ever want another 
experi ence of that sort. (Thi s substantial vol untary evacuation 
supports the findings of other researchers who maintain people tend to 
respond to a disaster warning based on their last major disaster 
experi ence.) 
Si nce Hurri cane All en was weaker on 1 andfa 11 than the weather 
service had predicted, its impact was less severe than the city had 
feared. The residents and public officals in Corpus Christi experienced 
a relatively brief emergency response phase and, consequently, entered 
the recovery phase very quickly. The storm struck on Saturday and 
Sunday, yet most public officials were in their offices on Monday 
morning. 
The characteri st i cs of thi s hurri cane were very different from 
those of Hurricane Celia (1970). Celia hit the city head-on, initially 
drew the water out of the bay (thus stranding boats), and caused less 
subsequent flooding from rainfall. Hurricane Allen differed in terms of 
intensity, warnings about its power, direction of approach, place of 
landfall, and attendant rains, winds, and tidal effects •• 
The city manager of Corpus Chri st i noted that the key vari ab 1 es 
determining the impact of a hurricane are the time of day; anticipated 
tides, wind, and rain; the rate of movement; and estimated landfall. A 
comparison of key data for Hurricanes Celia and Allen in Corpus Christi 
is shown in Table VI-I. Such differences highl ight the difficulty of 
doing recovery planning for the aftermath of a hurricane, even when the 
community has previous experience. 
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Winds 
Tide 
Rain 
Area deaths 
Property damage 
Response Phase 
TABLE VI-1 
THE IMPACTS OF HURRICANES CELIA AND ALLEN 
Celia--1970 
Up to 180 miles per hour 
Minus 4.5 feet 
7 inches 
5 
over $700,000,000 
Allen--1980 
Up to 92 miles per hour 
9 feet 
10.26 inches 
2 
$10,000,000 
The local citizens were well-prepared for Hurricane Allen not only 
because of the extensive weather service and media information and 
warnings, but also because of the frequent occurrence of hurricanes in 
the area. The city maintains an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in 
the basement of police headquarters, and has a half-time civil defense 
coordinator. Three special characteristics contributed to the local 
preparedness capabil i ty: 1) the city has experi enced frequent 
hurri canes (1 ess than ten years apart), whi ch means that cit i zens and 
officials were very familiar with that type of disaster; 2) several key 
apointed officials (e.g., the city manager, planning director, and city 
engineer) had been in office for ten or more years and had experiential 
knowledge of hurricane preparedness and recovery; and 3) the extreme 
destruction of Hurricane Celia (1970) has resulted in everyone who 
experienced it paying great heed to similar warnings. 
Given the sizable population and amount of resources (personal and 
material) that were not affected adversely by the hurricane, the 
substantial preparednes measures taken based on past experience, and the 
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indirect, relatively light impact of Hurricane Allen on Corpus Christi--
the locality weathered the storm and its aftermath quite well. 
Recovery Activities 
The 1 oca 1 appoi nted offi ci a 1 s commented that the recovery phase 
begins at different times for different disasters (even for two 
hurri canes), dependi ng on the type and size of the event and on the 
intensity of and needs resulting from a specific incident. They pointed 
out that it is difficult to do recovery-oriented planning because it is 
not possible to know in advance which clintele groups, structures, or 
land areas will be the focus of concern during the recovery period. 
Whil e an observer mi ght be tempted to state that a city that is 
chronically at risk from a single hazard--e.g., hurricane--would have an 
easier time performing emergency planning, the significant difference 
among hurricanes and their secondary effects (as shown in Table VI-i) 
underscore the difficulty of advance planning for long-term recovery. 
After Hurricane Allen, the long-term recovery process in Corpus 
Christi was not centrally determined or orchestrated (i .e., by the city 
manager or mayor). Each sector (public and private) and even each city 
department (especially the public works and budget departments) made 
their own plans or took actions appropriate to that operating unit. In 
other words, the city did not "have a specific recovery process, but 
rather an aggreyation of recovery processes (formal or informal) used by 
sectors of public officials, local leaders, and other groups. 
Staff Responsibilities 
Nevertheless, the city does have some structure for dealing with 
the emergency phase, and departments and key individuals have prescribed 
responsibilities for emergency operations and short-term recovery 
issues. When Hurricane Allen struck the city, officials were ready to 
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move into the emergency response phase and assume their emergency-period 
responsibilities. 
During the emergency response phase, three appointed officials have 
major responsibilities; namely, the city manager, planning director, and 
city engineer. For the recovery phase activities, these three 
officials, plus the buildings director, are primarily responsible for 
operations. While the city has a civil defense coordinator, who was on 
duty in the EOC duri ng the emergency phase, that person's role in 
recovery was never mentioned by anyone interviewed.* At the time of the 
interviews--about seven months after the storm--the city engineer and 
buildings department director bore most of the responsibility for the 
remaining longer-term recovery operations. 
Recovery Issue Identification 
Among the major problems the city faced after the hurricane were: 
1) The safety of the water supply. The drinking water supply was 
nearly contaminated by salt water driven up the river by the 
hurricane's winds. 
2) The redevelopment of North Corpus Chri st i Beach. Hurri cane 
Allen damaged numerous existing structures, which the city 
1 ater removed. The net effect was that of a major cl earance 
project, such as urban renewal. 
3) The development of Padre Island. Residential development had 
been proceeding on this large barrier island before the 
hurricane. As would be expected, Padre Island was hit hard. A 
question that remains is whether the residents feel differently 
about living there after seeing the hurricane's effect. 
The three main issues that Corpus Christi is working on in the aftermath 
of the disaster are described in greater detail below. 
Water supply. Saltwater, d ri ven by the hurri cane wi nds, went up 
the Nueces River and almost breached the relatively low walls of the 
city's water supply intake. Although the city had 35 million gallons in 
*The coordinator was out of the city at the time of the site visit 
and therefore could not be interviewed. 
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storage, and would have had a short-term emergency supply for its 
residents, the problem could have been very severe. The city's water 
system supplies customers in a 7,000 square mile area with water derived 
from surface supplies (some persons in that area use well water). 
Consequently, the water servi ce area that mi ght have been depri ved of 
supply is substantially larger than the city itself. The near-emergency 
water supply situation that occurred for the first time after Hurricane 
Allen is on the city's agenda for future attention, according to the 
city enyi neer, who sai d potential mit i gat i on steps wi 11 have to be 
analyzed. At the time of the interviews, no action was either being 
taken or scheduled. 
North Corpus Chri st i Beach. North Corpus Chri st i Beach is a low-
l yi ng peni nsul a of 1 and that belongs to th city; in the past it has 
sustained severe damage from wind and water and no doubt will do so in 
the future. The beach area was semi -deve loped, wi th many run-down, 
undesirable properties. Much of the area,which is only a few fee above 
sea level, is unprotected on two sides. Before the hurricane hit, the 
city had invested as much as $40,000 per acre for beach restoration and 
water and sewer systems. 
After the hurricane, the city took the lead in demolishing 
seriously damaged structures (offering free demol ition to owners whose 
buildings were seriously damaged) and in removing debris to, literally, 
clear the way for private investment and development in that area. The 
demolition work was paid for with COBG monies. Several city officials 
i ntervi ewed commented on the advantages of the cl earance work and the 
current ava il abi 1 ity of 1 arye tracts for development. In short, they 
saw the positive results of an urban renewal project, which cleared out 
undesirable structures and made room for large-scale new development. 
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About one month after the hurricane, the local newspaper reported 
on a city council meeting during which the issue arose regarding the re-
evaluation of the master plan for North Corpus Christi Beach, which was 
the work of the Department of Pl anni ng and the Pl anni ng and Zoni ng 
Commission. The city manager, according to the local newspaper, said 
that implementation recommendations would include a re-examination of 
the: 1) adequacy of zoning; 2) public acquisition of property; 3) 
extent of commercial development; and 4) requirements for a master plan 
for the beach. It shoul d be noted, however, thta such comprehens i ve 
overview information did not come out during the interviews with the 
city manager, planning director, or other local officials. 
Padre Island. Padre Island is a beautiful but vulnerable barrier 
i sl and connected to Corpus Chri st i by a 1 ow-l yi ng causeway. The Pad re 
Island National Seashore occupies nearly 100 miles of the narrow barrier 
island that stretches along the Gulf Coast. Currently, the part of 
Padre Island that is not in the National Seashore is under the 
jurisdiction of Nueces County. The area is not well-developed, but many 
lots have been sold by a major developer who expects that a substantial 
amount of building will occur in the near future. The Padre Isles 
Development Corporati on, a pri vate company, owns 3,000 acres that have 
been divided into 7,000 lots for residential development. Currently 75% 
of the lots are sold, although half or less have been developed. 
Development has been carried out consistent with city building cOdes'and 
standards (appropriate for participants in the NFIP) because the island 
is expected to be annexed by the city. 
General recovery issues. I ssues regard i ng the red eve 1 opment of 
North Corpus Christi Beach and the development of Padre Isl and existed 
before the storm, but came to the forefront during the aftermath of the 
hurricane. Both places are very vulnerable in terms of their 
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geomorphology. In that connection, it shoul d be noted that after the 
hurricane, the head of Insurance and Mitigation in the FEMA regional 
office wrote local officials that a recent study sponsored by the 
Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) indicated that some velocity 
zones appear to exist on North Corpus Christi Beach and on Padre Island 
and that such information should be taken into account in future 
development plans for those areas. 
A velocity zone (V-Zone) is a coastal area in which waves have 
their greatest impact. While such zones cover a very limited geographic 
area, they represent an area of s i gnifi cant ri sk. Recentl y, the NFl P 
decided that to put the flood insurance program on a sound actuarial 
basis in V-Zones, it is imperative that wave height and stability of 
structure be taken into account. FEMA requires rating individual 
structures for purposes of setting insurance rates for construction or 
substantial improvements in a coastal high hazard area. 
The recovery efforts to date have been city-di rected for the most 
part. This is not surprising considering city land--mostly beach front 
and park land--and municipal buildings were most heavily impacted by the 
storm. The restoration of public lands is being accomplished with 
federal (75%) and local matching funds (25%). 
No existing or ad hoc citizens groups arose during the initial 
recovery decision making period, probably because the damage to 
municipal propety was far greater, in dollar cost, than that to 
residential structures and other private property. 
The business community will probably have a larger role in the 
redevelopment of North Corpus Christi Beach, for which the redevelopment 
process is just becoming active. A February, 1981, field visit revealed 
that the local Chamber of Commerce had appointed a task force to make 
recommendati ons to the city council regardi ng the development of North 
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Corpus Chri st i Beach. Another task force was al so goi ng to look into 
development questions on Padre Island. 
In tal ki ng to the Corpus Chri st i Chamber of Commerce, it became 
obvious that the local business community is indeed interested in the 
future development prospects of both areas and has formed internal 
committees to study them. Of added interest was the fact that the city 
officials did not know (or so it appeared) about the two chamber 
committees. It appears that the local public and private sectorsare not 
(yet) coordinating their development planning regarding North Corpus 
Christi Beach and Padre Island. 
City Relations with FEMA 
In terms of intergovernmental relations in the early recovery 
peri od of Hurri cane All en, 1 oca 1 offi cia 1 s stated that they found it 
more difficult to deal with FEMA regarding response and recovery than 
had been true for the last Presidential Disaster Declaration. Several 
peopl e contrasted the vi gorous, generous federal commitment to ai ding 
the city after Hurricane Celia to the less than expedient experiences 
fo 11 owi ng Hurri cane All en. Two reasons for thi s were mentioned: 1) 
Hurricane Allen seriously affected nine large counties, only indirectly 
hitting Corpus Christi; and 2) the guidelines for federal assistance for 
public facilities have changed. Local displeasure with the perceived 
attitude of FEMA officials appeared to be separate from the recent match 
requirement for public assistance. 
Needless to say, the local officials were unhappy about the 
required 25% local match toward the 75% federal contribution for public 
facilities restoration. Because of the diffi culty in obtai ni ng the 
local share, the city's efforts to repair or restore public facilities 
proceeded very slowly. (The city used funds that had been raised by a 
two year-old bond issue and CDBG monies.) Local officials were also 
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annoyed by the reporting and documentation requirements, which are 
required by recipients of public assistance. 
Further, an exploitative attitude prevailed among some citizen 
groups in Corpus Christi and Nueces County, resulting in a sizeable 
number of fraudulent applications for assistance. This situation caused 
great problems and embarrassment for local and federal disaster 
officials. 
The criticism was made of both state and federal officials that 
they did not know what the city needed, did not bother to ask, but 
proceeded as if they did. Further, top-level local officials complained 
about not knowing when federal officials had arrived and where they were 
goi ng to open the FEMA one-stop centers. Thi s rai sed questi ons about 
the applicant's briefing: if there was such a briefing, it was not 
well-attended or well-remembered. 
The FEMA regi ona 1 offi ce had also pl anned to have an after-action 
meeting with officials of Corpus Christi and surrounding areas to 
discuss residual problems. That meeting was postponed and then 
cancelled, leaving unresolved the latent and residual misunderstandings 
and host il i ty. 
Local/State Relations 
The state was perceived as no help. When pressed, local officials 
conceded that the state had helped to assess the damage and had sent an 
auditor, but was no help in providing temporary housing. A city 
nei ghborhood improvement agency was asked to handl e temporary hous i ng 
not only for city residents, but also for displaced persons in a large 
radi us around Corpus Chri st i • (It seems unusual to have a city agency 
handle temporary housing for a multijurisdictional area.) 
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Summing up the local perception of local/state and local/federal 
relationships in the aftermath of Hurricane Allen, the city manager 
said: 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency had the burden of 
coordinating the federal efforts through the state. Possibly 
the new system has some advantages, but they are not readily 
apparent. Unfortunately, all the state ••• provides is a 
pass through and, like most pass throughs, all that is really 
accomplished is red tape and delay. 
Hopefully, before the system gets changed agai n, it can 
be improved. All that most damaged communities want from the 
state and federal government sis a clear appra i sa 1 of what 
assistance is available so that the real task can be 
accomplished to the extent of avail~ble resources. The 
recovery process quickly points out the need to know all 
state, federal, and local agency officials who might be 
involved in disaster recovery before the disaster occurs, 
even to the point of calling them to renew acquaintances as 
the disaster develops.* 
Public/Private Sector Relations 
In the future, major development in the two identified recover.)' 
areas wi 11 be determined by the local private sector, for the most part, 
although any actions will have to be taken within the context of local 
bui 1 di ng codes and standards imposed to be compl i ant with the NFIP. 
Given the presence of velocity zones in both development areas, as well 
as the known existence of the lOO-year flood plain, the type of building 
will hvae to be carefully monitored and controlled by public officials. 
Before the hurricane hit, the city had invested heavily in land 
preparation and infrastructure on North Corpus Christi Beach and, most 
recently, for the demolition of damaged st.ructures. It has, in fact, 
done all that is 1 ega 1 in the state to encourage development. (State 
laws do not allow write downs or tax inducements.) 
Likewise, the Padre Isles Development Corporation has completed 
subdivision preparation and other front-end community development work 
*"Hurricane: Tracking Many but Knowing Few," Public Management, 
63 (January/February 1981), p. 4. 
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appropri ate to deve 1 opi ng a si zeab 1 e new res i dent i a 1 community. It, 
too, has done everything possible to attract buyers and home builders to 
develop the area. 
As noted earl i er, the local Chamber of Commerce has created two 
committees to address the issues and opportunities for development in 
the two areas identified. The results of their work were not completed 
at the time of the site visit. 
Mitigation Measures 
Since the late 1960s, the city has had building codes, zoning 
regul at ions, and other requi rements that essent i ally were as st ri ngent 
as those required by the NFIP. In other words, mitigation efforts were 
made for many years prior to the city's particiJ'lation in the insurance 
program. Yet, there is constant tensi on (if not confl i ct) between the 
1 and use requi rements and the buil di ng standards needed to conform to 
the NFIP and the political and economic pressures to build and 
redevelop. This conflict shows in both areas currently receiving 
primary attention--North Corpus Christi Beach and Padre Island. 
Among the factors that counter the development/redevelopment in the 
two places are: 1) the low-lying land is patently vulnerable to wave 
and water damage; and 2) a letter from FEMA advising the city about the 
existence of velocity zones. The latter will mean higher flood 
insurance premiums and more stringent building requirements for future 
development. Nevertheless, the city has made a major investment in 
infrastructure and land preparation to make North Corpus Christi Beach 
attractive to commercial developers. Likewise, the Padre Isles 
Development Corporat i on has made the i sl and attract i ve to res i dent i al 
developers. The desire to develop appears to be the stronger force. 
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Interviewers' Perceptions 
One is struck by the city's continuous vulnerability to major 
damage from coastal storms and the accompanying water and winds. Given 
the frequency of seri ous coastal storm damage in Corpus Chri st i, if 
federal response recovery asssistance were not available the local tax 
rate woul d probably be so hi gh that few peopl e coul d afford to 1 i ve 
there. 
The emergency management capabi 1 i ty of the city, especi ally for 
preparedness and response, is very good. The longevity of the staff, 
and their collective wisdom and experience, are unbeatable 
characteristics contributing to that capability. 
The researchers are sensitive to the fact that the definitions and 
conceptual framework used in this study regarding the long-term recovery 
process are not necessarily those held by persons being interviewed. No 
one interviewed shared our perspective on the long-term recovery process 
and not all people understood it. In Corpus Christi, long-term recovery 
as a process is not centrally orchestrated (i .e., by city manager or 
mayor). As noted earl ier, each sector and even each city department 
(espcially the public works and budget departments) made their own 
pl ans. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SCITUATE, MASSACHUSETTS 
Background 
Scituate, Massachusetts is a small, quaint New England town bounded 
on the east and north by the Atlantic ocean, with a tidal shoreline of 
about 50 miles. Scituate has little commercial activity; tourism and 
fishing are the main industries. The population changes with the 
seasons--during the winter there are about 17,300 residents; the summer 
peopl e double that number. In the past ten years, the number of year-
round residents has been increasing at a rapid rate, yet little land use 
planning is accompanying this growth. The desirable exclusive shoreline 
has become crowded with new, expensive homes. 
Scituate has a town meeting form of government, but has a full-time 
town manager. Although the town meeting form is the most democratic, it 
is also the most cumbersome. It does not lend itself to quick decisions 
and therefore does not fare well in negotiations with more centralized 
bodies. This was a frequent handicap to town officials during the 
recovery process. 
The rna in actors in the disaster recovery effort were the town 
accountant, the pub 1 i c works di rector, and the chai r of the Board of 
Selectmen. None of the others had administrative experience in coping 
with a natural disaster. 
Description of Disaster 
The blizzard of 1978 reached the coast of Massachusetts on February 
6 • Although storm warni ngs had been issued, the state was hit sooner 
and harder than the weather servi ce had predi cted. Snow began fall i ng 
in the morning and by mid-afternoon the governor had declared a state of 
emergency and ordered workers to return home. The storm brought wi nds 
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of hurricane force, extremely high tides, and snow. The tides in Boston 
Harbor broke all existing records, and since the storm coincided with a 
perigee the tides were exceptionally brutal. More than 27 inches of 
snow fell in Boston before the storm headed out to sea on February 7. 
After the storm, temperatures remained below freezing for several days, 
which impeded rescue and relief operations. 
Blizzards accompanied by high winds, strong tides, and severe 
damage are not rare events on the Massachusetts coast. The south shore 
has been hit by almost a dozen storms classified as "extreme" by the 
state climatologist, including the Great Colonial Hurricane of 1635. 
Scituate has a long history of sea storms and disasters, including 
shipwrecks off the town's coast. In 1972, a "nor'easter" destroyed 23 
homes and damaged 360 structures causing $2.5 million in damage. During 
the 1920s and '30s, the town built sea walls and stone revetments to 
protect the shorefront. They have been repa i red and extended, but not 
improved, after each storm. 
The storm damage from the blizzard of 1978 was the most costly and 
extensive in the city's history. Scituate also sustained the most 
damage in the state. Destruction was everywhere. All beachfront 
sections were completely flooded. Areas behind the dunes that had been 
thought to be safe were flooded. The force of the ocean had tossed huge 
boulders into the streets and knocked houses off their foundations. 
Eighty-five houses were totally destroyed and 150 suffered structural 
damage of more than 50%. About 1,000 homes required some repair due to 
storm damage. A majority of the sea walls and riprap had to be repaired 
or repl aced. Land forms also changed due to the wi nd and water action 
of the severe storm. The pilings in Scituate harbor suffered damage, 
and many fishing and pleasure boats crashed into the shoreline or were 
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thrown many feet inland. Commercial areas along the waterfront were 
flooded, but few were located where the majority of the damage occurred. 
Response Phase 
Rescue operations by the policy and fire departments began early in 
the afternoon as the town realized the severity of the storm. Employees 
of the Department of Public Works were sent out to keep sewer drains 
clear, shovel snow, plow roads, and provide services as necessary. One 
employee and the young girl he was trying to evacuate drowned. an 
ambulance, a fire truck, and many other town vehicles sustained severe 
damage due to salt water. 
The coastal residents did not respond the way the town officials 
woul d have 1 i ked. Many stayed in thei r homes duri ng the fi rst hi gh 
tide; when the storm did not affect them, the residents assumed they 
were safe. Unfortunately, the second hi gh tide was more severe, whi ch 
led pelple to try to evacuate at the height of the storm. Once the snow 
stopped, the National Guard was called in to remove debris, prevent 
looting, and ensure public safety. 
On the eveni ng the storm hit, the Board of Sel ectmen was in the 
process of fi ri ng the town manager, 1 eavi ng the communi ty wi thout the 
services of a full-time official. In the absence of a town manager the 
selectmen created a response task force, headed by the town treasurer, 
to organize the town relief efforts. Although ad hoc, the group quickly 
developed an organizational structure, setting up emergency operations 
at the high school with the Federal Disaster Assistance Center. 
The role of the business community in the long-term recovery 
process was very limited. Fishing people were interested in getting 
their boats back in the water and merchants wanted to get their stores 
repaired. 
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A lthough Scituate residents have seen at 1 east two maj or storms 
batter and fl ood thei r community in the 1 ast ten years, the town has 
never budgeted any money for emergency preparedness or response. After 
the 1978 storm, the city finally enacted building codes that required 
measures to miti gate flood damage. The community IS losses in the past 
illustrate the problems of living on the shore, but the short memory of 
federa 1 ass i stance and devotion to the shorefront have reduced res ident 
fears of severe coastal storms. 
Recovery Activities 
The rna in goal of the community was to restore the town to its 
prestorm condition, which meant replacing and repairing the sea walls 
and rebuil ding the homes that had been destroyed or damaged. For the 
long-term recovery phase, a three-person commi ttee cons i st i ng of the 
chai r of the Board of Sel ectmen (who was also the designated federal 
local representative), the town accountant, and the public works 
di rector was formed. * Thi s group met da ily at fi rst, 1 ater reduced 
meet i ngs to once a week, and then met as needed. They have been 
responsible for applying for and monitoring all grants. 
The public works director supervised the recovery of public 
fac i 1 it i es--a full-t i me effort that caused an l8-month del ay in town 
improvement proj ects. The director was responsible for working with 
federa 1 agenci es, securi ng grants, 'hi ri ng contractors, and overseei ng 
all work. Using the Di saster Survey Reports (DSRs) prepared by the 
Corps of Engi neers and the State Department of Envi ronmental Quality 
Engineering, the town was able to secure a $7.5 million commitment from 
*The current town manager has not been a member of thi s group 
because he arri ved si x months after the storm. Hi s primary 
responsibility is to oversee the remaining recovery activities. 
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the FDAA to complete 248 individual projects. They applied for no other 
grants. 
The primary project was to repair the damaged sea walls by either 
patching cracked areas or totally rebuilding the section. The second 
major project used $2 million to restore the bluffs and to rebuild a 
support i ng wall that ran along the base of the bluffs. The thi rd 
element was to construct a massive stone wall along the shoreline where 
sea walls had not been built. 
All projects were designed to return the facilities to prestorm 
levels as allowed by federal regulation--a requirement that dismayed the 
pub 1 i cworks director. As noted previ ousl y, the shore protect i on was 
built during the 1920s and '30s. Since then, stronger and more 
effective construction techniques have been developed. Nevertheless, 
few of these techniques--such as additional height, stronger footings, 
or reinforced concrete--could be used to their full potential because 
the town was unable to supply the additional funding to make major 
improvements. 
It has taken three years to complete the sea wall construction, 
owing to the size of the project and the delays caused by administrative 
difficulties such as funding, budgeting, record keeping, and relations 
with the federal and state governments. For example, in the original 
DSRs there was no all oc'at i on foe engi neeri ng costs. The Corps of 
Engineers had no authorization to help, and the state engineers had no 
funding. Although an engineer, the public works director had no 
expertise in sea wall construction. Instead, a friend who worked for 
the Corps of Engineers provided consultation services on the engineering 
aspects. That person was 1 ater fi red because of generos ity, accordi ng 
to one local official. 
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The second major concern of the town was the rebuilding of the 235 
homes destroyed by the storm. The major issues were: 1) should 
individuals be allowed to rebuild their homes on the shorefront; 2) what 
stipulations, if any, were to be imposed on the design of new 
structures; and 3) what impact would other regulations regarding 
shoreline construction now in effect have on new construction. 
The Conservation Commission 
Most of the responsibility for overseeing the rebuilding of the 
residential structures fell to the Conservation Commission, which began 
its work immediately after the storm. The Commission is charged under 
state law with protecting the local wetlands and approving all 
structures that will be built in the flood plain. Because the majority 
of the houses damaged were in the flood plain, the Commission had to 
approve emergency bui 1 ding permitsthat are gi ven to allow repa irs to 
prevent further damage to the structure. After on-site inspections were 
made, 187 permits were issued. 
The Commission is also responsible for approving the building plans 
for those structures that had suffered damage of more than 50%.* 
Commission members took their responsibility very seriously and tried to 
follow the Wetlands Protection Act to the letter. They felt it was 
their duty to evaluate each plan critically so that those who insisted 
on rebuilding along the shore would be protected. Each house plan had 
to be evaluated in light of recently approved state and local sanitation 
codes, floodplain requirements, and the state building code. The FIA 
required Scituate to include strict mitigation measures in the town 
building code or lose $2 million in individual aid. The Commission also 
*The 50% rul e caused some controversy. There was di sagreement as 
to whether 50% damaged referred to structural damage or to the value of 
the house. The commission decided it meant structural damage. 
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implemented a comprehensive list of elevation, flotation, and other 
mitigation requirements. 
The Commission was required to hold individual hearing to review 
the plans for each building permit. The townspeople began to resent 
this degree of individual scrutiny, which they perceived as excessive 
government. This animosity became so intense that legislation was 
introduced in the state legislature to ensure that homeowners would be 
allowed to rebuild without any interference from the town. The 
selectmen originally supported the Conservation Commission, but as the 
memory of the storm faded and citizen complaints became louder, the 
officials stopped endorsing the Commission publicly. Such actions gave 
the Commission even less credibility, even though their legislative 
authority continued. 
Contractors 
After the blizzard, every home along the water and a majority of 
the homes near the ocean needed some repair. Much of the work that was 
needed--such as electrical, plumbing, and carpentry--had to be completed 
quickly to allow families to return to their homes. Contractors from 
outside the community came to Scituate to find work. A number of them 
were from out of state and were not familiar with local building codes, 
procedures, or the effects of salt water on wiring and other materials; 
this caused problems regarding the appropriateness and quality of their 
work. 
The town of Scituate employs only one building inspector, who is 
required to approve all building permits (about 800 of the 1,200 that 
were filed in 1978 were attributed to storm damage) and to help the 
Conservation Commission determine the 50% destruction requirement. 
During late 1980 and early 1981, there have been reports of shoddy work 
by contractors who arri ved just after the storm. Thi s has frustrated 
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the building inspector, who has neither enforcement power nor an 
adequate staff. 
Federal-Local Relations 
Some Scituate offi ci a 1 s remember the recovery process after the 
storm of 1972. The Office of Emergency Preparedness, the federal 
disaster agency at the time, was responsible for repairing public 
fac il it i es. It contracted with the Corps of Engi neers to do all the 
construction; the community had only to approve the scope of the 
work. After the blizzard of 1978, the FDAA wanted to assume an advisory 
role with the state in the area of public facilities rather than 
maintain direct contact with the communities on a long-term basis. 
Federal teams came to Scituate to file DSRs for the town, but this was 
their only direct contact in coping with public facilities projects 
until the final audits. 
Scituate offi cia 1 s woul d have preferred to deal with the federal 
government more often. Of major concern was the need to have 
regulations clarified, to demonstrate how inadequate regulations for 
rebuilding were in coastal communities, and to approve cost overruns as 
they accrued, rather than at the time of final audit. 
The majority of the DSRs prepared during the response phase were 
surprisingly accurate, but they could not predict cost overruns due to 
necessary addit i ona 1 work, delays, or i nfl at ion. Scituate determi ned 
that a few projects would go above the anticipated cost, but the city 
did not want to spend additional dollars without receiving assurance 
that the federal government woul d reimburse the addit i ona 1 work. The 
response from the federal government was if the work was within the 
ori gi na 1 scope, it woul d most 1 i ke ly be reimbursed, but the actual 
determination of eligibility would be made at the final audit. Scituate 
had no way of knowi ng if the overrun woul d be vi ewed aspart of the 
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ori gi na 1 scope of the work because there were no regul at ions regardi ng 
record keepi ng. 
City officials also resented the delays caused by FDAA. It was 
especially ironic that Scituate later had to petition the FDAA to extend 
the time frame on a project because of a delay the FDAA had caused. 
State-Local Relations 
Immediately after the storm, state officials established a Disaster 
Recovery Team (DRT) to hel p the towns affected by the storm cope with 
general long-term recovery issues. The team acted as the direct link to 
the federal government for the communities and helped to secure other 
state assistance. Scituate officials felt the DRT could not give them 
the two things they needed most: approval for cost overruns and 
technical engineering assistance. The state was viewed only as a pass-
through function that hampered the city's ability to proceed with 
construction and general recovery. 
The Conservation Commi ss ion felt that the state was more stri ct 
with Scituate than any other community. The commission maintained that 
other communities were not required to hold hearings or conduct on-site 
inspections for emergency permits. Scituate also held the unenviable 
position of a pacesetter--the state would not rule on the acceptability 
of another town's proposal unt i 1 Scituate determi ned what it was goi ng 
to do. 
The DRT was not staffed by engineers or technicians. The team had 
no interagency agreements to allow them to tap the resources of other 
state agencies or financial resources to hire technical consultants. 
Although the head of the DRT changed three times during the first year, 
this did not hve a long-term impact on the team's effectiveness. With a 
change in governors, another new di rector took over, but the DRT has 
been all but ignored by the current admi ni strati on. However, the DRT 
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staff believes this "benign neglect" has let them operate longer than 
. wou1 d otherwi se have been likely. 
Each DRT staff member was given a case load of communities. 
Scituate officials felt the DRT was more effective in those communities 
whose leaders were not well organized when it came to state priorities, 
and less effective in those communities that had determined their goals, 
especially when answering substantive questions. 
Mitigation Measures 
Scituate instituted both structural and nonstructura1 mitigation 
measures in the course of recoveri ng from the wi nter storm. The most 
extens i ve damage was caused by water breachi ng the sea wall s. The 
rebuil ding of the sea walls and stone revetments that run along the 
shoreline was a major structural effort due to their age and primitive 
engineering or construction. Despite the phenomenal cost, the sea walls 
protect the homes behind them only minimally. The federal government 
will reimburse local governments for repairing public facilities only to 
prestorm 1 evel. Thi s 1 imits towns 
unless they will pay the difference. 
from improving their facilities 
The sea wall s that were totally 
rebuilt had the advantage of modern engineering in the footings and 
rei nforced concrete; yet thei r hei ght cou1 d not be rai sed to make them 
more effective because the town could not pay the additional cost. 
The stone barriers are a work of art. Each side stone weighs a 
minimum of five tons and the top stones 15 tons. Yet their efficacy in 
taming a massive hurricane or flood is at best negligible. 
Nonstructura1 measures included the addition of mitigation 
requirements to the building codes and the use of federal monies (under 
Section 1362 of the National Flood Insurance Act) to acquire beachfront 
property, remove structures, and ma i ntai n 1 and as open space. Some 
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1 oca 1 offi ci al s wanted to restri ct reconstructi on on the oceanfront. 
They realized that any structure that was built would not be able to 
survive a major storm and that homeowners needed a monetary incentive to 
keep them from rebuilding. A bill was introduced in the state 
legislature to appropriate money to purchase waterfront land from 
willing sellers, but did not pass. The town then approached FEMA to 
determine its eligibility for the Section 1362 acquisition program. At 
that time, however, Congress had not appropriated any funds, and it was 
not until 1980 that Scituate began the Section 1362 acquisition 
process. Town officials contacted owners of eligible properties to 
determi ne if they were will i ng to sell, turned the names over to FEMA, 
and the formal processing began. The agreement between FEMA and 
Scituate was that the town would acquire the land as a gift and would be 
required to keep it as open space. 
Before any acquisition could take place, a town meeting had to 
agree to accept the 1 and that woul d be acqui red. The measure was 
soundly defeated at a special meeting in June 1980 for a number of 
reasons. Many residents distrusted the federal government, fearing that 
it was not being candid about the actual costs and benefits to Scituate 
in accepting the parcels as gifts. Others believed that if the land 
were turned into open space, undes i rab 1 es woul d take over the Scituate 
beaches. There also was concern over the loss of taxable property. The 
major reason for defeat, however, was that a number of people from the 
Humarock section of town, who would not have been directly affected by 
this action, overwhelmingly opposed it because FEMA had refused to fund 
a project for additional shore protection for their area. 
Despite the local vote, some homeowners were still willing to sell 
their property. Subsequently, the federal government bought a few 
parcel s and turned them over to the state I s Coastal Zone management 
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Office instead of to the town. The state currently is negotiating with 
the town to give them the parcels as a gift on permanent lease. 
Housing 
Scituate I s rna in concern duri ng the recovery process was to get 
everything back to normal. The only major mitigation effort the town 
undertook was the creation of new building codes, which were required by 
the NFIP. As the memory of the storm faded, town officials and many 
res i dents forgot about the severity of the damage and lost interest in 
supporting the Conservation Commission and issues of mitigation and 
relocation. there was no commitment to long-term mitigation measures, 
particularly to those that would require substantial changes in 
residential construction. Town officials believed mitigation 
requirements were meaningless because they only had the promise of 
future federal aid, which was thought to be essential for implementing 
mi t i gat i on measures. Town selectmen felt a fi rmer stand shoul d have 
been taken by the federal government. 
The FIA and the Small Business Administration (SBA) spent millions 
of doll ars in Scituate to repai rand repl ace houses. In 1978 federal 
doll ars were used to repai r many of the same houses repai red in 1972. 
this time the owners rebuilt in compliance with the elevation and 
building standards required by the NFIP. 
Many of the homes that were rebuilt are larger and have a higher 
assessed val ue than the previ ous structures. Accordi ng to the town 
assessor, this is because the owners were able to get low interest loans 
that allowed them to build previously unaffordable luxury features. 
(Unfortunatel y, many homeowners have been shocked and in some cases 
a 1 most unable to pay thei r increased tax bill s) • The worst part, 
according to the town engineer, is that these dream homes, despite being 
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built to the existing town requirements, still will not be able to 
withstand the force of a storm similar to the blizzard of 1978. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
Small towns with few financial resources and 1 imited staffs are 
likely to have more difficulty recovering from a massive disaster than 
larger, more sophisticated communities. Coping with a multimillion 
dollar project is a difficult job in its own right, but Scituate's 
three-person team also was faced with balancing citizen views with 
federal and state requirements. 
Town officials noted three major impediments to full recovery: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Federal money can be used to restore public facilities only to 
thei r prestorm 1 eve 1 • Scituate rebuil t sea walls that are 
inadequate for the needs of the town because it did not have 
the additional funds to upgrade the improvements. 
Consequent ly, the federal government, the town, and the 
homeowners will continue to make repairs to the same structures 
at an ever increasing cost. 
Cost overruns cannot be approved until the final audit. 
SCltuate has been unable to rearn from FEMA whether lt wlil be 
reimbursed for cost overruns incurred years before. As 
projects are being completed, town officials would like an 
intermediate inspection program to re-evaluate DSR estimates. 
Engineering and overhead costs are not included in the DSR. A 
major project, such as sea wall construction, requires a 
significant amount of time from engineers and other 
specialists, as well as the attention of local staff. Not to 
i ncl ude these costs in the DSR is not cost effecti ve in the 
long run. 
Although Scituate's compl a i nts about its current recovery process 
seem valid, the town has done little to prepare itself for the next 
major coastal storm. Si nce the b 1 i zzard of 1978, the city has not 
engaged in any emergency preparedness or response pl anni ng or 
trai ni ng. Accordi ng to the former treasurer, there has never been a 
budget for civil defense. Some officials expressed a desire to have a 
plan, whereas others were complacent, saying that when a storm strikes, 
the town will cope. One offi ci al remarked that the state shoul d hel p 
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them wri te a pl an. Another sai d that si nce the state and federal 
officials arrive and begin to work immediately after the disaster 
strikes, the community does not need a plan. 
This reluctance to put the town's experience into a plan is 
workable as long as the officials who handled the 1978 blizzard are 
still in office. However, the city manager--who is also the civil 
defense director (in title only)--has no experience with emergency 
management. This lack of concern over how to cope with the next event 
will only make it more difficult to respond and recover efficiently. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
HULL, MASSACHUSETTS 
Backkground 
Hull, Massachusetts is a small town (11,000 population) located 12 
miles south of Boston, that lies on a narow peninsula separating Hingham 
Bay from the Atlantic Ocean. At its narrowest point, there are 600 feet 
between shores; at the widest, 2,500 feet. 
Hull was once a summer resort for the wealthy, and large 
picturesque homes still line the rocky coast that faces Boston. Today, 
Hull entertains working-class families. Its major attractions are a 
run-down amusement park and a narrow strip of beach, which in the summer 
swell the daytime population substantially. Hull is currently being 
eyed by developers as a potentia I New Engl and-styl e Atl ant i c City, as 
plans are being considered to turn a once-grand mansion into a first-
class gambling casino. This development would increase the population 
year-round and give the town additional revenues as well as additional 
burdens. 
Hull has the town meeting form of government, which has been a 
source of aggravation to many local leaders. A common complaint is that 
it is difficult to get action under this form of government, which 
resulted in delays in the recovery process. Further, government 
inaction resulted from the inability of a majority of the town's 
officials to cope with the complexities of the federal government relief 
programs or the state grant process. 
Description of Disaster 
On February 6, 1978, Hull and other cities along the Massachusetts 
coast were hit by a fierce blizzard that caused two record high tides. 
Snow accumulations reached 27 inches in one day. Hurricane-force winds 
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caused water to breach the sea walls, and, at some points, for the bay 
and the ocean to meet on 1 and. A lthough the state is accustomed to 
winter "nor'easters," this storm was particularly devastating because of 
its ferocity. A state of emergency was declared by the governor early 
in the afternoon on February 6 to keep people off the roads. 
All parts of Hull were affected by the storm. Not only did the 
town suffer from flooding, but also from drifting snow. The southwest 
end, which is at a higher elevation, was battered by high winds and 
snow, with only occasional flooding. The major damage to residential 
and public property was caused by flood waters that did not recede. The 
town's elevation is slightly lower behind the sea walls, thus all of the 
water that came over the walls remained for three or more days, turning 
the residential areas into a huge catch basin. It was this extended 
contact with water that did the most damage to property. Water and wind 
destroyed 14 structures, with 75% of all structures needing some repair 
after the storm. 
The storm severely damaged public facilities such as storm sewers, 
streets, and sea walls. Most of the town's street lighting system was 
downed by ice on the electrical lines. Flooding also caused severe 
damage to the sewage treatment plant that was under construction. 
Response Phase 
The immediate response phase was uncoordinated and chaotic 
primaril y because town offi cia 1 s were not organi zed to respond to the 
diaster. The town emergency plan was ignored since it did not adquately 
address the problem of flooding. The Board of Selectmen were notorious 
for being unable to reach consensus on any issue, and the disaster only 
made the relations worse. The town's executive secretary had been fired 
shortly before the storm, and the public works director was pressured to 
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res i gn, thus 1 eavi ng the town with a reduced capacity duri ng a very 
difficult period. 
The storm cut the town into islands. Water completely covered the 
land from shore to shore in at least two places. Rather than unite to 
make decisions for the benefit of the entire town or plan for the days 
ahead, each selectman went to the shelter closest to home and began 
making promises and decisions without the approval of the board. It was 
not until three days after the storm that the selectmen met as a unit. 
An emergency operations center was established in the municipal 
building and used for six days. Victims of the flooding were moved to 
large shelters operated by the Red Cross. Many did not follow 
instructions to bring blankets, nonperishable food, and other 
necesities, but not pets, to the shelters. These nonconforming actions 
caused confusi on, havoc, and in some cases vi 01 ence. The governor had 
to step in and order additional shelters and other measures, including 
busing families 30 miles inland, in order to provide safe and adequate 
temporary housing. The town made a d i 1 i gent effort to get peopl e back 
to their homes as soon as possible, but disagreements between the 
building inspector and the public health director over the safety of the 
homes delayed the process. 
The first week after the disaster, the selectmen made a persistent 
effort to organize themselves and to agree on a course of action. This 
included relying totally on outside resources for the town's initial 
response and recovery, primarily the state Civil Oefense Office, 
National Guard, state DRT, and federal government. There were no 
officials in Hull with any disaster response or recovery experience. 
Recovery Activities 
As the recovery began, the majority of the town officials realized 
that the following problems needed to be rectified: insufficient shore 
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protection, inadequate storm drainage, and lack of floodproofing at thp. 
sewer treatment plant. Many individuals interviewed had personal 
agendas they felt were important and on which they had tried to act. 
For example, the then-current chair of the Board of Selectmen felt that 
the storm provi ded a perfect opportunity for the town to thi n out, to 
discourage and legislate against development along the shoreline, and to 
construct increased protection for shorefront housing. The civil 
defense director wanted to get more radio equipment and supplies and to 
use the disaster as a way to remind local busineses to complete their 
disaster equipment inventories. The community development director was 
hopeing for increased mitigation measures for residential 
construct ion. With the exception of increased rad i 0 equi pment, these 
aims were only moderatey supported by the community. 
Before the disaster, the majority of town officials and residents 
took a react i ve posit i on regardi ng emergency management (and no doubt 
other areas as well). The local decision makers, given this reactive 
posture, exhibited little foresight. After the blizzard of 1978, it was 
not long before the state DRT realized the town did not have the 
capacity to cope with repairing millions of dollars in damages to public 
facilities or to help residents recover from their losses. Hull could 
not take the lead on recovery activities because there was no town 
manager or public works director and because the selectmen were divided 
over how to coordinate recovery activities. This lack of central 
coordination was reflected in the fact that each time the city received 
a major grant, a consultant was hired to take charge of it. 
In the first month after the disaster, recovery efforts went 
relatively smoothly because the town's designated representative, a 
sel ectman, had been gi ven 1 eave from hi s job to take care of Hull's 
immed i ate needs and coordi nate the city's long-range recovery process. 
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The DRT, realizing that this type of professional management and 
coordination needed to continue, funded a full-time disaster coordinator 
with a grant from the EDA. Originally, the coordinator was to consult 
with Hull and the neighboring towns of Cohasset and Scituate. As it 
turned out, Hull's problems were so severe that the coordinator devoted 
all efforts to the city. The first person to hold this job remained for 
about a year and was then replaced by a certified public accountant who 
is i nvo 1 ved pri mari 1 y with record keepi ng and account i ng, but oversees 
the remaining disaster recovery work. 
Public Projects 
The DSRs estimated that it woul d cost $6 mill i on to compl ete 84 
public projects.* The two most costly projects funded by the FDAA 
(predecessor of FEMA) were the rebuil di ng of shorefront protection and 
the repa i ri ng of the wastewater treatment plant. Each project cost $2 
million. An additional $700,000 was used to restore the municipally 
owned street lighting system, and $1.3 million was used for clearance, 
demolition, and road repair. 
Shore protection. The storm damaged or dest royed most of the sea 
wa 11 on the ocean side of Hull. When the repair work was about to 
begin, the town discovered that although it had maintained the sea wall, 
it did not own all parts. The town negotiated easements for property it 
did not own in order to avoid further delays in construction. The Board 
of Selectmen and the disaster coordinator hired an engineering firm to 
rebuild the sea walls, which were being completed at the time of the 
interviews (March of 1981). The public works department had little 
involvement because the position of director was vacant during most of 
the reconstruction, as it is now. The town officials are convinced the 
*More federal money was spent in Hull under a number of different 
grants, as will be described in the following pages. 
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rebuilding that was done was not the best possible because of the legal 
requirement that specifies a community can be reimbursed only for the 
expenses necessary to bri ng the fac il i ty back to prestorm condition. 
The chair of the Board of Selectmen believes this hurt the town because 
many of the sea walls were inadequate when the storm hit. The time wa 
perfect to replace the sea walls with ones that met current standards, 
but the city was unable and the federal government unwill i ng to pay the 
additional cost. 
Nantasket Beach dune stabilization. Nantasket Beach runs along the 
oceans i de of Hull. Half of the beach is operated by the Metropolitan 
District Commission (a regional water, sewer, and parklands agency) as 
pub 1 i c beach; the other half is owned by the town. Si zeab 1 e dunes run 
along the shore road. The residents in the Hull incorporated area rely 
on the Nantasket dunes for storm protection. The blizzard caused 
significant damage to the dunes, and the town applied to FDAA for aid to 
rebuild them. The FDAA disallowed the expenditures because in order for 
the project to be funded the dunes must be human-made. The town claimed 
they were, but the FDAA felt there was i nsuffi c i ent evi dence to prove 
it. 
City offi cia 1 s then appl i ed for CDBG funds from the state, whi ch 
agreed to fund the project and commissioned a major engineering study. 
Town and state officials tried to "sell" the recommended improvements to 
the resi dents, but the proj ect was never approved. The homeowners 
believed the dunes would be 16 feet high, which would make it impossible 
to see the water from their homes, watch their children on the beach, or 
monitor those who were on the beach, and they would prevent handicapped 
persons from ga i ni ng access to the beach because of the prohi bit i ve 
hei ght. The confus i on arose over the difference between hei ght above 
sea level and height from beach level. Actually, the dune level would 
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have been only four to five feet high. The town could neither prove to 
many beach front homeowners that it owned the beach nor guarantee the 
added height would increase protection. In addition, the cost of 
maintaining the dunes was estimated to be very high. Unfortunately, 
this was the only structural mitigation measure that could be taken to 
protect the homes a 1 ongthe beach. Consequently, no structural measures 
were taken in the aftermath of the disaster, but damaged and destroyed 
homes were restored or rebuilt. 
Bl uff restorat ion. Over the years, the houses buil t on the Hull 
bl uffs had increased the amount of runoff the soil had to absorb. The 
soil was weakened because the runoff created a looser base ,mak i ng the 
lower porti on of the bluff more suscept i b 1 e to scouri ng and eros ion 
during storms. The February blizzard demonstrated the weakening as the 
bottom of thebl uff did suffer significant damage. The DRT provided 
funding to study and do major restoration on the bluffs. After 
completing the project, the DRT admitted if they had the choice again, 
they woul d not fund the bluffs because the cost was too hi gh for the 
minimal number of homes helped by the restoration. 
Sewage treatment pl ant. In February of 1978, the town I s sewage 
treatment plant, which was being built in compliance with federal 
wastewater treatment standards, was 98% complete. The plant is located 
at the edge of Hull; from its doorstep both the ocean and the bay are 
visible. The winter storm completely flooded the plant, damaging or 
destroying $2 million in equipment. It was evident that the 
floodproofing measures were not adequate. Many residents were not upset 
by the damage because the treatment plant had been a source of 
controversy for many years. 
Before beginning the repairs, the decision had to be made as to who 
was responsible. The plant had not been turned over to the town (which 
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did not want the financial burden). The FDAA had no precedent to fund 
the repairs, and the EPA declined responsibility because the plant was 
theoreti ca 11 y town property. The Corps of Engineers and the State 
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering were considered possible 
funding agencies, but both were reluctant to get involved. Eventually, 
all these federal agencies shared in the costs of repai rs. The current 
chair of the Board of Selectmen maintains that if the town had owned the 
plant, considerable time and effort would have been saved and the 
repairs would have been allowed under the public assistance program. 
Municipal lighting systems. Heavy snow and sleet from the blizzard 
pulled down large portions of the town's lighting system. Using the 
funds provided by a FDAA grant-in-lieu, the municipally-owned electric 
company repl aced the 1 i ght i ng system and improved it by us i ng copper 
rather than aluminum wiring. The switching system was also changed from 
manual to automatic. 
Storm drainage. Prolonged flood conditions did most of the damage 
to the res i dent i a 1 and pub 1 i c property. The f1 oodwaters remai ned in 
Hull for two or three days because of an inadequate storm drainage 
system. The state coul d not make pumps avail ab 1 e to get the water out 
of the streets. While the town waited for the water to recede, public 
works employees dug channels through existing sea walls to let the water 
out. 
Thi s prolonged f1 ood i ng wi 11 not happen aga in because the town is 
rebuil ding its entire storm sewer system wi th fundi ng from a 
Comprehensive Small Cities (HUD) grant. Sewer lines are being enlarged 
and a pumping station installed, which can pump water into Hingham Bay. 
Town Involvement with Residential Repair 
Hull had a CDBG-funded residential rehabilitation program under way 
at the time of the storm. The program, aimed at low- and moderate-
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income families, provided grants between $5,000 and $8,500. After the 
storm, these monies were used to help families rebuild their storm-
damaged homes. CDBG dolars, SBA funds,and emergency CDBG money from the 
state were used to fund the rehabil itation work. The CDBG program 
provided an additional code inspector to check for damage, to estimate 
repairs, to determine funding availability and applicability, and to 
provide other financial or technical assistance as needed. 
The state provided money, from a state CDBG grant, to elevate 
utilities and other essential structures. The floodproofing program was 
under-used for the most part because elevating homes was incredibly 
expensive and there was no interest in elevating utilities. 
Hull continues to offer the utility raising program, but the demand 
has not been heavy. The commun ity development di rector i ndi cated that 
a lthough many residences needed repai r, when those repai rs were made 
little was done to mitigate against flooding in the future. 
There was little controversy over the rebuilding of damaged 
homes. The local Conservation Commission was charged by state statute 
to protect the wetlands. To do so, the commi ss i on must revi ew, hold a 
heari ng, and approve any rebuil di ng pl an for a structure buil t on the 
wetlands that was damaged 50% or more. But, the commission had 
relatively little restrictive effect on such rebuilding because of the 
wide interpretation of the damages standard. 
Finances 
Hull was plagued with organizational problems before the diaster; 
when the b 1 i zzard struck, it exacerbated them. The state DRT and the 
town's designated representative worked to get the DSRs completed and to 
secure as much federal financial assistance as was possible. As the 
work began and federal spending requirements mounted, the state realized 
that the town accountant was unable to cope with the additional work. 
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This led to the decision to hire a disaster coordinator, who 
. unfortunate ly--a long with most of the town offi ci a 1 s--was 1 ax about 
record keepi ng. The 1 ack of adequate records has become a seri ous 
problem because the federal audits are beginning. 
The second financial problem for Hull is the federal process for 
getting money. Since FDAA operated on a reimbursement basis, Hull had 
to ra i se the money to compl ete the proj ects. Cities and towns cannot 
deficit spend without the approval of the State Emergency Finance Board 
and the governing body, a restriction that delayed the completion of 
many projects. 
Hull also received a disaster loan from a HUD discretionary fund, 
which was used to defray administrative costs. The disaster coordinator 
is hoping to obtain a waiver of the loan requirements and receive the 
money as a grant. 
Mitigation Measures 
Hull's short-term miti gat i on measures i ncl uded the replacement of 
the sea walls and other shore protection, which were undertaken as part 
of the rebuilding process. Their effectiveness as mitigation measures 
may be negligible if Hull receives a similar storm in the near future. 
The remainder of the town's mitigation projects were planned as long-
term measures. 
Acquisition 
Hull was approached by FEMA to consider using Section 1362 monies 
to acquire beachfront land. The town refused. Local residents were not 
interested in selling their property as long as it was unclear who was 
going to manage it. During initial discussions, it was suggested that 
the Metropol itan Di strict Commi ssi on take the 1 and si nce it controll ed 
the major beach in the town. Residents refused because a significant 
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rift exists between the town and the commission. The town felt that if 
either it or the federal government had guaranteed control, the 
acquisition would work. The current chair of the Board of Selectmen 
thi nks the Secti on 1362 program woul d be a great 1 and use tool for 
"pruning" the coast of the little houses that cover the waterfront. 
Civil Defense 
The Civil Defense Director, a volunteer part-time employee, 
expl ai ned that once the severity of the s ituat i on was real i zed, the 
emergency operations plan was discarded and the players began to act on 
instinct. Since the 1978 blizzard, Hull has reassessed its civil 
defense needs. There is now an emergency oeprat ions center in the 
municipal building and two back-up radio rooms in other parts of town; 
an increase is also in the town budget for suppl i es. Th,e di rector 
rea 1 i zes ci vil defense functions do not have top pri ority and concedes 
the town does not have a formal emergency plan. The di rector does 
believe, however, that there is enough support and necessary means to 
cope with emergency management. 
Emergency Management Capability 
Hull's emergency management capabil ity rests sol ely with the more 
sophisticated selectmen and, temporarily, with the Disaster 
Coordinator. Little effort has been made to institutionalize the 
recovery capabi 1 ity. The town is fortunate, however, to have a more 
capable Executive Secretary (manager) than it had in 1978. The current 
manager shows a capacity to understand the federal and state grants 
system, but has not had first-hand disaster experience. 
Ordinances 
Two ordi nances were passed at a town meeti ng as a result of the 
storm. One ord i nance now requi res ut il it i es to be rai sed out of the 
basement to avoid the dangers encountered previously. The second 
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increased the minimum lot size to help control the amount of 
construction on the remaining beach front property. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
Hull is a poor town; 50% of the residents are on some form of 
assistance. The town is unable to undertake substantial projects or 
initiate major land use or property ownership changes on its own. All 
major repair projects take place because the federal government imposes 
or pays for them. The local leaders do not have the stamina to create 
changes from within. 
For exampl e, a lot at the narrowest part ofthe town has long 
remained vacant due to local public indecision. Twelve years ago, a 
developer purchased the land to build a high-rise for the elderly. 
Because of zoning fights, funding difficulties, and legal battles, it 
has not been built. The selectmen realize that if the proposed building 
had been occupied during the blizzard, it would have been flooded and 
severe ly damaged. Neverthe 1 ess, they are unwi 11 i ng to prohi bit its 
construction. The town manager is discouraged by barrier beach 
conservat ion requi rements because they have stymi ed development in the 
town. 
The Nantasket Beach project is an example of residents being 
unwi 11 i ng to agree to make mi nor changes to improve thei r safety. 
Because they wi 11 not try to understand the proposed proj ect, they are 
willing to suffer more damage. 
It appears that Hull will continue to muddle through recovery 
activities. People will remain in their unprotected homes and suffer 
the consequences. The next storm wi 11 test the town' s new emergency 
response systems. Because there is no plan and no local public 
official s who are famil iar with emergency management, the leadership 
will have its ingenuity tested as well. 
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CHAPTER IX 
GRUNDY, VIRGINIA 
Background 
Grundy, Virginia, a tiny town of approximately 2,000 residents, is 
located 93 miles west of Blacksburg on a narrow flood plain along the 
Levisa River. The town covers slightly more than five square miles and 
is bordered by steep mountain slopes. 
Grundy is the seat of Buchanan County. It has a mayor-council form 
of government, part-time town offi cia 1 s, and a 1 oca 1 economy that is 
heavily dependent on the mining of metallurgical coal. In 1980, 
unemployment in Grundy was lower than in most areas of the country, but 
staggering inflation, soaring rates of interest, and "coal's poor market 
conditions" left the economy "somewhat listless," according to the area 
newspaper. Economic conditions had not improved during the first 
several months of 1981. 
Description of the Disaster 
On the morning of July 15, 1979, severe thunderstorms dropped 4.2 
inches of ran within a two-hour period on Buchanan and adjacent 
count i es. More rai n fell on the fo 11 owi ng day. These storms caused 
serious flash flooding in the Hurley and Knox Creek areas of Buchanan 
County and some minor flooding in Grundy. 
According to official reports, the torrential rains and rising 
waters in the county were responsible for the deaths of two persons and 
for injuries to 50 others. Additionally, 54 homes, 12 trailers, 15 
businesses, and 108 vehicles were either severely damaged or 
destroyed. The flood also damaged or destroyed 257 bridges (251 
private, 6 public), 76 miles of road (26 miles private, 50 miles 
public), and Grundy's water and sewer systems. Finally, the rising 
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waters forced the evacuation of approximately 200 famil i es and caused 
damage estimated at $8.7 million ($3.7 million public, $5 million 
private), a figure that indicates the flood was much less serious than 
several others that have occurred recently. 
Response Phase 
Soon after the rains began, the Emergency Services Coordinator for 
both Grundy and Buchanan County contacted each member of the County 
Board of Supervi sors. The board was requested to convene to determi ne 
if an emergency was imminent. The board, which met during the afternoon 
of Jul y 15, qui ckl y dec i ded that there was reason to begi n emergency 
operations. On July 17, an executive order proclaimed that a "state of 
emergency" existed in Grand County. The following day, President Carter 
was asked for a Presidential Disaster Declaration. The declaration, 
which was issued two days later on July 20, authorized the FDAA to cover 
the full cost of repairing storm-damaged structures. 
The board had accepted the Coordi nator I s recommendat i on to close 
the major road into Grundy, and ordered the evacuation of persons whose 
houses had been severely damaged or destroyed or who could not reach 
thei r houses because thei r pri vate roads and bridges had been washed 
away. The board also instructed the coordinator to establish a first-
aid station and a public shelter with food, bedding, baby formula, and 
medical supplies. A private helicopter owned by a board member was made 
avail ab 1 e for emergency use. Because most of the fl ood i ng and seri ous 
damage occurred in Buchanan County, rather than in Grundy, the county 
officials organized the immediate response. Nevertheless, the county 
officials did consult with the mayor throughout the emergency period. 
Duri ng that peri od, the mayor and the counc il also met. They 
instructed the town I s water department to begi n repai ri ng the damaged 
water and sewer systems, and called on several local mining companies to 
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assist in removing debris from blocked and damaged roads. The mayor and 
council also decided which town employees would work overtime during the 
crisis and how traffic was to be routed through the town. 
The residents of Grundy pride themselves on their independence and 
pioneer spirit--on their willingness to "pitch in" and help their 
neighbors in times of crisis and on their reluctance to ask for help 
unless it is absolutely essential. One official illustrated this point 
by noti ng that more than half of the peopl e whose homes had been 
seriously damaged found shelter with friends and family. Relatively 
few, in other words, found it necessary to wait for federal or state 
assistance. Another official recalled how willing and ready the mining 
companies were to respond to the council's request for heavy equipment. 
Despite the reluctance to accept assistance,' Grundy did receive 
help from a variety of sources. The state National Guard, for example, 
provided personnel and equipment to assist the locals in rescue and 
evacuat i on efforts. The guard also estab 1 i shed 20 water supply poi nts 
throughout the county. Moreover, the state highways and transportation 
department helped to remove debris, the Red Cross contributed first-aid 
suppl i es, the FDAA sent mobil e homes to be used for temporary hous i ng, 
and Mennoni tes from several nei ghbori ng states ass i sted homeowners in 
cleaning the mud and debris from their yards and houses. 
Within seven days of the initial storm, virtually all of the 
immediate human needs had been satisfied. The water and sewer mains had 
been repai red, all of the homel ess had found temporary hous i ng, and 
clean-up activities were well under way. 
Historical Context 
Eleven floods have ravaged Buchanan County since 1929. Prior to 
the flood of 1979, the most recent was in April, 1977. That flood swept 
through downtown Grundy and caused more than $99 mill ion in damage 
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throughout the county. Many resi dents cons ider the Apri 1 (1977) flood 
to be the worst in the county's history. Other floods occurred in 1957, 
1963, and 1967. 
Despite these experiences, few of the locals have moved away. Some 
claim that their pioneer spirit enables them to view a disaster as a 
chall enge to be met and overcome. Others assert that there is 1 itt1 e 
they can do to avoid the floods because most of the county's inhabitable 
land lies within the flood plain. For many of these people, moving out 
of the county and away from thei r jobs and fami 1 i es are unacceptable 
alternatives. 
It would seem, then, that most of the residents of Buchanan County 
soul d be acutely aware of the need for mit i gat ion measures--and, in 
fact, many are. That awareness, however, has not been converted into a 
persistent demand on public officials for mitigative actions. Though 
difficult to explain, one reason might be that many of the residents 
have been preoccupied with more immediate and presssing economic 
problems. Consider, for example, the period following the flood of 
April, 1977--a time when a concern with mitigation should have been 
high, but was not. During that period, construction on a mid-town road 
project had begun, which resulted in a traffic slowdown, a loss of 
parki ng, and lower wages for coal haul ers. Thi s, in turn, had an 
adverse effect on retail sales. In September, the United Mine Workers 
went out on strike; and in November, there was a second flood warranting 
a federal disaster declaration. Many of the temporary repairs to the 
water and sewer 1 i nes damaged the previ ous Apri 1 had to be redone. 
Then, between January and March of 1978, snow and ice covered many of 
Grundy's roads, bringing shopping in the downtown area almost to a 
ha It. By the mi dd1 e of 1978, the snow and ice had melted, but a 
railroad strike virtually paralyzed the economy of the town and 
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county. Finally, in January, 1978, the coal industry encountered a 
"soft" market, and production was severely curtailed. The point here is 
that poor economic conditions may be responsible for the fact that 
mitigation has not been a high priority for many of Granville's 
residents. 
It shoul d be noted, however, that between Apri 1, 1977, and June, 
1979, approxi mate 1 y 10% of the households in Buchanan County purchased 
fl ood insurance whil e the community was in the emergency phase of the 
NFIP. (Recently, more residents have been purchasing flood insurance; 
the community now is in the regular phase of the NFIP.) This suggests 
that many of the area's residents did consider flooding to be a serious 
problem prior to the storm of July, 1979. 
Recovery Activities 
As noted earlier, most of the damage caused by the flood occurred 
in the county, rather than in the town of Grundy. Consequently, the 
County Board of Supervi sors organi zed most of the recovery act i vit i es. 
According to several sources, those activities focused almost 
exclusively on the restoration of damaged roads and bridges because 
those structures bore the brunt of the rising waters. 
The County Board of Supervisors is composed of seven elected 
officials, each of whom represents a district within the county. Soon 
after the emergency had ended, these officials toured their districts to 
estimate the damage with representatives from FEMA and the highways and 
transportation department. 
Though each of the seven supervi sors was well aware that federal 
funds would pay for most of the restorations, there is little evidence 
that any of these offi ci a 1 s vi ewed the di saster as an opportunity to 
implement capital improvement projects that had been planned prior to 
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July. In other words, the board appears to have been quite content to 
restore the roads and bridges to predisaster conditions. 
When estimates of the damage had been ~ompleted, the board 
organi zed efforts to buil d temporary bri dges where they were needed 
most. In many cases, these were pri vate 1/ access 1/ bri dges that crossed 
the streams and creeks that ran between homes and roads. The buil ding 
of temporary bridges was deemed essential because many of the families 
whose houses had not been seri ousl y damaged were 1 i vi ng in temporary 
shelters because they had no way to reach their homes. According to one 
official, the cost of these temporary bridges was included in the DSRs. 
During the third week following the flood, the board accepted bids 
for rebuilding the damaged county bridges. An engineering firm from 
nearby Marion was hired to develop specifications and to review the 
technical merits of each bid. Ultimately, the board chose from among 
the bids and signed contrats with the winning firms, most of whom were 
based in the state and county. 
The rebuilding of the private bridges was handled somewhat 
differently. In many cases, the board used hourly labor to complete 
repairs. In other cases, they simply selected a reputable contractor, 
without inviting bids. And, in still other cases, residents were told 
how much money they coul d spend on repairs and were then allowed to 
decide for themselves who would do the work. In several of these cases, 
the cost of repai rs exceeded the all ocat ion, and the res i dents were 
required to pay the difference. A bidding process was not used for the 
private bridges because the FDAA had assured the board that bids were 
not required for projects of such limited scope. 
It should be noted that these projects were paid for with federal 
funds. Though somewhat unusual (typi ca 11 y, federal funds woul d not be 
used for repairing such privately owned structures), it is likely that 
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federal officials believed that the cost of repairing the access bridges 
would be less than the cost of relocating those families who could not 
reach their relatively undamaged houses. 
Although federal funds eventually paid for the rebuilding of 
vi rtua11 y all damaged roads and bri dges, the county was requi red to 
finance a large portion of each contract. For some, the county 
"fronted" 25%; for others that figure exceeded 90%. According to two 
officials, this was a problem because the county was forced to borrow 
money at hi gh rates of i nterest--and interest is not a recoverable 
expense. The official s al so compl ained that all of the federal funds 
still have not reached the county, a delay that is draining thousands of 
dollars from already-depleted county coffers. 
By the middle of October--roughly three months after the flood--
nearly all of the private bridges had been repaired. Within six months, 
most of the county bridges (and roads) also had been repaired. The 
Board of Supervi sors is proud of the fact that they were abl e to 
complete the recovery so quickly. Local opinions of the state's 
response to the disaster were quite favorable. The only negative 
comments focused on the 1 ength of time (14 days) the state took to 
process the Public Assistance checks and pass the money on to the town. 
Mitigation Measures 
For public officials of both the city of Grundy and Buchanan 
County, mitigation is a household word. Indeed, the officials recognize 
the need for fl ood prevention measures and have devoted cons i derab 1 e 
time to developing a mitigation strategy. This concern with mitigation, 
however, did not emerge in the wake of a single disaster; instead, it 
slowly evolved as a natural response to a frequently occurring problem. 
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Grundy's mi t i gat i on strategy revolves around Pub 1 i cLaw 96-367, 
Section 202, which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to construct, 
"at full federal expense," flood control measures in Buchanan and 
neighboring counties. More specifically, town officials approach 
mitigation as a process involving local planning and federal dollars. 
The principal element in Grundy's mitigation strategy is meetings--
of the council, with county supervisors, with representatives of the 
Corps of Engi neers, and with state and federal offi ci al s. Ouri ng these 
meetings, the participants discuss specific mitigation measures and a 
time frame for their implementation. For example, at one such meeting 
between town officials and the Corps of Engineers, the mayor presented a 
formal resolution containing several proposals for the Corps to 
consider. The proposals included constructing floodwalls; redesigning, 
raiSing, and moving bridges; reshaping the Levisa River Basin; and 
dredging the mouth of Watkins Branch. 
These proposals had been developed duri ng meet i ngs of the counc il 
at which citizen participation was encouraged. The engineering firm 
from Marion also attended these meetings. According to accounts in the 
1 oca 1 press, the proposals were supported by the Grundy Chamber of 
Commerce, by local utility companies, and by a small, informal group of 
concerned citizens. The reporter who wrote the stories and several town 
and county officials all agreed that none of the proposals were 
considered to be controversial by area residents. 
After the resolution had been presented, the Corps of Engineers 
agreed to study the proposals and decide which ones might warrant 
action. The Corps added, however, that no action would be taken for at 
least a year; to date, none has been taken. 
Grundy officials were annoyed with the Corps' response to the 
town's suggestions. For example, one official complained that while the 
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town was ready to act, the Corps was "holding things up." Another said 
that the Corps was more interested in studyi ng problems than in doi ng 
what was needed to sol ve them. St i 11 another noted that deal i ng with 
Washington is almost always a problem because of the massive amount of 
paperwork, and because "they'll study you to death." 
On another occas ion, the mayor and the town's water department 
director met with the county administrator, several county supervisors, 
the execut i ve director of an area deve 1 opment proj ect, three 
representat i ves of the Mari on engi neeri ng fi rm, and a senator's ai de. 
The purpose of that meeting was to exchange ideas for a flood prevention 
program. One participant suggested that local officials would be well-
advi sed to keep in close touch with the Corps of Engi neers. Another 
argued that the vari ous proposal s bei ng developed shoul d be combi ned 
into a "coordinated program" before being sent to the Corps, and still 
another suggested that the Corps be i nvi ted to Grundy for addit i ona 1 
discussions. 
Clearly, town officials appear to believe that they know what 
mi ti gat i on measures are needed. They a I so appear to be I i eve that the 
Corps should accept their recommendations and begin construction without 
further del ay. 
Several officials spoke of a mitigation measure that they have been 
discussing for more than a decade. That proposal involves rerouting the 
Levisa River around Grundy by making a "cut" through a mountain. The 
earth and rock from the cut would be used to fill the obsolete section 
of river bed, thereby increasing the town's inhabitable acreage. Nearly 
every official interviewed agreed that "moving the river" was the only 
permanent solution to Grundy's flooding problem. However, since the 
estimated cost of the project exceeds the amount of 202 funds available, 
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the council has not asked the Corps to study it seriously. Nor has the 
town sought funding from other sources. 
The County Board of Supervisors has also engaged in mitigation 
planning. Working with the Cumberland Plateau Planning District 
Commission, the board has proposed relocating approximately 19 miles of 
State Route 460 to an area far removed from the banks of the Levi sa 
River. Initially, seven alternative routes were developed, but the 
board recently selected two for the state to consider. 
On March 31, 1981, a public meeting was held in Grundy to discuss 
the proj ect. Officials from the State Highways and Transportation 
Department attended. At present, no one is sure what the state wi 11 
deci de. However, even the most opt imi st i c 1 oca 1 offi cia 1 s expect fi ve 
years to elapse before anything concrete is accomplished. 
The proposals contained in the council's resolution and the 
rerouting of both the Levisa River and State Route 460 are by no means 
the only suggestions di scussed among those concerned with mit i gat i on. 
For example, a local shop owner called for the construction of "hundreds 
of 1 ittle dams" at the heads of creeks that fl ow through the 
mountains. A retired county official favored the terracing of slopes 
along the floodplain and the periodic dredging and snagging of heavily 
silted waterways. A town offi ci a 1 supported stri cter enforcement of 
existing flood plain regulations, complaining that neither the county 
nor the Corps has adequate enforcement authority. Another official also 
called for stricter enforcement of floodplain regulations, but added 
that strict enforcement probably would never happen because many of the 
regulations were ill-suited to the area's terrain. The official noted 
that most buildings would be safe from a lOO-year flood only if elevated 
a dozen feet, and that this was such an unrealistic demand that the 
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county felt compelled to issue construction variances on an almost 
regular basis. 
Finally, both town and county officials spoke of the need to 
encourage the area's mining companies to "level-off" the tops of 
mountains after the coal has been removed. They said that the level 
acreage coul d be used for re 1 ocat i ng res i dents now 1 i vi ng along the 
ri vers and creeks. To date, thi s proposal has not recei ved wi despread 
support because the funds to bring water, sewers, and power to the tops 
of mountai ns are not avail ab 1 e. It shoul d be noted, however, that 
Grundy has constructed an airport (or, to be more precise, a runway) on 
the top of one mountain, and a coal company has begun construction of a 
residential community on the top of another. The 1,500 acre community 
will consist of 1,000 single-family homes, 350 trailer pads, 200 to 400 
apartment units, a school, a church, and a fire station. It will also 
include park areas and a business district. Though the coal company's 
primary purpose is to house miners who work for the firm, the project is 
considered by some to be an excellent example of an alternative to 
building in the flood plain. 
Since 1979, several major mitigation studies have been conducted 
for the Grundy area. One study was initiated by the Cumberland Plateau 
Commi ss i on, whi ch hi red the engi neeri ng fi rm from Mari on to do the 
research. (The study was fun,ded by a grant from a regional 
commission.) The firm was charged with exploring the causes of 
flooding, developing a sound flood abatement program based on both 
corretive and prventive measures, preparing an implementation schedule, 
and ident ifyi ng poss i b 1 e sources of fund i ng. Accord i ng to the deputy 
director of the Cumberland Plateau Commission, the study stresses 
nonstructural measures such as protecting individual buildings by 
waterproofing, installing warning systems, and enforcing flood plain 
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management programs and zoning controls. When the report was completed, 
it was presented to the County Board of Supervisors and is currently 
under review. 
A second study is bei ng conducted by the Corps of Engi neers to 
examine nonstructural solutions to the flooding problem. It will also 
examine structural alternatives, including the building of dams and 
bridges. 
Town and county officials are very eager to develop and implement a 
flood program. (More eager, in fact, than many of the area's 
res i dents.) They devote consi derab 1 e energy to formul at i ng proposals 
and to encouraging the Corps of Engineers to adopt them. It should be 
stressed, however, that the Corps has the fi nal say over what will be 
done, and for many officials that is a continuing source of frustration. 
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CHAPTER X 
PIKE COUNTY, KENTUCKY 
Backround 
Pi ke County, the 1 argest county in Kentucky, covers 780 square 
miles in the southeastern part of the state. The county's population is 
81,000. The Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River flows along Pike County's 
northeastern boundary; the Russell and Levi sa forks of the Bi g Sandy 
River run throuyh the western half. The county government is headed by 
an elected county judge/executive. A five-member fiscal court acts as 
the legislative body. 
Pi ke County's economy is di rectly 1 inked to coal, with coal 
production vi rtually the only industry n the area. The few 
manufacturers who have located in the area make equi pment used in the 
production of coal. Coal companies and their employees are the 
purchasers of the majority of local services. 
Description of the Disaster 
The flash flooding that occurred on the morning of July 15, 1979, 
in the Freburn, Phelps, and Majestic sections (approximate population 
6,000 to 7,000) of Pi ke County was caused by a 1 oca 1 i zed storm that 
produced between 4.5 and 6 inches of rain over a period of three hours 
in a seven square mile area. The storm produced flash flooding in the 
local streams and creeks, which in turn carried away vehicles and 
damaged or destroyed houses, bridges, and roadways. As a result of the 
July, 1979, storm, three deaths occurred and almost ten homes were 
either badly damaged or destroyed. 
A Presidential Disaster Declaration was issued for the affected 
portions of Pike County on July 19, 1979. This declaration was the 
first instance in which federal disaster operations were coordinated by 
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the area's regional FEMA office. The approximate total expenditures 
under federal disaster programs in Pike County were: $700,000+ for 
temporary housing, $450,000 for individual and family grants, and 
$1,390,000 for public assistance. 
Fl oodi ng is not an unusual event in Pi ke County. Because of the 
1 oca 1 topography, the ent ire county is vul nerab 1 e to fl oodi ng. The 
county's terrain is mountainous and rugged, with the only flat land in 
the narrow river valleys and hollows. Roadbeds, railways, and homes are 
built along the banks of the numerous creeks. Runoff from the mountains 
is fast because of strip mining activities that clear mountainsides of 
vegetation and build mining roads up the mountains. The runoff causes 
erosion, which in turn increases the siltation rate of the creeks and 
streams, thereby decreasing their carrying capacity. This vulnerability 
is a function of topography, land use, and economics. The entire county 
has a large network of streams and creeks that drain into two forks of 
the Big Sandy River. 
The largest flood of record, which occurred in April, 1977, 
affected not only Pike County, but also 44 other counties in a four-
state area and caused an estimated $200 million in damage. The flood of 
1977 exceeded the 100-year level in Pike County and is looked on as the 
flood that raised the community's consciousness. Most of the people 
interviewed repeatedley referred to the flood of 1977, which struck the 
city of Pikeville heavily. 
In contrast to the 1977 fl ood, the fl ood of 1979 occurred in the 
eastern section of the county in Freburn, Phelps and Majestic. The 
flash flood, which was contained within this small area (approximately 
seven square miles), was typically localized. The only level land 
available for building sites is also located in the flood plain, thus a 
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large part of Pike County's flood problem is interwoven with housing and 
community development problems. 
An increased need for housing units brought about by the growth of 
the coal industry forces people to occupy homes in the flood plain. 
Land is extremely expensive because of the value of the mineral rights, 
and, as a result, the local mortgage market is extremely tight. In some 
cases, down payments of 50% are required, with a payback period of only 
10 to 15 years. The above factors help to explain why nine out of ten 
new homes in Pike County are mobile homes. 
The county judge had a great deal of experience deal ing with the 
effects of floods in Pike County and was no stranger to Presidential 
Di saster Decl arat ions. When asked about the flood of July, 1979, many 
peopl e referred to the fl ood of 1977 as a great 1 earni ng experi ence. 
The feeling seemed to be that if the community could rebuild after the 
1977 flood, the floods since then (1978, 1979) were manageable. 
At the fi rst i ndi cat i on of an i mpendi ng fl ood, the county judge 
convened a meeting of those people who would be involved in a possible 
emergency response. The group included the county flood plain manager, 
the county fl ood coord i nator, the county inspection and codes 
enforcement officer, the executive vice president of the county Chamber 
of Commerce, and the di saster and emergency services di rector. The 
judge appeared to be the central actor in these meetings as well as in 
all county administrative activities. At this meeting, preparations 
were checked and coordination reviewed. In the event of an actual 
flood, each person has asigned tasks to be carried out. This 
organization appears to have evolved over the years that the judge (who 
recently was defeated in a bid for a third term), has been in office. 
The county mobilizes its business community through the Chamber of 
Commerce. Although Pike County is basically rural, the Chamber of 
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Commerce has a full-time paid staff of three and a membership of 300 
businesses. the chamber has two special standing committees to deal 
with the flooding problem: the Warning Committee and the Flood 
Committee. Among the chamber's members are some of the county's major 
employers, including the coal companies, even though the coal operators 
have their own association. 
An interesting relationship was noted between the county government 
and the coal companies concerning response to flood disasters. 
Generally, the coal companies were quite helpful in providing personnel 
and hevy equipment for the initial clean-up following a flood. The 
county judge knew which coal companies would provide personnel and 
equipment and did not hesitate to ask for their assistance in an 
emergency. However, every local government official interviewed agreed 
that it would be improper for them to try to enlist the coal company's 
support in mitigation measures. Local official s were very grateful for 
the help of the coal compani es and felt very reluctant to ask for any 
type of additional assistance with the flooding problem. 
The judge was very successful in securing federal money in the form 
of general revenue shari ng, CDBG funds, and Farmers Home Admi ni strat ion 
funds. In addition, the state returns a substantial amount of money to 
Pi ke County in the form of coal severance taxes (over $3 mi 11 ion in 
fiscal year 1980-81). This is particularly important because the state 
has instituted a Proposition 13-type cap on local tax rates and this, 
combined with the tightening of federal grant money, has severely 
iimited the activities of the county government. 
The judge also subscribed to a commercial newsletter that announced 
the availability of grant money. From these announcements, he decided 
which grants to apply for based on recommendations of a private 
consultant who is retained to write grar.t appl ications. The judge was 
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successful in using this approach to obtain federal grant money not only 
under normal conditions, but also in flood recovery efforts. 
The county emergency services director was pleased with the state's 
response to the di saster. The only problem encountered was 
logistical: the lack of housing in the flood area forced the 
approximately 30 state employees who responded to the disaster to 
commute over 100 mi 1 es daily between the as i stance centers and thei r 
lodgings. 
Mitigation and Recovery 
Because Pi ke County has had along hi story of fl ood di sasters, 
flood mitigation actions are a continual concern. While some flood 
mitigation projects are in response to a single flooding incident, most 
are of a more general nature and are in recogni t i on that the area is 
extremely vulnerable to flooding. 
In July, 1979, the county was in the emergency phase of the NFIP. 
Now in the regular program, the county has enacted and is enforcing 
flood plain regulations. Several mitigation actions have been taken as 
a direct result of the flooding of July 15, 1979: 
1) No rebuilding has been allowed in the flood plain as 
indicated on the flood hazard boundary maps. While this 
is a good start, a problem has been encountered because 
the flood hazard boundary map does not sufficiently 
identify flood-prone areas. Because of the topography of 
thi s regi on, a maj ori ty of the fl ooded 1 and was not 
identified as being in the flood plain. Smaller scale 
flood maps are needed to obtain the full benefits from 
the NFIP and from the new flood plain regulations. 
2) A request was made for HUD Section 407 disaster funds for 
an alternative flood-free housing program. Initially 
affecting 80 households, this program is administered by 
the Pi ke County Hous i ng Authority and is des i gned to 
eliminate the future flood damage in the flood plain. 
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This voluntary program provides several options: 1) nonparticipation; 
2) acquisition and relocation; 3) relocation to a higher elevation on 
the same property; or 4) elevation of the structure in place. 
Many other mitigation measures in Pike County were undertaken not 
as a direct result of the 1979 flood, but in response to previous floods 
or in recognition of the continuous hazard posed by flooding. For 
example, in response to the April, 1977 flood, the Central Appalachian 
Development Association was created to reduce or mitigate flood damages 
in the area and three neighboring states. Pike County has directly 
benefited from these cooperative efforts setting up an area-wide flash 
flood warning system. this system uses a combination of volunteer 
observers and remote sensing rain gauges linked by microwave radio to a 
computer in nearby Frankfort to provide accurate information on which to 
base flood warnings. With additional federal funds, the commission has 
contracted with the Corps of Engineers to perform stream rehabilitation 
and to clear and snag creeks in the county. 
Other programs supporting flood mitigation affecting Pike County 
are run by the water resources division of the state national resources 
bureau. This division operates the Community Flood Damage Abatement 
Program. through this program, Pike County has been awarded state funds 
to create a flood insurance informational education program. A new 
emergency ope rat ions plan that has been wri t ten for Pi ke County is a 
result of a cooperativeeffort of the county, the state, and the Big 
Sandy Develoment Oi stri ct. Thi s pl an i ncl udes an annex coveri ng the 
operation of the Flash Flood Warning System. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
Pike County's flooding problems are tied to its housing problems. 
In the past, the 1 ack of deve 1 opab 1 eland has forced development of 
123 
flood-prone areas. The enforcement of new flood plain regulations 
together with better flood mapping should stop this practice. But the 
pressures to develop land within the flood plain will be tremendous. 
Community development funds to provi de water and sewer servi ce to new 
hous i ng developments on fl at-topped mountans woul d al so foster fl ood 
mitigation. The innovative use of grant money will be needed to 
accomplish this. 
At the state and local level, the new warning system should help to 
reduce damages in Pike County. The new Pikeville/Pike County Emergency 
Operations Plan, while a step in the right direction, should include 
more information on the vulnerability of the county to flooding and 
individual operational plans for when a flooding emergency occurs. In 
Pi ke County it is not a question of whether a fl ood wi 11 occur, but 
when. 
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CHAPTER XI 
PHOENIX, ARIZONA 
Background 
Phoenix, one of the fastest growing cities in the United States, 
has a popul at i on of 665,000. Its metropolitan area houses 50% of the 
state's population. Phoenix is a sophisticated, well-managed community 
that attempts to keep up administratively with the increasing demands of 
a growing municipality. A pleasant climate makes tourism a major part 
of the local economy, and the city is currently the ninth largest 
tourist area in the country. Other major industries are electronic 
equipment manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, sand and gravel mining, 
and government. 
Phoeni x, whi ch is al so the state capital, has the council-manager 
form of government, with an active mayor. It is the largest city in 
Maricopa County, which also encompasses Mesa, Tempe, and Scottsdale, and 
serves a population of 970,000. The relationship between the two 
jurisdictions is important because the county provides emergency 
management services (among others) for the municipalities within its 
boundari es. Mari copa County effectively coordi nates activities among 
the local jurisdictions. 
Phoenix is in a desert area; yet since 1891, the city has had a 
1 arge number of severe fl oods. The fl oods can be caused by: 1) a 
winter storm with low-intensity rainfall covering wide areas for several 
days; 2) general summer storms with heavy rainfall over wide areas; or 
3) local thunderstorms with high-intensity rainfall, usually of short 
duration, over small areas. Other factors that contribute to the 
severity of flooding are the levels of water contained in the watersheds 
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behind the dams upriver and the level of snow melt in the mountains 
during a rainstorm. 
Organizational Actors 
When flooding occurs in Phoenix, a number of organizations become 
involved in response and recovery activities. The main actors are the 
City of Phoenix, the Flood Control District of Maricopa County, the Salt 
River Project, the State Transportation Department, the State Disaster 
Preparedness Office, and the Maricopa County Civil Defense Office. The 
role each plays both before and after the disaster event is critical to 
how Phoenix copes with flooding. 
Phoenix. Because Phoenix has had three major floods in the last 
three years, the city has acquired the ability to respond effectively. 
The city's emergency operating plan is written to allow individual 
departments flexibility in designing their response within the overall 
city plan. Implementation of the plan requires no new staff or 
procedures. Because Phoenix is the largest jurisdiction in Maricopa 
County, and because it suffers the most damage due to the high value of 
the public facilities affected, the city has a very powerful voice in 
recovery planning for the area. 
The Flood Control District of Maricopa County. Founded in 1959, 
the Flood Control District is a municipal corporation and political 
subdivision of the state. The agency is responsible for providing 
structural flood control facilities within the county. The district is 
governed by a Board of Directors (county supervisors), with the advice 
of the Citizen's Flood Control Advisory Board. The district, which 
includes all other muniCipal corporations and political subdivisions 
within the county: 
• Acts as the local sponsor of federal flood control 
projects designed and constructed by the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service; 
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• Plans and constructs nonfederal flood control projects; 
and 
• Provides technical services related to flood plain 
management. 
Federa 1 agenci es pay the construction costs on federal proj ects. 
Land rights and relocations on federal projects are paid from the flood 
control tax on real property (currently 4~ per $100 of assessed value), 
and half of these costs are reimbursed by the state. The flood control 
tax provides an income of about $12 million per year. Loca 1 
(nonfederal) projects are paid for by a variety of state, flood control 
district, county, and city cost-sharing arrangements. 
Ouri ng a fl ood, the di stri ct operates its own emergency operations 
center. The staff monitors the water level of the Salt and other rivers 
and works with the Salt River Project in alerting the potentially 
affected communit i es as to the severity of the situat ion. It also 
provides technical assistance to all jurisdictions during and after a 
fl ood emergency. 
The Salt River Project. The Salt River Project is the nation's 
oldest multipurpose reclamation development project. Run by landowners 
in the valley, it has the 1 ega 1 status of a muni c i pa 1 ity. The project 
began as a water user's association in 1903 in order to obtain a federal 
loan to build a reservoi r that would hel p ease the water shortage 
problems in the valley. It now serves the most populated area of the 
state. 
Since the Roosevelt Dam was built in 1911, five more dams have been 
constructed to provi de water storage and power for the entire valley 
area. This system of dams has allowed Phoenix to grow and prosper, 
because the Salt River Project has provided a source of water and power 
that has grown as demand has increased. 
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During a flood, the Salt River Project has a number of functions. 
From its emergency operations center, water level and speed are 
monitored. It also makes the cruc i a 1 deci si on as to when water shoul d 
be released from the reservoirs to avoid topping the dams. In previous 
years, the Salt River Project has been criticized for not releasing 
water soon enough--resulting in overburdened channels and therefore 
causing more damage than was necessary. 
State Department of Transportation. The State Department of 
Transportation serves as the coordinating force for the local transit 
authorities. In this capacity, it helps to maintain similar levels of 
transportation technology throughout the state. The department becomes 
involved after a flood primarily in helping to plan a response to a 
transportation emergency. The situation reaches an emergency level in 
Phoenix because the Salt River, which floods most severely, bisects the 
city and separates the downtown section from the commuter cities of 
Tempe and Mesa. 
State Division of Emergency Services. The State Division of 
Emergency Services is a well-run and locally respected organizatiun. 
The staff see it as their responsibility to coordinate the efforts of 
all the jurisdictions in relations with the federal government and to 
aid during response as much as possible (see later discussion on 
local/state relations and state involvement). 
Maricopa County Department of Civil Defense and Emergency Services. 
The Ci vil Defense Offi ce coordi nates the efforts of all the groups 
involved in disaster response. The disaster plans of all agencies are 
coordinated with the county's plan, and all jurisdictions contract with 
the county for civil defense servces. In addition, representatives from 
the groups 1 i sted above, i ncl udi ng the sheriff's offi ce and the Red 
Cross, are represented in the County Emergency Operations Center during 
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the emergency. This allows for a better distribution of effort and 
keeps everyone aware of the latest information on weather. water flow. 
and bridge conditions. 
Description of the Disaster 
The rain began on February 12. 1980. as a series of major 
rainstorms. one almost immediately following another. moved into the 
state. The rain was heaviest northeast of Phoenix. in the watershed 
areas. The Salt River Project. which operates the dams. began releasing 
water from the storage areas to prevent water from toppi ng the dams. 
this was a critical decision because the storage areas were at 95% 
capacity when the rain began. The release of water. the rain. and the 
heavy snow me 1t from the mountai ns continued for ten days. causing 
severe flooding along the Salt and Agua Fria Rivers. 
Response Phase 
The city/county response to the 1980 flood was as close to routine 
as the city officials want to admit. After having major floods in 1978 
and 1979. the city and the county developed an emergency response 
system. As mentioned previously. the Emergency Operations Center was 
the control center. The county civil defense director was responsible 
for ordering evacuations and coordinating the activities of county 
organi zat ions. These i ncl uded the county sheriff IS offi ce. the Sa 1t 
River Project. Maricopa County Flood Control District. the Salvation 
Army. the Red Cross. the State Disaster Office. and the Phoenix Civil 
Defense Office. 
Evacuat i on warni ngs were issued begi nni ng on February 14. Few of 
the communities were affected by flood warnings because there were few 
developments along the rivers. Some communities have worked to keep 
flood plain development to a minimum. even though until 1978 such 
development did not appear to be risky. The communities affected had 
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been flooded during the two previous floods so they were well-organized 
with flood watch captains and pyramid phone call systems. The 
evacuations that were required went smoothly. 
The city staff responded to the disaster by giving extra hours of 
thei r time to answeri ng the di saster hot 1 i ne and whatever el se was 
necessary. The public transit system was put on stand-by for evacuation 
purposes. The Phoeni x emergency ope rat ions center was opened and made 
ready. Whil e the county EOC di d pl ay an important role in the county-
wide response to the flood, the city, through its own EQC, was solely 
responsible for all flood activities except shelters within the city 
limits. 
After the flood waters receded in the affected six-county area, the 
total damage was estimated at $12 million. As of May, 1981, Phoenix had 
recei ved $3.8 mill i on from the FEMA to cover repair costs. It is 
est imated that the total cost of repai rs wi 11 be $7.9 mill ion. The 
majority of the damage was done to public facilities: bridges, roads, 
and ri ver and channel beds. Phoeni x lost all but two bri dges over the 
Salt Ri ver, whi ch bi sects and separates the city from its southern 
neighbors. These bridges carry commuters from Tempe, Mesa, South 
Phoeni x and from Phoeni x. There was also si gnifi cant damage to the 
south end of the runway at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International 
Ai rport. Proj ects that were part of the recovery from previ ous floods 
also suffered heavy damage. 
Recovery Activities 
Heavy residential damage was restricted to a few communities. Very 
few homes were completely destroyed, with most of the damage restricted 
to water in basements and damaged utilities. The dams and other water 
control services suffered little or no damage. 
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The recovery process from this 
processes of the 1978 and 1979 floods. 
flood built on the recovery 
The problems were already well-
defi ned; it was now up to the city to compl ete or reevaluate proj ects 
that had been started earlier and to add others. 
The city used the same staff and same organization for recovery 
from the fl ood as was used for daily operat ions. No new organi zat ion 
was needed. This was true particularly in 1980 as the methods and 
coordinating ability were already in place. 
The main actors for the recovery process in Phoenix were the 
transportation director from the city manager's office and a junior 
member of the city manager's staff. These two individuals coordinated 
the work of the city engineers, the public transit administration and 
the city's relations with the state, county, Salt River Project, 
Maricopa County Flood Control District, and FEMA. 
As the storm waters receded, the city was left with two usable 
bridges out of 21 that crossed the Salt River, a flooded and damaged 
runway at the airport, a sanitary sewer leak, renewed demands for 
increased flood control from the citizens, and a need for all of the 
jurisdictions involved to reevaluate the options for flood control. 
At the heart of the recovery issue debate is Orme Dam. Many 
individuals in Phoenix believe that if the dam had been built, all the 
recent floods could have been avoided. In order to understand the 
city's situation, it is important to explain the Orme Dam controversy. 
Orme Dam and Its Alternatives 
Orme Dam was to be bui 1 t at the confl uence of the Sal t and Verde 
ri vers to the east of Phoeni x. A proposal for a dam at that site was 
made in the 1940s and was negotiated throug the decades until authorized 
by Congress about 1976. 
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Phoenix planners, hearing that Onne Dam was to be built, fell 
victim to long-term planning. The plans for the bridges and airport 
were designed on the assumption that the dam was to be built. this 
assured the city that the Salt River would have a flow of no more than 
50,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at any time. However, in 1977, Orme 
Dam was a victim of President Carter's water project hit list, which 
generated cons i derab 1 e controversy. When the debate became intense in 
Washington, President Carter commissioned a study to determine if Orme 
Dam was the correct, most cost-effecti ve, and fai rest method of flood 
control. The study came out against the dam. Many charged the 
administration with foul-play, but the study's findings held. The 
search for the proper alternative began. 
Conservationists oppose Orme Dam because they claim the nesting 
yrounds of the southern eagle will be destroyed. The Audubon Society 
says there are six pairs, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
indicated only one pair. Dam opponents also claim that there is a 
serious geologic fault in the area; the Bureau of Reclamation denies 
this. Others believe the alternatives, primarily a system of channels 
and 1 evees that make up the Central Ari zona Proj ect' sAri zona Canal 
Diversionary Channel (ACDC), which is to be completed in 1991, will be 
more cost effective. 
Another controversy surroundi ng the Orme Dam site is that the 
reservoir (watershed) behind the dam will flood a majority of the Fort 
McDowell Indian Reservation. The Indians claim the lake will cover a 
historic burial ground; the planners deny this. The Indians also say 
they would have to relocate 325 residents to other parts of the 
reservation. The Indian reservation bordering Fort McDowell would have 
a minor portion of its land affected, but opposes Orme Dam in support of 
the neighboring tribe. 
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The most recent argument agai nst the dam comes from the "tubers," 
those who use inner tubes to go down the Salt Ri ver rapi ds. It is 
estimated that there are 10,000 tubers a day during the season. They 
vow to fi ght the dam, cit i ng that it will ru in thei r low-cost 
rec reat ion. 
The supporters of Orme Dam believe it is the most efficient and the 
only way of providing flood control for the Phoenix urbanized valley. 
They understand Indi an concerns, but counter that re 1 ocat i ng a small 
number of people is better than spending millions of dollars to 
reconstruct bridges and airports--not to mention the hundreds of people 
the flood will drive from their homes, who in turn will lose thousands 
of dollars in productive time because they are unable to get work. 
Currentl y, there is a study bei ng conducted by the Army Corps of 
Engineers and other groups to choose the best alternatives for 
controlling flooding in the Phoenix area. The recommendations of the 
Orme Dam A lternat i ves Study Committee were due in October, 1981. The 
majority of the people interviewed felt Orme Dam would be the 
alternative selected as it was the only alternative that would provide 
a 11 the necessary protection. However, others who approved the dam in 
theory were doubtful that it would ever be built. They realize that the 
ori gi na 1 estimated cost of $400 mill i on will be much hi gher by 1982, 
making the cost-benefit ratio less appealing to the Corps of Engineers 
or the administration. 
Recently, another point has been raised in discussing flood 
protection. The Corps released a series of seismological safety 
requirements for dams. A careful inspection revealed that none of the 
fi ve dams upstream passed the stri ct requi rements. Thi s development, 
according to a Corps representative, is not being considered in the 
study of Orme Dam alternatives. He believes this deliberate oversight 
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will cause a delay in the release of the alternatives report aswellas in 
the resol uti on of the issue. Thi s problem cannot be ignored when the 
overall plan for flood control is put into effect. 
The Orme Dam or an alternative is needed in order to prevent 
further flooding; everyone agrees on this. Currently, everything being 
constructed downstream is consi dered temporary because whatever 
structure is put into place will have different effects. Communities in 
the Phoenix metropolitan area are forced to make recovery decisions that 
may 1 ead either to overprotect i on or underprotect i on of thei r pub 1 i c 
facilities and residents, depending on the final outcome. 
The other alternatives being studied are expanding the ACDC; 
floodproofing all of North Phoenix by building a series of earthen dams 
and levees, greenways, and channels; raising the Roosevelt Dam 15 feet 
to allow for more water storage; constructing a new cliff dam on the 
Verde River; constructing a new Stewart Mountain Dam; building a new 
Waddell Dam; reregulating the Salt River Project; or establishing a 
water exchange project with the Salt River Project. 
A Maricopa County supervisor has indicated disapproval of the ACDC 
Channel, claiming it will require relocating twice as many people as 
Orme Dam. Specifically, 700 people, 44 businesses, and 784 parcels of 
land would be relocated by the channel as opposed to 325 Indian 
residents for the dam. 
North Phoenix, but 
Some flood proofi ng is already bei ng done in 
the amount would have to be increased 
significantly. An engineer with the Corps explained that the Roosevelt 
Dam is not strong enough to support an increase in hei ght, and will 
probably have to be completely rebuilt. He suggests the money for Orme 
Dam should be used to build an enormous dam just below the Roosevelt. 
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Business Community 
According to the Phoenix transportation director, the business 
community and civic leaders have been actively in favor of flood 
control. The local papers have spoken in favor of some structural 
measure and of raising the flood control tax in Maricopa County to pay 
for the improvement. Three industries are directly affected by the lack 
of flood control--the sand and gravel industry, the airlines, and the 
tourist trade. 
The sand and gravel interests, located along the Salt River, own 
both the banks and the ri ver bed. Whenever there is severe fl ood i ng, 
they lose equipment as well as many days of productivity. The 
businesses, however, have been willing to cooperate with the city to try 
to correct the situation. This spirit of cooperation is evidenced in a 
number of projects, including the airport diversion channel that is 
being built around the airport to help control the flow of the river and 
to protect businesses and runways. 
Transportat ion 
Short term. Duri ng the fi rst week after the storm, Phoeni x had 
only one bridge out of 21 that was structurally sound. Some had been 
destroyed; others needed new approaches or other maj or reconst ruct i on. 
The interstate bri dge needed mi nor repairs before it reopened shortl y 
after the storm. The traffic over these two bridges, which increased 
from 30,000 average daily trips to 100,000, caused severe congestion on 
the approaches and raised quest ions as to the bri dges I capac i ty to 
withstand the additional stress. 
The city took responsibil ity for all the traffic reduction 
measures, except the Amtrak trai n. Those measures i ncl uded: park-and-
ride lots with express bus service downtown, car pool and bus express 
lanes on the bridges, reverse lanes during rush hours, specific access 
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streets for buses only, and the opening of a four-car Amtrak train that 
operated for a short time between Tempe, Mesa, and Phoenix. The state 
made the arrangements with the city to have the city buses meet the 
train and take passengers to a transfer point. 
Long term. The four-car Amtrak train no longer runs, the 
barricades are down, but there are still bridges to be rebuilt. The 
absence of any bridges across the Salt River is a major concern to 
officials of Phoenix and other jurisdictions. The public has not 
forgotten the traffic jams of 1980, as reflected in public approval of a 
recent bond issue for bridge construction. Seventy-five percent of the 
voters agreed to spend $63 million for the building of bridges able to 
wi thstand 200,000 cfs and for the access roads and sewers to accompany 
them. The Corps of Engineers feels this is overkill, pOinting out that 
a bridge of 200,000 cfs will withstand the 100-year flood, but will be 
very expensive to build. When additional flood control measures are 
constructed, according to the Corps, there will be no need to have such 
large bridges. One city official interviewed said the city should build 
bridges of different capacities. 
The commuting patterns of residents have not changed dramatically. 
The state government, however, is st ill advert is i ng the importance of 
car pooling, and the city is providing reverse rush hour lanes. The 
publ ic transportation di rector did note an increase in bus ridership 
si nce the fl ood. 
A major benefit of the storm for the assi stant di rector for the 
state I stransportat i on department was better working re 1 at ions wi th the 
city and the county. The official indicated that the department had 
developed a more sophisticated contingency plan. He also felt the 
efficacy of the short-term Amtrak route had helped citizens to realize 
136 
the possibility of light rail vehicle transportation in the metropolitan 
Phoenix area. 
Ai rport Channel 
In the 1978 flood, the Phoenix airport was badly damaged. Most of 
the southern runway, whi ch was located in the fl ood pl ai n, was under 
water. If adequate flood control measures were not introduced, the 
ai rport woul d have to relocate in order to expand to the capaci ty 
originally anticipated in the master plan. Estimates for this move have 
gone as high as $1 billion. 
A study commi ss i oned after the 1978 flood resulted ina proposed 
$10 million project to channel the Salt River in the vicinity of 15th 
Avenue, with funding provided by the state, the City of Phoenix, and the 
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). In April 1979, the State Legislature 
approved $4 million for the project. In May, 1979, voters approved bond 
issues that would provide the bond funds required for the city's 
share. FAA representatives have i nd i cated that federal funds woul d be 
available for acquisition of a portion of the required right-of-way for 
the proj ect. The des i gn flow is 176,000 cfs, with three feet of 
freeboard. The city consultant reports that a flow of 250,000 cfs would 
be contained within the channelized area with zero freeboard. FEMA has 
hi red a consultant to eval uate the stabil ity of the channel (see 1 ater 
discussion on relations with FEMA). 
As the work began, problems arose. Part of the area to be 
excavated was a landfill that had been closed years before. The EPA 
required the landfill be moved in order to avoid a health hazard. There 
was also a hazardous materials dump that had to be removed at a cost of 
millions of dollars. A Corps engineer predicts that this interim 
channel will disappear within one to fifty years, depending on future 
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flooding, and it will not alow the full expansion of the airport as the 
planners hope. 
Relations with FEMA 
Phoenix has had a lot of experience with FEMA and FDAA, its 
predecessor. A 11 the offi ci al s i ntervi ewed prefaced thei r comments on 
FEMA by saying they appreciated the substantial amounts of money 
received to rebuild and repair the community. They admitted they could 
not rebuild using only local revenues. Each, however, had a particular 
complaint, which frequently was about the new regulation requiring 
communities to pay for 25% of the recovery cost. This was a requirement 
for whi ch the 1 oca 1 s were not prepared. The offi cia 1 s emphasi zed that 
if Phoenix had another major disaster the city would not have the funds 
to contribute the 25%. One official, who showed us 11 inches of 
paperwork that were requi red to be kept for each di saster, stressed 
there must be some way to reduce this volume. FEMA was also acused of 
being narrowminded in its view of mitigation; the official thinks FEMA 
should have accepted Orme Dam as the supreme mitigation project. 
Another complaint voiced frequently was about the delays in 
beginning the audits. For Phoenix this is a significant problem because 
the city had three floods in three consecutive years. Officials 
indicated the difficulty in keeping each flood separate in their minds, 
let alone in the paperwork. Expenditure records are difficult to 
maintain and sUbstantiate from the earlier floods. A FEMA examiner 
wanted to see the results of a bridge repair from the 1978 flood; this 
was diffi cult because it had been destroyed in the 1980 fl ood., Rather 
than have audits to determine the amount of money a city should receive 
as a reimbursement, one local official thought the federal government 
shoul d gi ve the community the necessary amount to compl ete all the 
repai rs and then audit for any refund due to the federal government. 
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The offi ci a 1 was will i ng to take the chance that everythi ng woul d be 
done correctly and none of the money would have to be returned. 
Another official noted the change in attitude in the FEMA staff 
between the 1978 and the 1980 floods. In 1978, FEMA was receptive, 
encouraging, and helpful; in 1980, the representatives took on a 
disinterested, almost hostile attitude. It appeared as though FEMA 
wanted to see how little funding could be given and as uncooperatively 
as possible. The city was especially displeased with the lack of 
technical expertise exhibited by the 1980 FEMA representatives. 
Phoenix officials were particularly disturbed about several 
instances when FEMA disallowed or questioned proposed expenditures. In 
the vicinity of the airport diversion channel, a sewer main broke during 
the flood that caused concern over the safety of the drinking water. 
Because the city felt there were no adequate safeguards to preclude this 
ki nd of damage, local engi neers were instructed to put ina sewage 
bypass sytem. The city viewed this as a mitigating effort; FEMA 
questioned the work, saying it was unnecessary and too expensive. 
A second disallowance was the cost of overtime for public transit 
bus drivers. During the heaviest flooding, public buses were put on 
standby to evacuate residents in low-lying areas. Extra buses were used 
to shuttle passengers from the commuter train, which stopped at a 
previously unserved location, to other parts of town. The city also 
provided new routes to eliminate heavy traffic congestion. FEMA 
disallowed all of these costs because public transit was a service 
provided by the city on a regular basis. FEMA explained that Phoenix 
would have been reimbursed had they hired an outside private contractor 
to provide the same service. 
This bias against the city staff al so became apparent when FEMA 
allowed overhead expenses for contractors, but not for the city 
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employees. FEMA also did not approve expenditures for a phone bank that 
the city operated for two weeks after the di saster. Operated by city 
personnel who volunteered or worked overtime, the phone bank served as a 
rumor control center and helped the citizens become aware of the local 
situation. They city felt this was not a service provided under normal 
circumstances and should be recognized as such. 
FEMA did spend $70,000 to double check data on the Salt River flood 
and channel for designing the airport diversion channel that had been 
collected by Phoenix city engineers and a private consulting firm. The 
city and firm felt the additional work was unusual and unnecessary. 
Local officials also found distressing unrealistic requirements for 
mitigation. As one official explained, he felt personally competent to 
determi ne whether a faci 1 i ty that had been damaged requi red extensi ve 
mitigation measures during rebuilding or simple replacement. He 
commented that often the costs of mitigation measures relative to the 
value of property saved were too great, when compared with chances of 
the severe flooding occurring again. The unfavorable cost-benefit ratio 
essentially precluded dOing expensive mitigation work. 
The overall good relationship the city had with the Federal Highway 
Administration made the experience with FEMA particularly 
disappointing. The agency funded bridge reconstruction and moved 
quickly on the reimbursements. City officials also noted the poor 
coordination among federal agencies in their regulations on funding 
procedures and eligible activities. Particularly annoying was the 
difference in flood plain delineation between the Corps of Engineers and 
FEMA. 
Local-State Relations and State Involvement 
After the 1980 flood, relations between the state and Phoenix began 
poorly when the state disaster coordinator designed a payment schedule 
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that required the city to pay a portion of the recovery costs for public 
facilities.* The city was not prepared for this increased cost, and no 
contingency funds were available for this purpose. 
Despite the initial dispute with the governor, the Phoenix 
officials were very complimentary about the State Office of Emergency 
Services and the designated state representative. The relations between 
the state representative and the Phoenix and Maricopa County disaster 
representat i ves were good because they had worked together before and 
understood many of the potential problems and solutions. 
The state took the position that the community would benefit if the 
state did the preliminary work on as many application forms as possible 
and discussed all funding issues with the community officials before 
approaching FEMA. The state felt this would serve as a way to reduce 
delays in processing the applications. 
State official s al so had difficulties with FEMA, and were 
especi ally di scouraged by the slow approval process, cumbersome 
regulations, and excessive paperwork at all levels of government. At 
the time of writiny, the state is still waiting for action on ten 
Di saster Survey Reports. Last spri ng, the regi on had at 1 east three 
maj or di sasters, whi ch compounded the problems for everyone concerned. 
The state agrees with the city that audits are conducted too long after 
the disaster, and has recommended they be done during the recovery. 
Transportat i on was the mai n area in whi ch the city and the state 
coordinated activities. The city and state have now prepared 
*The actual wording of the agreement stated that the first $500,000 
would come from FEMA. From $500,000 to $1 million, the community would 
pay 10%; anythi ng over $1 mill ion, the community woul d pay 25%. The 
agreement was made for all communities in the affected area, not just 
Phoenix. The state was required to pay 20% of all FEMA-sponsored state 
projects. 
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conti ngency pl ans on how to coordi nate future di saster acti viti es to 
benefit both parties. 
Mitigation Measures 
Phoenix official s want to have mitigation measures of almost any 
kind in order to minimize the damage from future storms. In the past, 
all building has been predicated on something being constructed as a 
fl ood control measure upstream. Any miti gat i on work that mi ght have 
been prudent has been prohibitively expensive. One Phoenix official 
estimates mitigation projects have been as much as eight times more 
expensive than rebuilding, and the city could not afford this expense. 
All of the projects described in the recovery section are aimed at 
mitigating the effects of flooding. The community is faced with a 
Catch-22 problem: does it overbuil d and survi ve until the Orme Dam or 
an al ternati ve is constructed, or does it buil d "temporary" structures 
and wait with crossed fingers until the dam or an alternative is 
completed? 
Public Works 
To prevent washout of waste material, pollution of groundwater, and 
po 11 ut i on of surface water from i nundat i on by a 50-year fl ood at the 
city's landfills along the Salt River, Phoenix has hired a consulting 
firm to recommend measures to provide permanent protection against 
erosion and flood damage. Definite implementation dates will be decided 
after staff review. In the interim, plans and specifications are being 
prepared to award a contract to replace the protective berm at the 7th 
Street 1 andfi 11 and cover materi al at another 1 andfi 11, both of whi ch 
washed out during the February, 1980, flood. 
To mitigate flood damage to water and sewer lines (which flood 
waters have exposed in the past), the city plans to construct protective 
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barriers. These barriers will consists of heavy riprap or gabions, 
aggregate material, and steel piles. 
To mit i gate flood damage to the city IS sani tary sewer system, 
Phoenix is replacing all damaged manholes with watertight, tied-down 
frames and covers. The manholes are structurally reinforced to minimize 
damage from flood debris. 
Bridges 
Three new bridges planned are designed to handle flows of at least 
HIO,OOO cfs and not obstruct the 100-year flood flow. Either drilled 
caissons or steel pile footings will be used to resist scour. 
Channelization upstream and downstream from the structures and also 
d i king and ban k protect ion (tyi ng into 1 and fill protect i on) wi 11 be the 
results. The 24th Street bridge is financed by city funds supplemented 
by a $1 million appropriation from the state legislature in May, 1980; 
the other two bridges are funded by Emergency Bridge Replacement Funds 
of the Federal Highway Administration. 
Consu I ti ng fi rms have been sel ected to desi gn repl acement bridges 
for both the 7th Street and 35th Avenue crossings. The actual capacity 
cannot be determined at this time; however, they will meet federal 
regulations that prohibit obstructing the 100-year flow to the extent 
that upstream water surface elevations are increased. These bridges 
will also be funded by Emergency Bridge Replacement Funds of the Federal 
Highway Administration. 
Relocation 
After the December, 1978 flood, the state signed an agreement with 
FDAA that required it to consider mitigation measures to prevent future 
flood damage; FDAA recommended relocation. Maricopa County now has a 
substantial relocation program that is mo~ing several entire communities 
(both residential and commercial properties). 
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In March, 1979, the state received a Title IX grant from the EDA to 
provide money to pay the sal ary for a di saster recovery coordi nator. 
This person secured a $1.7 million grant from the Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Dvelopment's discretionary fund and targeted three communities 
in the pilot project. 
In April, 1979, the Corps of Engineers became involved, using a 
Section 205 Small Project Authority grant for nonstructural flood 
control. Corps involvement allowed the HUD money to be allocated to two 
other communities. 
The state al so became a part of the project by starting a 1 and 
exchange program. Under thi s 1 egi sl at ion, a 1 and owner can exchange 
fl oOd-prone 1 and for "safe" state-owned 1 and. As of 1980, about 60 
families had taken advantage of the exchange. In addition, the Section 
1362 program of the FIA has been used by eight homeowners at a cost of 
$370,000. 
In a much larger community, where 450 residences are affected, the 
residents were not eager to leave the existing spacious homes on large 
lots. They regarded relocating as the last alternative and wanted every 
structural measure tried first. The residents had invested $300,000 in 
a dam that burst during the 1980 flood. 
Since the February, 1980 flood, the project has taken on four 
additional communities.* 
Emergency Management Capability and Civil Defense 
Phoenix has made a noticeable attempt to update its emergency plans 
after each disaster. The city has designed a framework in which each 
department can handl e the emergency its own way, but withi n certai n 
parameters to maintain consistent operation with the county. 
*For more details, see the Division of Emergency Services' 
"Relocation Program," Phoenix, April, 1981. 
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The Maricopa County Civil Defense Office is an example of good 
civil defense preparation. The director, a jovial person who is proud 
of his work and the operation he runs, is prepared for almost anything 
and has plans to prove it. The county and other agencies, such as the 
Flood Control District and the Salt River Project, have formed an 
association to establish a sophisticated system for predicting floods, 
monitoring water levels, and helping flood-prone communities prepare for 
a disaster. Mari copa County has also added a new phase to its ci vil 
defense plan--flood fighting. Because of the lack of adequate 
protection upstream, the county feels this is the only thing to do until 
flood control is provided. 
Another reason the civil defense office operates smoothly is that 
all levels of government cooperate. This is particularly true in 
recei vi ng money. If a city declares an emergency, but the county does 
not, the city will not be able to collect any disaster funds from the 
state. It is also true in the completion of federal forms. All 
departments and levels of governments participate in completing the 
forms before they go to the federal agency. 
There are a number of people involved in civil defense and 
emergency mangagement in Phoenix. Since they see it as an integral part 
of their work, many staff members gain experience in emergency 
management, and the skills are not lost as the staff changes. 
Ordinances 
The city's flood plain ordinance, which has been approved by FEMA, 
provides for regulation of all new development and reconstruction of 
structures damaged more than 50% in flood plain areas. Flood damage to 
developments built after the initial adoption of the ordinance in 1974 
has been extremely small. In fact, it amounts to only a few hundred 
square feet of an industrial parking lot. Permission was refused owners 
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seek i ng to rebuil d several small businesses constructed pri or to the 
ordinance that were substantially damaged in recent floods. 
The flood plain ordinance is tied to the flood insurance maps 
supplied by FEMA. By state law, the benefited area below any flood 
control project must be redefined within 120 days after its 
completion. The Salt River channelization would qualify as a flood 
control project and therefore would have to be defined within this time 
frame. 
Public Awareness 
In the past, Phoenix has mailed brochures to its water customers 
informing them that flood insurance is available to all residents. 
Flood insurance is also a major emphasis of the state, which has a major 
program to have flood insurance available in every community. The city 
has published flood plain maps in the newspapers, established a 
Floodplain Management Office, and made presentations to real estate and 
insurance groups. The city has requested detailed operations plans from 
sand and gravel operators in an effort to minimize problems from future 
operations. 
At the present time, owners of property located ina fl ood p1 ai n 
are being notified that any future development or modification to 
exi st i ng structures will be subj ect to regu1 at ion • All these efforts 
are geared to publicizing the existence of flood hazards and the city's 
intention to minimize future damage through regulation. 
The city is investigating the feasibility of constructing a movable 
model of the river to help estimate potential erosion and degradation of 
the river in future flood events. This information will enable more 
flood-resistant design of new public facilities, and provide a valuable 
tool to regulate sand and gravel mining. 
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Interviewers' Perceptions 
Phoenix is in a unique situation because it faces the problems of 
drought and severe flooding annually. Both of these issues have become 
highly political and involve all levels of government. The Phoenix 
metropolitan area has grown tremendously in spite of its water 
problems. The city has been continually forced to adapt each change in 
policy, each new technological advance, into its master plan, political 
1 ife, and daily operations. Phoenix has not tried to ignore the 
prob 1 em, but rather to take each development in stri de and do as much 
mitigntion work as is possible. 
From all indications, the city has coped well. Phoenix has adopted 
many mitigation measures as part of its public works budget, enforced 
strict ordinances on building in the flood plain, encouraged homeowners 
to purchase flood insurance, built bridges using new technologies to 
withstand hi gh capacity, worked with other juri sdi ct ions to coordi nate 
land use decisions to promote greenways, and developed a workable system 
within the city and with other jurisdictions to respond effectively to 
disasters. 
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CHAPTER XII 
MARIN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
Background 
The San Francisco Bay Area is composed of ten counties: Sonoma, 
Marin, Napa, Solano, Contra Costa, Alameda, Santa Clara, San Mateo, San 
Francisco and Santa Cruz. The Bay Area has had great population growth 
during the last 20 years. There are apfJroximately five million people 
in 7,500 square miles. Land uses vary significantly throughout the 
counties. San Francisco is the center of commerce, culture, employment, 
and popul at ion. Solano, Sonoma and Santa Cruz Count i es are mostly 
agricultural with related residential and commercial activity. Santa 
Clara County is the hub of the electronics and computer industry; San 
Mateo, Contra Costa and Alameda Counties are mixed residential and 
industrial. Marin is primarily residential. 
Hydrology and Flood History 
Periodically, the Bay Area has damaging floods. These floods are 
usually of riverine origin and affect flood plain lands adjacent to the 
streams. Combinations of high tides, winds, and intense rainfall have 
caused coastal flooding in areas of San Francisco Bay and Santa Cruz. 
There was extensive flooding throughout the Bay Area in 1955 and 
1958, and in parts of the region in 1940, 1952, 1963, and 1964. Losses 
from the four latest floods were about $23 million in 1955, $14 million 
in 1958, $4 million in 1963, and $17 million in 1964. Generally, annual 
flood losses have increased as a result of increased property values, 
runoff caused by development, and occupancy of the flood plain lands. 
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Governmental Complexity 
The San Francisco Bay Area is one of the most governmentally 
complex of any of the nation's metropolitan areas. An estimated 85% of 
the region's population lives in the Bay Area's incorporated cities. 
The region's cities and counties do not provide all local governmental 
services. Like the rest of California, the Bay Area has a large number 
of special districts--more than 1,200 in the region. Roughly one-
quarter of the Bay Area's special districts have environmental 
management or development responsibilities (see Attachment A). 
In urban counties, cities provide most municipal services: police 
and fire protection, street maintenance, sewers, parks and recreation 
facilities, building inspection, emergency planning and management, and 
many other servi ces and regul atory funct ions. Count i es provi dp many 
municipal services in unincorporated areas directly and through special 
service areas. Most counties have flood control districts. Independent 
special districts may provide still other municipal services to local 
agencies. 
Loca 1 government has tradit i ona 11 y re 1 i ed upon urban growth and 
economi c development to increase revenues in order to provi de 
governmental services. The cost of government has risen markedly in 
recent years, but revenues have not kept pace. Since the passage of 
State of California Propositions 13 and 4, local officials are 
increasingly concerned about the costs of public programs and the 
abi 1 i ty of 1 oca 1 governments to provi de adequate servi ces with 
significantly reduced resources. 
Description of the Disaster 
As the new year of 1982 approached, the San Franc i sco Bay Area 
became the victim of two colliding jet streams. These air masses 
remained stationary for about 30 hours, from January 3 to January 4, 
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1982, producing moderate to heavy rainfall, ranging from 15 inches in 
portions of Marin County to nearly 25 inches in the Santa Cruz 
Mountains. Preliminary reports indicate rainfall rates of one-half to 
one inch per hour along the southwest slopes in Marin and Santa Cruz 
Counties, and one-tenth to one-half inch per hour elsewhere. On January 
4 and 5, heavy rains added moisture to the upper levels of soil faster 
than percolation could take place. Where steep, unstable slopes 
existed, the fluidity of the saturated soils, and the great weight of 
the rainwater in the soil caused the waterlogged soils to collapse. 
Over two feet of rain fell in some areas south of San Francisco. 
Each acre of the wettest slopes received a rainfall mass which totaled 
in excess of five million pounds, and the consequent stress on the 
slopes caused numerous landslides. Although extremely high water was 
reported in numerous local streams, flooding alone was not the worst 
problem. The combination of flooding and slope failure caused most of 
the damage. 
Damage Caused by the Flood 
The most severe damage was in the hills of the coastal range, where 
landslides and mud and debris flows destroyed many homes. Most damaged 
structures were in known (i.e., mapped) flood plains or near the mouths 
of canyons, but many homes located in the higher reaches of canyons were 
affected as well. Approximately 1,500 people needed temporary housing. 
Many neighborhoods and communities were isolated when access roads 
were either washed out or covered by slides. Thousands of Marin Gounty 
residents were stranded in San Francisco when Highway 101 was closed by 
slides. The community of Inverness (Marin County), population 1,200, 
was isolated for several days when numerous slides covered the road into 
the town. Five hundred homes were inaccessible in the San Lorenzo River 
Valley area (Santa Cruz County), because their only access road was 
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damaged. It was estimated that 1,000 residents in Brookdale, ~oulder 
Creek, Felton and Scotts Valley (Santa Cruz County) were isolated. 
Thousands of peopl e were evacuated from thei r homes for fear of 
injuries or deaths due to slides or flooding. Six hundred people were 
evacuated in Sausalito (Marin County) after a slide killed one person, 
destroyed two homes, and threatened dozens more. One hundred fami lies 
were evacuated in Boulder Creek (Santa Cruz County) due to the danger of 
more s I i des and fl ood i ng, and two hund red res i dents in Pescadero (San 
Mateo County) were evacuated due to dangerous flood waters. 
Phone service was disrupted throughout the entire disaster area for 
several days and even longer in some areas. Water systems were badly 
damaged in the city of Santa Cruz and in the Inverness area of Marin 
County. Water rationing was in effect in these areas, which meant that 
many non-essent i a I busi nesses and i ndust ri es were shut down. Many 
businesses were damaged by flooding or slides, or were closed hecause 
the employees could not get to their jobs. Some, particularly in San 
Anselmo, never reopened. 
On January 6, the governor requested that a major di saster be 
declared in the State of California. On January 7, the president 
determi ned that damages from severe storms, muds I ides, hi gh tide and 
fl ood i ng were of suffi ci ent magn i tude and severity to warrant a maj or 
disaster declaration under PL 93-288. Solano, Sonoma, San Mateo, Santa 
Cruz, Contra Costa, Alameda and Marin counties were declared for 
Individual and Public Assistance. Humboldt, San Joaquin and Santa Clara 
counties were declared for only Public Assistance. The Small Business 
Administration declared Lake, Mendocino, Napa, Sacramento, Monterey, San 
Beni to, San Franci sco and Yo 10 count i es disaster areas for the SBA 
program. 
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Joint federal and state damage estimates indicated that 6,300 
residences were damaged, of which 231 were destroyed. Dollar estimates 
of damage were $109 milllon to public facilities and $172.4 million to 
private property. 
muds I ides. 
There were 33 deaths, 24 due to landslides and 
Si nce so many 1 oca 1 it i es were affected, two count i es--Mari nand 
Santa Cruz--were selected to serve as examples of the recovery process 
(see the next chapter for discussion of Santa Cruz County). These two 
counties were selectd for several reasons: 
I} Given the significant responsibil ities and powers of 
counties in California, the county unit was selected 
rather than a city. 
2} The two counties chosen offered a wide spectrum of 
geographic and topographic characteristics and of city-
county arrangements and relationships. 
3} According to several federal and state officials 
interviewed over the telephone before the field visit, 
these two counties showed significant variations in 
their recovery efforts (at that time). Therefore, it 
was expected that they woul d provi de cont rast i ng 
examples. 
While city officials within each county were interviewed, the focal 
pOint of the following two studies is the county government--its 
functions and responsibilities during and after the disaster. It sould 
be noted that in California, counties are legal subdivisions of the 
state and serve primarily as administrative agencies for the state. 
Principal county functions include general government, protection of 
persons and property, health and sanitat ion, roads and bri dges, 
recreation, welfare and corrections, and land use planning. The 
county's jurisdiction is over the unincorporated areas only for some of 
these functions, and over the entire county for others (such as health, 
sanitation, welfare, and corrections). 
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Marin County 
Marin County, California, is primarily a suburban residential and 
recreational area, although ranching and dairying are still carried out 
in the rural, western portion of the county. Industry in the county 
includes metal fabrication, printing, boat building, and the manufacture 
of plastic products, integrated circuits, missile components, cosmetics, 
candles, and cheese. 
One of the fiine counties that compose the Bay Area, Marin is linked 
to San Francisco by the Golden Gate Bridge to the south, and to the East 
Bay by the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge. It is bordered on the north and 
northeast by Sonoma County and to the west by the Pacific Ocean. Within 
the 521 square miles of Marin, a wide variety of topography, climate and 
vegetation exists. 
made the county 
The combination of mountains, sea and climate has 
a recreation spot for the entire Bay Area. 
Approximately 93,600 acres divided among federal, state, and county 
lands are devoted to recreation. 
The county seat is San Rafael. Incorporated cities are B~lvedere, 
Corte Madera, Fairfax, Larkspur, Mill Valley, Novato, Ross, San Anselmo, 
San Rafael, Sausalito, and Tiburon, with a combined population of 
154,000. Another 63,000 people live in unincorporated areas, mostly in 
western Marin County. Additional legal entities that operate within the 
county are special districts. Details about those districts, as well as 
the regional agencies that exercise some control over Marin County, are 
provided in Attachment A. 
Recent Disaster History 
Marin County is chronically at risk from many natural hazards, 
notably flooding, mudslides, landslides, and earthquakes. In early 
1982, the rains were of varying intensities and quantities in areas 
within the county. The City of Petaluma in Sonoma County had roughly a 
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250-year flood, whil e the Inverness area had about a 140-year flood. 
Other areas wi thi n the county experi enced 1 esser impacts. The nature 
and impact of the fl oodi ng vari ed wi de ly as di d the muds 1 i des and 
mudlows. Professi anal geo 1 ogi sts were surpri sed by the type 
(surficial), speed, and location of some of the mudslides, mudflows, and 
debris avalanches. Given the unusually large amount of rainfall within 
a short period and the great number of mudslides (unusual for northern 
California), such incidents were the "disaster of record" for many 
areas. 
The disaster was not a one-time occurrence; mudslides continued for 
months after the early January rains. In addition, the mudslides were 
(and still are) a contributor to landslides. The fact that the disaster 
happened over along peri od of time became important in deal i ng with 
FEMA, whose enabling legislation for public assistance does not 
adequately allow for a continuing disaster event. 
Recovery Activities 
To reduce the confusion over terms and definitions, the project 
staff used the following definition of recovery (which was made explicit 
to persons being interviewed): 
The long-term recovery or reconstruction process is 
characterized by attention to rebuilding and new 
construction; restoration of major urban services; and review 
of predisaster land uses, especially insofar as they include 
consideration of local hazards in the recovery plans for the 
affected areas. Many persons (especi a 11 y resea rchers) tend 
to think of recovery as a linear process; yet, in fact, long-
term recovery begins at different times in different places 
for different activities. 
Added to the usual diffi culty of i dent ifyi ng when the long-term 
recovery activities begin, the mudslides after the disaster was declared 
and the continuous debris removal made the transition from the response 
to the recovery phase even harder to pinpoint. Several county officials 
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viewed the beginning of the recovery phase (per our definition) as 
several poi nts in time, dependi ng on the segment of activities bei ng 
addressed--e.g., public property reconstruction, road restoration, or 
creek cleaning. 
The project team found it difficult to identify the local publ ic 
pri orit i es from among the array of recovery issues and problems that 
arose duri ng the aftermath of a di saster. Those di ffi cul ties were 
compounded by the new, strong federal presence and involvement in 
selecting priorities for mitigation in those cases where a Federal 
Hazard Mit i gat i on Team was appoi nted. With the advent of the Federal 
Interagency Hazard Mi t i gat i on Team, a different cast of actors and a 
short time-frame for mitigation decision making was introduced. In 
Marin County, the two priority sites (Corte Madera Creek and Inverness) 
were identified for attention in the report prepared 15 days after the 
disaster. From interviewing county officials, it was clear that while 
the team had identified its priorities, those sites were not necessarily 
the priorities local officials would have selected. 
Further, there was often disagreement about how easily an 
identified priority problem could be solved. For example, tnt' Flood 
Control Zone of the Corte Madera Creek area covers the cities of 
Fairfax, San Anselmo, Ross, Larkspur, and the community of Kentfield, 
all of which suffered serious damage after the heavy rains in early 
January. After many years of discussions and planning for this flood-
prone area, a structural solution had been decided upon. The U.S. Army 
Corps of Engi neers had supported a structural flood control proj ect, 
known as the Corte Madera Project; however, completion of the multi-
million dollar project was stopped by local protests when it was three-
quarters completed. The Corps estimated that the project in its 
unfinished form was only one-third effective. They believe that if the 
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project had been completed as originally designed, there would h.ave been 
little or no damage downstream of San Anselmo. 
As would be expected, the Hazard Mitigation Team picked this 
unfinished flood control project as a priority mitigation effort for 
Marin County (this will be discussed later in the section on 
mitigation). The cost of completing the project ($600,000) was seen as 
nominal by federal officials, who reasoned that the dollar amount was 
1 ess than the cost of two or three homes in thi s 1 arge, affl uent 
county. The interviewer's perception of the county official's viewpoint 
was that the county government had incurred only $60,000 in damage to 
pub 1 i c property duri ng the very severe storm; therefore, why shoul d it 
invest $600,000 to prevent future possible damage or losses? Finally, 
citizens in several local jurisdictions within the Corte Madera flood 
control district objected to raising the funds, because they reasoned 
that since only a relatively few property owners had major damage or 
loss, a large number of citizens should not have to pay the taxes 
requi red to rai se $600,000 when they had not been (nor were 1 i kel y to 
be) affected by flooding. 
Damage in the fl oodi ng/mudsl ide events was concentrated in 
residential or non-commercial areas. This minimized the role of most of 
the busi ness community. Loca 1 heavy equi pment contractors and 
construction firms were a notable exception. 
were dedicated to emergency activities 
Their equipment and crews 
and numerous restoration 
projects. The involvement and role of ad hoc citizen or interest groups 
did not appear to be significant. Nevertheless, existing citizen 
groups, such as taxpayer groups in the Corte Madera project area or 
established environmental groups in the Inverness area, were active in 
championing the causes for which they were created. The focal point of 
interact ion duri ng the recovery pl anni ng peri od was between the county 
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and federal officials, although state officials were involved 
throughout. 
CitY-County Relations 
While only one city administrator in Marin County was interviewed, 
it appears that ci ty-county reI ati ons were good duri ng and after the 
disaster. The county, for the most part, dealt with the state on behalf 
of the communities within its boundaries. The city officials 
interviewed thought that the city-county relationship was positive. 
The good city-county reI at ions duri ng and after the di saster were 
an extension of the good intergovernmental relations during normal 
times. Generally, the city and county officials have regular meetings, 
telephone contact, and communications. During the disaster, the 
organi zat i ona I interaction between these two I eve I s of government was 
thought to be good. For the first few days after the main flooding, 
each municipality used its equipment and personnel to take care of its 
own needs; then each shared what it could with other jurisdictions. 
Officials in the city of San Rafael commented that the regular 
interaction among city and county officials that is cultivated during 
normal times continued during the emergency, which means they were not 
fighting out jurisdictional problems while battling the disaster. 
It should be noted that the researchers did not devote mucn time to 
the I oca I preparedness pI an or to the city-county emergency management 
activities for this disaster, since the mud- and landslides were very 
unusual. It was assumed that the unusual number and nature of the 
slides created needs and problems not covered by existing preparedness 
pI ans. It was further assumed that the emergency response acti ons had 
less bearing on the recovery planning activities than is true in other 
types of natural disasters. 
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County-State Relations 
The county's perception of the state's role was positive, 
generally. State activities in the aff0~ted localities varied from the 
direct assistance of the National Guard, to the advocacy of local needs 
to the federal officials. At the same time, the state aided the federal 
government by explaining, or seconding, federal insistence on mitigative 
steps by local governments. Since the state is the co-signer of the 
federal/state agreement required by a Presidential Disaster Declaration, 
all local paperwork and requests must go through the state. This 
protocol is sometimes considered onerous by local officials. 
Shortly after the Presidential Declaration was issued, the state 
geologist made several suggestions for state legislation and actions: 
1) Creating landslide-protection zones along the coast, in 
which particularly stringent building requirements would 
be put into effect and remedial measures taken. 
2) undertaking a comprehensive "critical area and slope 
stability investigation" statewide to pinpoint land- and 
mudslide-prone land. 
3) Requiring mandatory notification of prospective 
homeowners and apartment buyers of potent i a 1 stabi 1 i ty 
problems. 
The geologist further commented that his department had "shelved a 
landslide hazard prevention legislative package because of the 
administration's across-the-board fiscal retrenchment late last fall." 
It appears that the California Division of Mines and Geology, which has 
responsibility for hazard mitigation (as required under Section 406), is 
aware of many needed act ions to reduce the 1 andsl i de hazard. 
Neverthe 1 ess, that agency's abil i ty to "encourage communities to adopt 
and implement land use regulations, construction standards and emergency 
plans in unstable slope areas" remains problematic, according to the 
Hazard Mitigation Team's first progress report. 
158 
Marin County is heavily dependent on income from property taxes and 
from state and federal transfers. In addition, the county has the 
unusual resource of the San Francisco Foundation, a private foundation 
with a spec i a 1 trust fund dedi cated to the benefit of Mari n County. 
After the disaster, the county and cities received about $3.5 million 
from the Foundation, which the county and cities primarily used as the 
local share of disaster assistance grants. 
As a general charter county, Mari n County has the usual 1 oca 1 
authorities and power of counties in California. As is true of all 
other municipalities in the state, it is subject to the limits of 
Proposition 13 with regard to raising revenues. Under that requirement, 
a taxing measure must be placed on the ballot for voter consideration 
and must receive a two-thirds vote to be sustained. Needless to say, 
very few of the tax-generating measures are passed. This fact makes it 
unlikely that many of the flood control and other hazard mitigation 
measures needed will be achieved when extraordinary revenues are 
requi red. 
County-Federal Relations 
County officials, particularly those engaged in preparing and 
reviewiny the Damage Survey ~eports (DSRs), had numerous difficulties in 
dealing with FEMA staff or their designees (disaster reservists). Since 
the county had about 300 sites for which DSRs had to be prepared, there 
were many opportunities for di sagreement. The confl i cts stl~mn ed from 
definitional questions over mudslides vs. landslides (which are not 
covered under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)) and what 
const itutes repa i r vs. permanent restorat ion. The county and federal 
officials also argued about legislative intent for the public assistance 
provided by FEMA and about engineering estimates. 
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The county officials were very dissatisfied with the process of 
preparing DSRs and with FEMA's disposition (or lack thereof) of the 
DSRs. The research team thought that at the heart of many of the 
disagreements over individual DSRs was the fact that the FEMA staffers 
(reservists) simply wanted to restore the damaged areas, while the 
county (and local) officials wanted to improve them. For example, 
county officials wanted to shore up a section of a hillside that had 
experienced a slide which dumped debris on a roadway, while federal 
officials were willing only to pay for clearing the debris off the 
roadway. 
The restoration vs. betterment issue arises frequently because FEMA 
is constrai ned in what it can payout for pub 1 i c ass i stance under its 
enabling legislation, admi ni strat i ve regulations, and policy 
decisions. Moreover, the issue was exacerbated in California by the 
unusua 1 nature and great number of 1 and and mudsl i des and the 
problematic issues of coverage under the NFIP. 
Mitigation Measures 
Prior to the disaster of 1982, the county administration had taken 
several mitigative steps: 
1) In 1973, the county adopted a General Plan which placed 
a high value on environmental integrity, making it clear 
that development should not harm the environment. that 
pl an contai ned an Envi ronmental Hazards El ement whi ch 
pertained to new development. 
2) Special mapping was done for hazard-prone areas, such as 
Inverness. 
3) As a participant in the regular phase of the National 
Flood Insurance Program, the county had recently revised 
(as of 1981) the flood hazard areas. 
4) The county had undertaken some slope stability and 
hydrology studies. 
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Shortly after the disaster, county officials began to think about 
the needs of the Inverness area, which had sustained extensive damage. 
The county committed $90,000 to an engineering firm to study the area's 
needs and to make recommendations regarding reconstruction in 
Inverness. (It could not be determined whther the county initiated this 
effort on its own or because it knew the Interagency Team had marked 
Inverness as a priority for attention.) The county planner expects that 
a special comprehensive plan will be needed for the Inverness community, 
which will probably require changes in land use regulations and building 
standards in the area. Examples of potential changes include 
prohi bi ti ng all new development in the upper reaches of the stream 
valley, and improving the floodproofing of existing buildings. It is 
expected that the proposed changes will generate considerable 
controversy in Inverness. 
After the disaster, when the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team was 
formed, the county and state representatives became part of the team 
from the very begi nni ng. The county pl anni ng di rector was the 1 oca 1 
representative on that team. Two main sites for mitigation efforts were 
determined by the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team: Corte Madera and 
Inverness. The former would require the completion of a structural 
solution, a flood-control system. The latter would entail mainly non-
structural measures (e.g., 1 and use, buil ding code changes) and perhaps 
some structural measures (e.g., pumps, dredging). Further, the 
negotiations between the federal, state and county governments are 
continuing. The federal position had been to hold up the processing of 
claims and dollars for public assistance via the processing of payments 
for individual site Damage Survey Reports until Marin County 
demonstrated it was maki ng II good faith" efforts to achi eve the two 
priority mitigation projects just mentioned. 
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Interviewer's Perceptions 
The burden of response and much of the recovery fell on the Public 
Works and Planning Departments, because of the large amounts of mud that 
slid and the attendant land use issues. 
The widespread and numerous mudslides raised a number of ~uestions, 
including definitional and coverage questions vis-a-vis the National 
Flood Insurance Program; the aggressive role of the federal Hazard 
Mitigation Team after a nonflood (i.e., mudslide or landslide) event; 
FEMA's i nsi stence that the state's 406 plan be an act i ve one, tak i ng 
into account the multi-hazard risk facing the affected areas; and the 
position ofthe Reagan Administration regarding federal financial 
involvement in local recovery. 
Marin County is an especially interesting example in that it has 
notable publ ic capacity and capabil ity as well as a nationwide 
reputati on for the affl uence of its res i dents. Yet, the conservative 
attitude of the local taxpayers regarding raising local taxes, together 
with the ceiling imposed by the state's Proposition 13, result in a 
questionable commitment to long-term mitigation measures on the part of 
the county and of the individual cities within its bouqdaries. 
Simil arly, 1 imitat ions of both personnel and resources seem to have 
restricted the state's ability to mitigate the landslide hazard, e.g., 
the efforts of the California Division of Mines and Geology. 
On the positive side, the harmonious and carefully cultivated city-
county relations that existed before the disaster worked well in the 
stressful postdisaster period. Similarly, the county quickly involved 
itself in the mitigation planning activities of the federally initiated 
Hazard Mitigation Team, which allowed it to both anticipate and 
participate in choices and decisions being made for the county. 
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Update on Marin County 
Slightly more than two years after the presidentially declared 
disaster in California on January 7, 1982--for flooding, landslides, and 
mudsl ides--the research team went back to Marin County to review the 
progress the county had made in achieving its recovery and mitigation 
~oals. In the first site visit report, two priority sites for 
mitigation measures during recovery were noted, the Corte Madera Creek 
proj ect, and Inverness. At that time, the federal Interagency Haza rd 
Mitigation Team (HMT) , which provided a strong federal presence and 
involvement soon after the disaster, significantly influenced the 
selection of the priority sites. 
At the time of the second visit, relatively little progress had 
been made in connection with the Corte Madera Creek project. The 
project is bound up in lengthy litigation which promises to extend into 
the indefinite future. Regarding Inverness, notable pro~ress has been 
made, as will be described below. In addition, several individual 
communities within the county have decided to undertake and pay for some 
flood mitigative actions. 
During the second visit, the research team observed a growing 
willingness to "pay for government" by a population that had only a few 
years ago supported Proposition 13. This new attitude toward local 
government was evident in Santa Cruz County as well. Local progress 
toward recovery and mitigation goals in San Rafael, Santa Venetia, 
Novato, Petaluma and also in Inverness suggests that the events of 1982 
(and those of 1983 as well) led local officials to find the funding for 
projects citizens wanted. In some of these areas, local tax increases 
were necessary. 
As requi red under the terms of the Pres ident i a 1 Di saster 
Decl arati on, and the attendant federal and state agency i nvol vement, 
163 
several reports on mitigation were prepared during the recovery 
process. The fi rst set was that of the federal Interagency Hazard 
Mitigation Team. The team issued reports 15, 30, and 90 days after the 
disaster was declared. The second source of mitigation reporting was 
the state of California, which prepared the State Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. This plan is supposed to be prepared six months after the state 
receives a Presidential Disaster Declaration; in actual fact, the state 
issued the State Hazard Mitigation Plan and One-Year Update almost two 
years after the disaster occurred. The reasons for and effects of that 
delay will be explained below. The net results, however, were that the 
HMT reports, which were prepared very early in the recovery planning 
period, had a significant influence on the planning process, while the 
State Plan was not issued early enough to influence the planning 
process. The State Report and its One-Year Update appears to be useful 
as a progress report and as an aid for long-term follow-up. It seems 
unlikely that the State Report influenced to any significant degree the 
recovery and mit i gat i on efforts in the year foll owi ng the fl oodi ng and 
slides. That is not to say that state officials may not have been 
influential during 1982. 
The HMT report issued thi rty days after the di saster (Febrary 7, 
1982) identified two sites for priority attention: the Cort"! Madera 
Creek water control project and the Inverness area of the county. 
Subsequent federal activities (under the direction of the Hazard 
Mitigation Officer in the FEMA Regional Office) were mainly monitoring 
the implementation of the report's recommendations. 
The state prepared its hazard mitigation plan under the provisions 
of Section 406 of the Federal Disaster Relief Act and Paragraph 8 of the 
Federal/State Di saster Assi stance Agreement. The state's pl an and its 
mi ti gation recommendations are intended to provide the framework for 
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flood hazard mitigation during the recovery process and to reduce the 
potential for future flood losses. The recommended measures were 
derived from the HMT Report of February 7th, 1982. 
The state I s Hazard Miti gati on Pl an also 1 i sts Corte Madera Creek 
and Inverness as the priority areas for hazard mitigation in Marin 
County. The report states that ". • • mudsl i de and 1 ands 1 i de hazards 
are directly related to storm and flood conditions in this disaster and 
that these hazards can be reduced by an effective program of appropriate 
land use regulation, construction standards and emergency evacuation and 
warning plans." 
For Marin County the state listed nine specific actions, each of 
which was described in terms of 1) hazard identification, 2) mitigation 
measure, 3) implementation, 4) funding, and 5) one-year update of the 
actions. One of the nine covered the Corte Madera flood control 
project; the other ei ght recommended acti ons dealt with needs in the 
Inverness area, including public facilities, public access, 
communications, and storm water flow. 
The county has made significant efforts to implement the priority 
mitigation projects. The Corte Madera project, which requi res local 
political decisions and the completion of litigati?n, will take several 
years to settl e. Si nce the fi na 1 deci s ions rest with the courts, the 
county cannot di rectly affect the timi ng or the outcome of the Corte 
Madera project. 
In Inverness, which is an unincorporated area of the county, 
development has been in three steep and rugged canyons. Shortly after 
the disaster declaration, the county hired an engineering firm to 
prepare engineering designs for repairs to public structures and 
recommend policies for new construction to mitigate future damage in 
Inverness. The county accepted and acted on both of these products. 
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The county pl anner commented that improvi ng the safety of exi st i ng 
structures is far more difficult and will take many years. 
In response to the question, "What is the county doing differently 
since 1982?" the county administrator noted: 
1) the continuing work of the Flood Control District (an 
entity that legally and financially is separate from the 
county government, although its Board of Directors is 
the County's Board of Supervisors); 
2) a $4 mill i on bond issue due on the ballot in November 
1984, in the community of Novato for a structural flod 
control project; 
3) increases in levies for flood-related projects in Marin 
County and several cities; and 
4) spending of local money by San Rafael for its own flood 
control projects. 
Other actions since 1982 that will improve local preparedness were 
i nit i ated by the county's emergency coordi nator. They include working 
with business and non-profit organizations to improve home and workplace 
preparedness, working with the local Red Cross to stimulate self-help 
efforts within neighborhoods, and crisis intervention programs for 
persons with disaster-related emotional and mental health problems. 
As was noted after the first visit, Marin County exhibited quality 
public leadership during and after the 1982 disaster. The second visit 
rei nforced the i nit i a 1 impression of unusually hi gh competence both in 
'general management and in emergency management at the county level. 
Si nce the San And reas fault runs through Mari n County, the county 
has engaged in consistent and systematic earthquake emergency 
preparations and training since about 1970. For about 12 years, the 
annual emergency drills were just practice. A far-sighted emergency 
coordinator insisted that the periodic drills be run, despite the 
snickers of his colleagues. In 1982, when the county was hit by the 
landslides, mud flows and flooding, the county officials were ready and 
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ab 1 e to deal effect i vel y with thi s di saster--even though it was quite 
different from the one they thought would hit them. The dozen years of 
preparation during quiet times is highly unusual; but the ever-present 
threat of an earthquake caused the county to maintain a high state of 
readi ness. When a different di saster struck, thei r preparations paid 
off. 
County-State Relations 
The state had provided National Guard personnel to assist Marin 
County during the response phase. The state also had provided some 
technical assistance in the forms of seismic mapping and geological 
resource analysis, and had participated in the Hazard Mitigation Team. 
In fact, two state officials participated in HMT activities, one from 
the Uffi ce of Emergency Servi ces and the other from the Department of 
Natural Resources (Division of Flood Plain Management). The latter was 
instrumental in organizing on an informal basis a state-level 
interagency hazard mitigation team. Nevertheless, Marin County 
officials feel the state played only a minor role in the postdisaster 
period. These feelings of local officials regarding their state 
government have been documented in several of the earlier case studies, 
including communities in other states. 
County officials have sent mitigation progress reports to state and 
federal officials for the past two years, with the knowledge that both 
levels of government are monitoring their efforts. County officials 
seem I ess concerned wi th stri ct enforcement of requi rements connected 
with the '82 disaster declaration than they are with the prospect of not 
being eligible for disaster relief in a future disaster in the same 
area. 
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county-Federal Relations 
County officials view the HMT as a positive and useful mechanism 
for focusi ng attent i on on mit i gat i on and recovery needs soon after the 
disaster declaration. Public officials at all levels generally said 
that thi s process is useful, although 1 oca 1 offi ci a 1 s noted that usually 
it cannot provide the monetary resources needed. 
County officials were very vocal about problems with the DSRs, with 
record keeping requirements, and with cash flow problems resulting from 
slow federal reimbursement of pub 1 i c assistance funds. In fact, at the 
time of the second interview, the Marin County Supervisor, who has 
emergency management overview responsibi lities, was in Washington, DC, 
serving as spokesperson for the North Coast County Supervi sors 
Association (a sUb-state regional organization of elected county 
officials in Northern California) to discuss the above-mentioned 
problems with the director of FEMA. The list of his concerns is 
included in Attachment B. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
The State Hazard Mit i gat ion Pl an was more a status report than a 
planning document, because it was issued almost two years after the 
actual event. (The delay was due to the number of disasters with which 
the over-worked staff had to contend.) Similarly, the press of new 
disasters prevents the FEMA Hazard Mit i gat ion Offi cer from doi ng more 
than monitoring local ations about three to six months after a dlsaster 
declaration. Local officials are motivated to complete the recommended 
mitigation actions mainly because a significant amount of "unfinished 
busi ness" mi ght interfere with needed federal assistance ina s imil ar, 
future disaster. 
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As noted earlier, the county administration is highly competent in 
normal times. What is unusual is the amount of time and attention paid 
to regular, routine meeting and training in emergency management. Prior 
to the 1982 Dec1 arat ion, the county he1 d regu1 ar emergency dri 11 s for 
more than a decade, even though no major disasters occurred. The fact 
that the San Andreas fault goes through the county does help to ensure 
the concern and attentiveness of the county officials. Nevertheless, 
the continuous attention to emergency management and the regularly 
maintained coordination and training activities allow the county to 
smoothly swing into action to handle an emergency. 
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Attachment A 
Special Districts* 
(Marin' County) 
~pecial districts are legal entities with an authorized governing body, 
operating in a defined area, with the right and duty to provide certaLn ser-
vices. District fis~al ?owers include a variety of combinations of special 
assessments, property taxes, service charges, and the issuance of bonds. Most 
syecial districts are created by resolution of the Board of Supervisors and con-
f rmed by the electors. The governing boards of districts may be elected or 
appointed I or the Board of Supervisors may serve in this capacitr as set up by 
the enablLng state legislation. In Marin County, as of January , 1980, 34 
special districts are governed by the Board of Supervisors: 
County Service Area .•••..•.•.•• 14 
Sewer Maintenance •••.•.•••••••. 4 
Lighting ••••.•••.••••..•••••••• 1 
Flood Control .................. 8 
Permanent Road Division...... 5 
Transi t •••••..•....•••.••••• 1 
Parks and Open Space ••.••••• 1 
57 special districts are governed by local representation: 
Community Services ...•.•....... 
Fire •••.•...•.......••...•.•... 
Marin Hospital .•..•.••.•.•..••. 
Mosquito Abatement ..•••.•...... 
Public Utility ................ . 
7 
8 
1 
1 
2 
Recreation •.•..........•••.. 1 
School .......•....•....•...• 23 
Soil Conservation ..•.•.••.•. 1 
Sanitary and Sanitation ..... 11 
Water .•.••••••...••.••...•.• 2 
Marin County is a part of 2 regional or multi-county special districts: 
Bay Area Air Pollution Control 
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation 
There are 5 regional agencies that exercise some control over Marin County: 
California Regional Water Quality Control District, San Francisco Bay 
Region 
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) 
North Central Coast Regional Commission 
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) 
The size of a special district ranges from a few city blocks to a multi-county 
or regional district. A Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFC) reviews 
boundary chan~es for new and existing cities and districts within the county. 
The State LegLslature is responsible for setting the boundaries and functions 
of regional or multi-county special districts and regional agencies. 
A special district provides service that people feel they need which general 
government is not able to meet. It does not necessitate city incorporation 
where only a few services are required. Only the citizens Wlthin the special 
district pay for these services. 
Special districts once formed, however, tend to be resistant to dissolution or 
change when the need for them lessens. Because of the great numbers and the 
overlapping of boundaries, there is sometimes little citizen awareness of or 
interest in special districts. One result is a lack of candidates for some 
district boards. Another disadvantage of manv special districts is the lack of 
over-all planning for an area in budget priority, facility placement, and uni-
form, efficient service. 
The taxpayer may determine which syeci~ districts he is paying for by referring 
to his tax bill. There are approx illat~.; 400 tQ.)( code areas in r!ann County. 
* Source: "Your County Marin--A Citizen's Guide to County Government 1980-1982," League of Women Voters, Marin County, California, Apri1 1981. 
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Attachment B 
The North Coast County Supervisors Associaton approved the 
following list of necessary improvements to PL-93-288 at its 
meeting of February 3, 1984. Supervisor Robert Roumiguiere 
of Marin County was authorized to present the list to FEMA 
during meetings the week of February 6, 1984. 
I. Define as eligible extraordinary equipment maintenance 
as an eligible expense. Apply the preceding three year 
history of maintenance costs to determine such costs. 
II. Employ the jurisdictions certified local schedule of 
equipment (owned) rates on old force account expenses. 
III. Define directly related administrative expenses and 
fringe benefit expenses as eligible. 
IV. Allow the use of State Controller required accounting 
format for storm project accounting and audits. 
V. Alloy7 full, directly related, engineering costs as 
eligible expense. 
VI. Adopt FHWA standards for repair and reconstruction of 
storm damage sites. Allow,construction to approved local 
standards including betterments required by current 
standards as an eligible expense. 
VII. Improve reimbursement procedures to insure receipt of 
payments within thirty days of billing date. 
VIII. Restore the reality of 100% federal funding for all 
disaster expenses. Stop all efforts to codify the 
financially disasterous and unlegislated 75/25 cost sharing 
formula. 
IX. Stop excessive reviews of DSR's limit review process to 
the field revie"~ and a single administrative review. 
X. Landslide policy is highly discriminatory to the State of 
California. If an engineering review determining a site 
to be re-buildable site restoration, expenses should be 
defined as eligible. 
XI. Restore the disaster funding advance mechanism. Lack of 
cash flow is a serious impediment to disaster recovery. 
Initiate a presumptive advance mechanism based on a com-
pleted disaster assistance application and the FAST team 
estimates. Write down the presumptive advance against 
the maximum DSR based advance. 
XII. Define secondary damage as eligible for disaster assistance. 
Secondary damage is defined as unavoidable damage incurred 
as a result of disaster response. 
XIII. A~ply Hazard ~~tigation and Insurance requirements to sites 
w~th restorat~on costs in excess of $25,000. 
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CHAPTER XII I 
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
Background 
See discussion in the previous chapter. 
Santa Cruz County 
A few significant differences between Santa Cruz and Marin counties 
should be noted: 
1) Santa Cruz County is in the Emergency Phase of the NFIP, 
althouyh some cities within the county are in the 
Regular Phase. (More municipal actions to achieve flood 
plain management are required by FEMA of communities in 
the Regular Phase.) 
2) City/county relations were not smooth prior to the 
disaster; and after the disaster, a Grand Jury found 
fault with the county's emergency response to the flood 
and muds I ides. 
A general description of the disaster was provided in the previous 
chapter. In Santa Cruz County, the torrential rains and subsequent 
mudslides caused destruction as well as about 22 deaths. It was a 100-
year storm for much of the area. 
Recovery Activities 
Officials in Santa Cruz said the timing for the transition from 
response to recovery vari ed with the type of act i vi ty. The stream and 
high-water damage was repaired quickly, and within two weeks the Public 
Works Department was planning recovery actions. The road damage took a 
long time to compl ete, whi ch meant that the begi nni ng of the recovery 
period for that segment of reconstruction activities came later. In the 
early days of the disaster, virtually all county staffers assisted with 
operational jobs, regardless of their usual duties. For example, 
professional staff went to the severely stricken areas to assist with 
the manual labor needed to protect property and stem further destruction 
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(e.g., clearing away mud and debris from buildings and roadways). After 
a few days of basic, manual tasks, several switched to planning or 
analysis jobs, which they thought would make a more meaningful 
contribution to understanding and coping with the disaster recovery and 
mitigation. 
Discerning the county government's priorities in the array of 
recovery issues and probl ems after the di saster was clouded by the 
priority site selected by the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team. In 
Santa Cruz County, the team's report cited only one 
Lorenzo Valley, although that is a large geographic 
location, San 
area. County 
officials did not disagree with that site as a priority for attention, 
but they did think that some refinement and more specific target areas 
would be more appropriate in terms of the county's agenda for 
mitigation. 
Since most of the damage occurred in residential and agricultural 
areas, the role of the bus i ness community and the extent of pub 1 i c/ 
private interaction regarding recovery were minimal. 
City/County Relations 
Interaction between city and county officials in Santa Cruz County 
was troubled. The research team did not delve very deeply into the 
emergency response phase, since most of the issues regard i ng recovery 
from and mitigation of the land and mudslides arose later. 
Nevertheless, from the brief discussions of emergency preparedness and 
response, it became clear that there were problems. One problem was 
that the county was reluctant to activate the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) because it was vulnerable to flooding, potentially 
endangeri ng the safety of the emergency seri ces personnel. A second 
~roblem was disagreement between city and county emergency personnel as 
to basic needs and priorities. Officials in some of the cities did not 
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think the county had been responsive to their needs during the response 
peri od. 
Ultimately, a Grand Jury investigated and criticized the 
intergovernmental activities and relationships. The Grand Jury was 
characterized as "politically inspired" by some individuals. On the 
other hand, several persons commented that some county offi ci a 1 shad 
over-reacted to the report. While the details of the Grand Jury process 
and results are not known to the field research team, the formation of 
the Grand Jury and the controversy over its actions ref] ect troubled 
relations between city and county officials. It appears that the city 
and county officials did not meet regularly prior to the disaster and 
that relations even under normal conditions were strained. As a result, 
the stresses of the disaster response and recovery exacerbated existing 
difficulties. 
CountY-State-Federal Relations 
There was cons i derab 1 e wrangl i ng over the Damage Survey Reports 
(DSRs). Ultimately, the disagreements over what projects were eligible 
and what federal assistance would be made available resulted in the 
estab Ii shment of many schedul ed meeti ngs--weekly for two months after 
the disaster, and then biweekly--with the Congressman and top county, 
state, and federal officials in attendance. The county officials 
i ntervi ewed attri buted need for such a seri es of meetings to thei r 
speci a 1 neds for re 1 i ef and ass i stance and also to the heavy demands 
they made on FEMA. Some local official s accused FEMA of not being 
familiar enough with the area, saying the agency should have relied more 
on local people--particularly with regard to the determination of the 
mitigation "opportunity" sites and the measures feasible to use. 
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Mitigation Measures 
While the public assistance determination process became highly 
argumentative and politicized, the county-state-federal interchange 
about recommended hazard mi t i gat i on measures al so caused a maj or stir. 
For reasons never explicitly identified, the county government did not 
name an individual to be the local hazard mitigation liaison for the 
Hazard Mitigation Team until late April, about 15 weeks after the 
Declaration was issued. This delay angered FEMA officials and raised 
questions about the county's commitment to hazard mitigation. As it 
turned out, county officials were, in fact, thinking about land use and 
other restrictions that would be necessary during the recovery period in 
the San Lorenzo Valley, even if they were not doing so in the context of 
the team effort. The 1 oca 1 person ass i gned to the team in April was a 
member of the County Planning Department. 
In the San Lorenzo Valley, a host of issues about land use 
controls, particularly in the Love Creek section of that valley had been 
simmering. The Hazard Mitigation Team report describes the terrain and 
hazard potential in San Lorenzo Valley as follows: 
The San Lorenzo Valley is an unincorporated part of 
Santa Cruz County and includes all of the San Lorenzo River 
Basin and its tributaries upstream of Henry Cowell Redwoods 
State Park (southern unit). The major tributaries are 
Zayante Creek, Love Creek, Bear Creek and Boulder Creek. the 
unincorporated towns of Felton, Ben Lomond, Brookdale, and 
Boulder Creek are all within the San Lorenzo Valley. The 
area is characterized by low density residential and 
commercial development surrounded by forest. 
Beari ng the brunt of the storm, the hi 11 s of the San 
Lorenzo Valley received rainfall in amounts of 10" to 18" 
with numerous reports in excess of 24". The great weight of 
the rain in the soil exerted excessive stress on the slopes 
which triggered numerous landslides and mudslides. The slide 
situation was so del icate that rescue workers feared the 
propeller wash from helicopters and small planes would topple 
trees around them. 
The San Lorenzo Valley floodplain is very narrow, due to 
the deeply incised water courses, and broadens where 
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tributaries feed into the San Lorenzo River. There is 
development in the floodplain 100-year flood level. The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engi neers I prel imi nary fl ood frequency 
calculations show the San Lorenzo River at Big Trees at only 
a 10-year flood event. 
The San Lorenzo River Basin was the most heavily 
affected area in the declared counties. Almost every problem 
found in this disaster was evident in the San Lorenzo 
Valley. Landslide, mudslide and flooding caused loss of life 
and numerous injuries, loss of access and utilities, and 
damage and destruction of many buildings and facilities. 
An estimated 14 people were killed by landslide and 
mudslide in the San Lorenzo Valley. Reliable information on 
damages in San Lorenzo Valley is not available because the 
information is on a countywide basis. However, of the over 
400 famil i es from San Lorenzo Valley who regi stered at the 
Disaster Assistance Center, 39 reported their homes were 
destroyed, 152 reported maj or damage, and 217 reported mi nor 
damage. 
The Team is very concerned about the safety of 
developments in San Lorenzo Vall ey and concl uded that the 
hazards, their severity and likelihood of occurrence must be 
determined before further development is allowed. Once the 
hazards are evaluated, new develoment and reconstruction 
should only be a"llowed if they can be reasonably safe from 
damage. Since most of the deaths in this disaster occurred 
in San Lorenzo Valley, the county should implement a warning 
and evacuation plan. 
More specifically, the Hazard Mitigation Survey Team report listed 
the foll owi ng work to be done: 1) i dent ify s i gnifi cant hazards in San 
Lorenzo Valley; 2) evaluate the impacts of these hazards; 3) review and 
evaluate applicable land use regulations, construction standards and 
other existing hazard mitigation measures; 4) evaluate measures which 
could mitigate these impacts; and 5) recommend appropriate mitigation 
measures. 
While county officials did not dispute the selection of ,San Lorenzo 
Valley for mitiyation attention, they favored a narrower, site-specific 
focus. Further, some county officials were highly concerned with the 
potential cost and, of equal importance, the political feasibility of 
achieving mitigation--especially in the already developed portions of 
San Lorenzo Valley. 
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Interviewers' Perceptions 
In Santa Cruz County, the bulk of the response work--e.g., debris 
removal, mudslides, creek cleaning--fell to the Public Works 
Department. That department, together wi th the Pl anni ng Department, 
also had the lead role in the recovery process. Yet, the county 
representative to the Hazard Mitigation Team was in the Planning 
Department. For reasons not fully known, the Planning Department 
appeared to have a secondary rather than primary role in recovery 
planning. 
Fundamental to the conflict over the Hazard Mitigation Team's 
recommendat ions is the fact that the county's buil di ng codes and 1 and 
use controls were not adequate to protect 1 i fe and property from the 
disaster. The changes needed are a major community issue, one which 
sparks controversy because of the varying philosophies as well as 
ability and willingness to pay (directly and indirectly) for them. The 
outcome--and whether or not it was influenced by the Hazard Mitigation 
Team's efforts--will be a significant indicator of the future of 
recovery and mitigation in the county. 
One of the critic isms of the county's emergency response was its 
unwillingness to activate the Emergency Operations Center because it was 
in the basement of the County Administration Building, which is 
susceptible to flooding. To ensure the safety of the emergency command 
personnel, the decision to activate was delayed. As a result, during 
the early hours after the emergency, r-pntralized, effective leadrsllip at 
the county level was not as good as many of the city officials within 
the county wanted. 
It did seem surprising that four months after the disaster, the 
county p 1 anni ng offi ci a 1 s were not aware of federal Execut i ve Order 
11988 or its California counterpart. Both the federal and state flood 
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plain regulations require that attention be paid to flood hazard 
mitigation in every reconstruction project proposal to reduce the 
potential for future losses. Such requirements are the basis for the 
activities of the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Teams. A related 
1 imi tat i on was the fact that the county di d not name a representative 
for the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team until late April, 1982. It 
is interesting to contrast the Santa Cruz situation with that of Marin 
County, where the County Planning Director was a participant on the 
Hazard Mitigation Team from its inception. 
Update on Santa Cruz County 
During the spring of 1982, Santa Cruz County had many problems to 
deal with after the devastating series of floods, landslides, and 
mudslides of January and February of that year. The problems ranged 
from inadequate emergency preparedness to a need for extensive changes 
in land use regulations for development in an area of delicate 
ecological balance. The local population concentrations are unusual in 
Santa Cruz County. which includes almost 190,000 persons. About 50,000 
persons live in the canyon areas; about half of those live in 
unincorporated areas. The ability to mitigate natural hazards is 
limited because so much of the land within the county forms canyons, the 
population is scattered rather than concentrated, and many persons live 
in areas without strong local government. 
Aside from susceptibil ity to flooding (both coastal and inland), 
the county has three major earthquake faults within its boundaries. A 
number of the persons who live deep in the canyon areas are reclusive--
they live without electricity and municipal water and sewer services and 
they want minimal contact with public officials. For all these reasons, 
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it is difficult to identify all of those persons and structures at risk, 
let alone enlist their support for mitigation activities. 
By the wi nter of 1983, when the research team was on-s ite the 
second time, the county had taken several major actions to reduce its 
vul nerabil i ty to future flood and 1 andsl i de hazards. The county had 
thoroughly revamped its emergency management operation (including a 
substanti a 1 rewrite of its ope rat ions manual and the estab 1 i shment of a 
second emergency oprat ions center); compl eted several of the 1 and use 
control actions recommended by the HMT; and generally accomplished many 
changes that would improve the county's preparedness for a future 
disaster. 
When county officials were asked what they were doing differently 
since the 1982 disaster declaration, they 'listed the following: 1) 
changes in county regul at ions regardi ng how to locate new construct ion 
and critical faci lities; 2) several programs for the public to ensure 
better personal preparedness; 3) condemnation of 28 (intact) houses in 
the Love Creek area, most of which have been moved or torn down; and 4) 
condemnation of 200 structures in other parts of the county. 
The State Hazard Mitigation Report 
The 3~-day HMT Report had sel ected the San Lorenzo Vall ey for 
priority attention. In the two years since the 1982 disaster, the 
county has implemented a number of mitigation measures in the San 
Lorenzo Valley and elsewhere. A brief summary of the 11 hazard items 
identified for mitigative action by the State Hazard Mitigation Report 
follows: 
1) Map areas with slope instability, 
2) Review population directly in geologically hazardous 
areas, 
3) Improve maintenance for public and private roads, 
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4) Reduce damage due to stream bank erosion and stream side 
slope failure, 
5) Accelerate log and debris jam removal, 
6) Improve flood plain mapping, 
7) Improve storm drain capacity, 
8) Design standards for floodproofing and elevation of 
structures in the flood plain, 
9) Improve policies in the County General Plan relative to 
project design and densities in flood plains, 
10) Require the elevation of mobile homes in flood plains 
above the base flood level after they have sustained 
damage in excess of their value, and 
11) Revise ordinances regarding elevation of septic systems 
in the flood plains. 
Of the above list, seven items had been at least partially completed as 
of January, 1984; work on items 7, 8, 9, and 10 has not yet been 
compl eted. Some of these latter items are years from completion, 
depending on availability of funds. 
In addition to the major mitigative actions recommended by the HMT, 
county officials in Santa Cruz have undertaken a variety of other 
measures to faci 1 i tate the county I s recovery and improve its future 
preparedness. Many taxpayers have changed their attitude about 
government spending. Since the 1982 and 1983 floods and related 
devastation in Santa Cruz, citizens are more willing to pay for flood 
and slide prevention measures and netter understand the need for certain 
land use regulations. 
County land use regulations now require a geologic hazards analysis 
on sites for dvelopment. County officials make field visits and 
personally review all sites of new construction. It should be noted 
that four county employees perform these site inspections and also do 
erosion control work. 
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The county has mounted a publ ic information campaign to provide 
citizens with more information about hazards and preparedness. In the 
fall of 1983, the county prepared a tabloid with information on natural 
hazards which was mailed to county residents. Also, county officials 
organized a series of community meetings at which county geologists 
spoke with citizens about the geologic hazards from which they are at 
risk. In addition, the county has stepped up its erosion control work. 
Other mi t i gat i ve steps include setting up about 100 pri vate road 
assessment districts as a new mechanism for coordinating private 
response, estab Ii shi ny a watershed revi ew process for the Soquel Creek 
area, and improving a flood alert system. 
County-State Relations 
County officials acknowledged help from the state after both the 
1982 and 1983 disaster declarations. Yet they view the state as a 
"mil d" advocate of thei r needs and interests vi s-a-vi s the federal 
government and woul d like st ronger support from the state. "The state 
should defend its children," explained one county official. In 
addition, loedl officials think that the state offers too few disaster 
recovery programs. 
County-Federal Relations 
As noted earlier, initial county-federal relations were filled with 
tension and conflict. County officials acknowledge that they were very 
aggressive and argumentative regarding public assistance from FEMA. 
They defend their outspoken behavior, saying that for a relatively small 
county government the paperwork is extremely burdensome, the amount of 
federal aid and assistance is too little and hence "devastating" to a 
small community, and the administrative process for achieving and 
implementing the DSRs is "overwhelming." At the time of the second 
visit, county officials were less agitated about the process, but they 
181 
were st ill very vocal about the problems. Cash flow is a cont i nui ng 
concern for the county due to slow payments by the federal agencies. 
The public works officials, on whom most DSR-related work falls, 
commented on the grey areas in the process. Some public assistance 
projects which the county puts forward to FEMA for payment el igibil ity 
determination are answered with a "probably no," rather than a "yes" or 
"no." When the possibility for project-funding was thought to exist, 
county officials would pursue it. -In Santa Cruz, county officials felt 
that they "had chased the carrot too far" on occasion. In addition, the 
Public Works Department spent about $250,000 on engineering 
consultations which were necessary to supplement the existing staff to 
meet the workload. These expenditures of both time and money are the 
types of efforts that contribute to the feeling that the administrative 
burden is overwhelming. FEMA is viewed as not offering enough financial 
assistance to make recovery possible, yet placing heavy demands on local 
officials after a disaster. 
Santa Cruz County pub 1 i c works offi ci a 1 s advi se others in thei r 
s i tuat i on to document everythi ng. They recommend recordi ng proj ect 
details from the engineering perspective (including photos) and 
document i ng how time and money are spent. The deta il s help 1 ater with 
presentations and the inevitable appeals. They also help if a 
subsequent disaster wipes out the earlier project for which a DSR was 
prepared. 
They also recommend being as specific as possible in requests to 
federal officials for equipment and expertise. It's also important to 
know how to ask for things--for example, you may be better off calling 
for a training exercise rather than for disaster response assistance if 
you are asking the state for help from the National Guard. 
182 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
The second vi sit to Santa Cruz was espec i all y useful, becallse some 
mitigation measures--like changes in land use requirements and building 
standards--requi re many months or even years to impl ement. The second 
visit provided an opportunity to document changes that had mitigative 
effects, but were not evident at the time of the first field trip. 
Since the first visit was about four months after the declared 
disaster event (and additional land and mudslides occurred after that 
date), it was not yet possible to discern what mitigative steps would be 
taken during the recovery period. This follow-up more than a year later 
was useful because it: 1) rei nforced the deci s i on the research team 
made in Year II of the project that a first visit should be made about 
one year after the declaration; and 2) validated the decision to revisit 
communities where recovery was expected to be long and difficult, but 
where potentially significant hazard mitigation measures miyht be 
implemented. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
FORT WAYNE, INDIANA 
Backgr.ound 
The city of Fort Wayne is the second largest city in Indiana, with 
a population of approximately 172,000. The city is located at the 
confl uence of three ri vers: the St. Marys, the St. Joseph, and the 
Maumee. The St. Marys flows into the city from the south, and the St. 
Joseph flows into the city from the north. These two rivers meet in the 
downtown section of the city, forming the Maumee River, which flows in 
an easterly direction out of the city. The St. Marys and the St. Joseph 
drain two entirely different watersheds and, therefore, their flows are 
independent of each other. 
Owi ng to an extens i ve network of di kes and 1 evees, the city can 
usually withstand the floodwaters of either the St. Marys or the St. 
Joseph ri vers. Because each ri ver is ina different watershed, each 
river peaks at different times, allowing the Maumee to carry the water 
out of the city. When temperatures and precipitation combine to deliver 
peak flows to both rivers simultaneously, the Maumee cannot handle the 
load. The resulting floods often reach disastrous proportions. 
The city of Fort Wayne has a long history of floods. Between 1829 
and the winter of 1982, the city had 24 damaging floods. The most 
damaging flood in the city's history was in 1913, when the Maumee River 
crested at 26.1 feet. Floods in 1959 and 1978 resulted in Presidential 
Disaster Declarations. It is interesting to note that while the 1913 
fl ood of record produced a peak fl ow of 34,000 cubi c feet per second 
(cfs), causing the Maumee to crest at 26.1 feet, the flood of 1982 
produced a peak flow of 27,000 cfs, causing the Maumee to crest at 25.9 
feet. The city has a major flood on the average of once every six 
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years, but city officials think there are floods at more frequent 
intervals. 
Description of Disaster 
The flooding disaster of 1982 began on Friday, March 12, when the 
rivers started to rise; it did not end until Sunday, March 21, when the 
I ast of 9,000 evacuees returned to thei r homes. The fl ood waters of 
March can be traced in part to a record snowfall in Fort Wayne duri ng 
the winter months; the snowfall exceeded 70 inches and caused several 
snow emergenci es. The snow, combi ned with unseasonably warm 
temperatures in the watersheds of both the St. Marys and the St. Joseph 
rivers, set the stage for what has since become known in Fort Wayne as 
the "Great Flood of '82." 
Extent of Damage 
The Great Flood of '82 was the second most damagi ng and the most 
costly flood in Fort Wayne's history. Nearly 20% of the city was 
fl oOded, caus i ng damages of al most $50 mill ion. Flood-reI ated costs 
include the cost of emergency operations, damage in the primary impact 
area, and damage in the secondary impact area. The cost of emergency 
operations for flood fighting totalled more than $4.7 million. 
The tot a 1 cost for a 11 pub Ii c and pri vate flood damage, as we 11 as 
reI ated expenses, was estimated at over $45 mi 11 i on. Pub Ii c property 
damage, which includes public and city utilities in the primary impact 
area, totalled over $7 million. The cost of flood-related damage 
outside the flooded area was almost $2 million. In addition to these 
hi gh costs, Y,OOO persons had to be evacuated from thei r homes duri ng 
the course of the emergency. About 35,000 peopl e vol untarily 
participated in the flood fighting activities as "sandbaggers" and 
support personnel. 
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As great as the costs and impacts were for the city and its 
residents, the disaster could have been much worse. If two strategic 
dikes had failed, thousands more people would have to have been 
evacuated and the cost of flood damage would have been an additional $27 
million. The city was almost divided into six "islands," and it came 
close to losing its water supply. City officials and citizens realize 
that flooding is likely in the future. 
Because Fort Wayne was in the midst of a severe economic downturn, 
the 1982 flood and its attendant expenses increased the city's financial 
and personnel d iffi cult i es. Bond revenues wi 11 have to be used to pay 
the local share of some federal disaster recovery grants, as well as for 
several million dollars in street repairs. In addition, a number of 
capital improvements will be del ayed (or cancelled) in order to gi ve 
precedence to mitigation activities. A sizable number of layoffs have 
occurred and more are expected. 
In contrast to negative financial consequences to the city and its 
residents, there were some positive aspects to the flood. After an 
extreme 1 y hard wi nter with record snowfalls, the city's fi ght against 
the flood of '82 appears to have raised the community's spirits. The 
flood also diverted the community's attention from its serious economic 
situation, reflected in an 11.4% unemployment rate and possible plant 
closings. The flood of '82 also brought the city of Fort Wayne national 
media exposure, including many pictures of President Reagan (wearing hip 
boots) assisting with the sandbagging efforts. The city capitalized on 
this publicity by running an advertising campaign to attract new 
busi nesses. The theme of the campai gn was "Fort Wayne, the Ci ty that 
Saved Itself." 
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Response Phase 
Duri ng the wi nter before the fl ood, the city had several snow 
emergencies during which the city's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
was activated. These snow emergencies were cited as good practice for 
the flood which followed. Also, since everyone expected a spring flood, 
the city formulated a plan in advance. The Fort Wayne Flood 
Preparedness Pl an, dated February 22,1982, is comprehens i ve and 
practical. The plan describes the staffing of the EOC (which is next to 
the mayor's offi ce) and sets forth the respons i bil it i es of each city 
department duri ng a fl ood emergency. In the early stages of the flood 
the plan worked well; however, the di saster soon outgrew the pl an and 
on-the-spot group decisions had to be made. 
For example, on Tuesday, March 16, sandbagging operations were 
switched from the city garage to the memorial coliseum. The plan did 
not envision the need for the 30,000 to 35,000 volunteers that 
eventua 11 y responded to fi 11 and pl ace sandbags. At the hei ght of the 
flood, local officials feared that the city would be divided into six 
"islands" by the rising waters. Public safety officials responded to 
the threat by quickly developing contingency plans to reposition fire 
and police resources to operate in six locations. 
Some of the problems with early response to the flooding were the 
result of the swift onset and the timing of the flood. The flooding 
began on Saturday, March 13, 1982, the fi rst ni ce day of spri ng, whi 1 e 
many people were away from their homes. This made it difficult to 
contact both city employees and volunteers. The good weather also made 
it hard for many people to believe that there was a flooding problem. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engi neers arri ved Saturday with addit i ona 1 
sandbags and pumps. Cooperation between the local government and the 
Corps was characterized as good, but city officials seem to feel that 
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the Corps was operating under tight legal constraints as to what it 
could and could not do. 
The city's response to the flood reflected its leadership's normal 
management styl e, whi ch is characteri zed by very ti ght control at the 
policy level and great discretion at the operational level. Policy 
issues were decided by the mayor, with advice from a small number of 
advisors. Tasks were identified by the policy group and department 
heads, and then assigned to personnel working in interdepartmental 
teams. For exampl e, when the command staff of the pol ice department 
identified one of the first problems caused by the flood--traffic 
congest i on and street fl oodi ng--they ass i gned the head of the traffi c 
division to the EOC to direct road closings and the rerouting of 
traffic. 
On Sunday, March 14, the governor declared the city and surrounding 
Allen County a disaster area. The National Guard responded and assumed 
responsibility for security in the evauated areas. The National Guard 
worked exclusively with the State Police, allowing the city police to 
concentrate on tra ffi c problems caused by the fl ood and to mai ntai n 
service areas of the city (80%) which were not affected. Local police 
officers were placed on 12-hour shifts. 
All the resources of the city were brought into the extended flood 
fight. The city has approximately 1,800 employees, and when city 
personnel ran short, contractors were used. The city school system 
provi ded transportation for the thousands of volunteers who worked on 
the dikes. The city's response activities can best be characterized by 
the mayor's advice to other local officials faced with a similar 
disaster: "Be flexible; call all agencies fast; don't be afraid to 
spend money." The mayor followed his own advice, and the city survived, 
but the cost was high. Because of the flood, the severe winter storms, 
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and the depressed local economy, it was necessary to: 1) issue a $1.5 
million bond in order to raise the 25% match for the public assistance 
component of the Presidential Disaster Declaration; 2) issue a $3 
million bond to finance street repair; and 3) layoff 70 city utility 
employees. In addition, the entire capital improvement budget is being 
reconsidered. All of this took place in a state which has had property 
tax freeze legislation since 1973, and in a city which is making 
concessions to keep its major industrial employer while at the same time 
trying to attract new industry. 
Recovery Activities 
Recovery activities began before the response phase had ended. In 
the early part of the response phase, a consultant with disaster 
experience who was working for the city on an unrelated project advised 
city offi cia 1 s of some of the recovery and mit i gati on problems he knew 
they would face. This convinced the officials that one person should be 
gi ven 1 ead res pons i bil ity for the recovery phase. Si nce the city did 
not have anyone on staff with recovery experience, an outside consultant 
was hired. Four days after President Reagan visited Fort Wayne, the 
state received a Presidential Disaster Declaration for Allen County. 
That same day, March 20, the city's recovery consultant arrived. 
On March 23, 1982, the mayor's office distributed an internal memo 
describing a four-phase flood recovery effort. Each phase was assigned 
to an interdepartmental team. Phase I involved a critique of the city's 
response to the disaster; Phase II, headed by the recovery consultant, 
was to deal with pub Ii c recovery issues, such as the Di aster Survey 
Reports (DSRs), and relief issues; Phase III was a 30-day effort to 
produce a local mitigation plan; and Phase IV consisted of a "Flood 
Festival" to thank the many flood volunteers for their assistance. 
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The city administration took a very active role in the Disaster 
Assistance Centers (DACs). Seventy city employees were detailed to work 
at the DACs. Two identical centers wre set up in the same building to 
reduce waiting time. Interviews with victims at the DACs often included 
the participation of local mental health workers. 
In addition to participating in the DACs, the city set up a non-
profit foundation to distribute the flood relief money which had been 
contributed by many individuals and organizations. The city was able to 
anticipate the need for this foundation through information provided by 
its Citizens' Advocate Office. 
During emergencies, the Citizens' Advocate Office and the Office of 
Civil Defense share the responsibility for managing the EOC. The 
Cit i zens' Advocate Offi ce also responds to non-emergency requests for 
assistance. 
Fort Wayne Flood '82, Inc. was created on March 21, 1982 as a non-
profi t foundation to recei ve monetary and materi a 1 donations for fl ood 
victims. The fund was managed by a board of directors representing the 
community. Flood victims could apply for grants of up to $250 by 
completing a simple application form. Grant applicants had to meet 
three requirements: 1) live in a flooded area of Fort Wayne or Allen 
county; 2) either own and live in their own home in the flooded area or 
rent a house, apartment, or trailer (absentee landlords were not 
elibible); and 3) apply for $250 or less. As of June 4, 1982, Fort 
Wayne Flood '82, Inc. had received approximately $300,000 and had 
distributed $235,617 directly to individuals. Eighty-three percent of 
all applicants received grants. About 1,240 awards were made to 
individuals, with the average grant amounting to $190. The remaining 
funds wi 11 be di stri buted to non-profit organi zati ons that spent money 
in the flood fighting effort or lost equipment as a result of the flood. 
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Mitigation Measures 
Local mitigation planning was initiated as Phase III of the four 
phase recovery process described earlier. The Flood Protection Planning 
Team was mainly an in-house team composed of 12 members from key 
departments representing a variety of professional perspectives and 
skills. The team's planning process also involved state and federal 
officials, Allen County engineers, and private consultants under 
contract to the city. The Indi ana Department of Natural Resources 
provided computer analysis of solution elements, and the U.S. An~y Corps 
of Engineers aided in the development of the alternative solutions 
summarized below. Overall, the team was charged with identifying land 
use development and flood prevention alternatives and selecting a 
specific strategy to prevent recurrence. 
A parallel but more restricted task was undertaken by the 
Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team (HMT). Members of these teams were 
appoi nted by the regi ona 1 FEMA Di rector fo 11 owi ng the di saster 
declaration. The HMT is composed of federal agency representatives and 
representatives of state and local governments. Several members of the 
Fort Wayne Phase III Team also were members of the HMT. While the 
activities of the two teams were similar, their perspectives and goals 
were different. Beginning with the initial joint meetings, efforts were 
made to integrate both sets of recommend at ions in order to produce 
consistent, sequenced mitigation and flood protection options. Drafts 
of the HMT report were evaluated by the representati ves on that team 
from the State of Indiana and the City of Fort Wayne to insure 
consistency with the flood protection plan subsequently produced by the 
Fort Wayne Phase III Team. That team maintained coordination with the 
federal agency members of the HMT. 
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The Flood Protection Planning Team 
For the Phase III Team, the complexity of the mitigation planning 
task and the 30-day completion schedule established by the mayor 
required an intense team effort and a major reallocation of duties for 
all team members. Much of the early work was directed at developing an 
accurate data base for use in preparing the mitigation and flood 
protection alternatives. A detailed field study provided data on 
flooded and potentially flooded areas. The team emphasized the 
development of flood protection alternative solutions for the potential 
impact of the 1982 flood, thereby broadening its frame of reference and 
demonstrat i ng commi tment to long-term sol ut ions to the fl oodi ng 
problem. A variety of technical, economic, environmental and other 
criteria were used by the team both in developing and selecting 
alternative solutions. As will be explained, these solutions were in 
part based on the Hazard Mitigation Team Report. 
The Hazard Mitigation Team Report 
The HMT focused on the problems and opportunities of specific 
neighborhoods in providing a framework for flood hazard mitigation 
duri ng the reconstruction phase. Thi s strategy was chosen in order to 
1) utilize the Mitigation Team's recommendations, 2) avoid duplication 
of efforts ,vi s-a-vi s the Phase II Team, and 3) help bri dge the gap 
between whatever long-term alternatives were developed and the shorter-
term flood protection needs in Fort Wayne. 
The HMT developed its recommendations and presented them in the 
form of three distinct strategies, based on working assumptions about 
the flood potential in three different areas. The three strategies are 
as follows: 
1) Offer lOa-year protection without the need for fl ood 
fighting. Elements in this package emphasized short-
term structural measures and focused on the Pemberton 
192 
area, which was the focal point of the massive 
sandbagging effort described earlier. 
2) Offer 100-year protection with flood fighting. In some 
damaged areas, the team chose a combi nat i on of 
nonstructural, short-term mitigation measures, including 
floodproofing, limited acquisition and relocation, 
technical assistance and training, and purchase of flood 
insurance. L imi ted structural measures were also 
incl uded. 
3) Reduce the effect of flooding in those neighborhoods 
where 100-year protection is not possible in the near 
future. These elements emphasized floodproofing by 
homeowners, the purchase of the flooded Michael-Ross 
area, and review of potential relocation of several 
businesses out of the vul nerable central business 
district area known as the Thumb. 
As shown on the following summary of the HMT's recommendations trom the 
April 5, 1982, report many of the mit i gat i on measures are short-term, 
nonstructural, and expensive. 
The HMT employed both economic and technical criteria in deveioping 
the proposed measures; it recognized the need to be realistic because of 
the long history of development in the flood plain as well as the 
estimated high cost of extensive structural and nonstructural solutions 
(e.g., large-scale relation). One major nonstructural measure was 
endorsed. Thi s endorsement was cont i ngent upon the development of a 
comprehens i ve, long-term flood protecti on prog ram by the city of Fort 
Wayne. 
The Fort Wayne-Allen County Flood Protection Plan 
In its planning process, the Phase III Team intended to develop a 
full range of alternative flood protection solutions. It was recognizd 
that a number of the solutions would be considered infeasible or 
unacceptab 1 e. The a lternat i ves that were developed ranged from who lly 
nonstructural to those emphasizing long-term major structural mitigation 
measures. The nine alternatives that ultimately were identified by the 
team included diversion, evacuation of the flood plain, floodproofing, 
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channelization, diking, and impoundment. The team thought that it was 
essential to develop solutions that would offer protection in the longer 
term, as well as for the interim period. In addition, thE: proposed 
solution had to be financially realistic and acceptable to the 
community. 
Two sets of criteri a were employed in deve 1 opi ng and sel ect i ng 
alternative solutions. The technical criteria consisted of engineering 
standards, regulations, and guidelines, based in part on current plans 
and studies. A second, broader set of criteria was employed to evaluate 
the various alternatives and to propose a single solution. These 
criteria include: 
• technical feasibility 
• monetary cost 
• effectiveness and reliability in reducing flood damage 
• energy and resource use 
• public acceptance 
• implementation capability 
• impact on the natural environment 
• social and economic impact 
The development of the nine strongest alternative solutions 
involved extensive discussions among local engineers, planners and other 
team members. The team then conducted pub 1 i c heari ngs on the proposed 
so 1 ut ions and subsequent 1 y used citizen comments to help refi ne the 
alternatives and to reduce the number to be further considered. 
After the fi rst pub I i c heari ng, the team refi ned some of the 
sol uti ons and removed others from further cons i derat ion. Each of the 
solutions seriously considered contained some element of a diversion 
approach to mitigating future floods, i.e., a viable comprehensive 
solution must include the diversion of some portion of the St. Marys 
River lOO-year floodwaters around key parts of the city of Fort Wayne. 
A refined version of Alternative 4 was selected as the best 
comprehensive flood protection solution, because its multi-faceted 
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approach incorporated the short~term mitigation measures recommended by 
the Hazard Miti gat i on Team, a vari ety of the stronger concepts and 
features of other alternatives (acquisition-relocation, dike and levee 
improvements, internal drainage improvements) ,and the most acceptable of 
the key long-term measures (40% di vers i on of the St. Marys 100-year 
fl oodwaters) • 
Alternative 4 Implementation Issues 
The proposed implementation strategy for the proposed flood 
protection sol ution is considered by Fort Wayne official s to be both 
optimistic and realistic. An initial trip to Washington, DC by a 
delegation from Fort Wayne, the other local jurisdictions affected by 
the 1982 fl ood, and the state of I nd i ana set the tone for subsequent 
implementation efforts. The first trip, early in April 1982, was made 
prior to the completion of the flood protection plan and the adoption of 
Alternative 4. Its purpose was to discuss damages and to explore 
potential mitigation and long-term recovery options that could be 
supported in Washington both by members of Congress and key federal 
agency officials. The trip was successful because it publicized the 
magnitude of Fort Wayne's disaster and the need for mitigation and 
recovery assistance. 
After the flood protection plan was completed (and Alternative 4 
was selected), another delegation traveled to Washington to present the 
plan and to demonstrate local initiative in developing viable mitigation 
solutions. The plan had been endorsed and accepted by the various local 
governments and key state officials, along with a number of regional 
federal agency officials. On August 26, 1982, FEMA approved two 
mitigation projects for 75/25% funding in Fort Wayne. One project will 
protect the Fort Wayne wastewater treatment plant from flooding through 
the construction of floodwalls and an earthen berm. The second project 
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will prevent flooding in two buildings on the Purdue University, Fort 
Wayne Campus. Gate valves will be installed in the storm and sanitary 
sewer lines outside of the buildings. Closing of these valves during 
flooding incidents will prevent damage to mechanical equipment located 
in the basement of the libary and student union buildings. 
In agreeing to this innovative action, the Associate Director used 
the following standard: 
Public facilities in the lOO-year floodplain damaged by 
a major disaster shall be protected against anticipated 
flooding damage by flood hazard mitigation measures, but only 
where the proposed measures meet the fo 11 owi ng four 
conditions: 
1. The measures must be judged effective in substantially 
alleviating or eliminating recurrence of flooding damage 
done to the public facility by the major disaster. 
2. The measures must be feas i b 1 e from the stand poi nt of 
sound engineering and construction practices. 
3. The measures must be cost-effective; further, they must 
be more cost-effective than any alternative measures 
which would be eligible as disaster-proofing. In any 
event, the cost of the measures shall not exceed a small 
percentage of the eligible project (DSR) costs approved 
by FEMA unless approved by the Associate Director under 
unusual circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 
4. The measures must be consistent with applicable NFIP 
standards (44 CFR, page 59, LT seq.), Floodplain 
Management Regulations (44 CFR, Par 9), and (w~ere 
applicable) environmental considerations (44 CFR, Part 
10) • 
Proposed projects will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the 
Assoc i ate Di rector of FEMA I s State and Local Programs and Support, for 
compliance with the above conditions. 
Fort Wayne officials have initiated the l8-month implementation 
plan, which includes 12 key tasks for accomplishing flood protection 
under Alternative 4. These tasks include: 
• upgrading flood-fighting capability 
• obtaining plan approval and adoption 
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• establishing a new organization to control flooding 
• creating an interim organization 
• conducting preliminary design work (revised cost/technical 
estimates) 
• improving levees to original condition 
• i nsta 11 i ng backwater gates (to prevent sewer system 
damage) 
• repairing sewers and pumping stations 
• performing river dredging 
• performing ditch cleaning 
• acquiring land 
• planning the Trier Ditch cut-off (the 40% diversion) 
• raising existing dikes 
• limited construction of new dikes 
Several of the steps in the implementation plan were assessed by 
Fort Wayne officials as being relatively straightforward and non-
problematic. Other steps, however, could pose major stumbling-blocks to 
the effort. The officials stressedthe integrated nature of the plan, 
and that all elements are necessary tu dchieve the level and immediacy 
of flood protection required to insure the safety of Fort Wayne and the 
affected areas nearby. Perhaps the most serious problem is in bringing 
certain dikes and levees to original pre-flood conditions, employing 
bentonite trenches in especially vulnerable locations. This action had 
been recommended by the Detroit offi ce of the U.S. Army Corps of 
En;)i neers fo 11 owi ng an extensi ve survey of the area. Even though the 
establishment of stable dikes is critical to the integrated flood 
protection plan, a difference in interpretation over the permissibility 
of the recommended bentonite treatment between the Detroit CJE district 
office and the Chicago COE regional office had not been resolved at the 
time of this writing. 
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A number of other implementation steps could prove difficult, 
including obtaining plan approval by the public and adoption by the City 
Council, and establishing a new organization--possibly a conservancy 
type special district--to administer the flood protection effort. 
Despite possible difficulties, the city of Fort Wayne already has 
assigned a variety of implementation responsibilities to local 
departments. 
To complement these internal efforts and to assist in the resource 
procurement and marketing of its ambitious flood protection program, the 
city not only has shifted its internal staff resources, but has retained 
the services of the recovery consultant mentioned earlier and the 
consulting engineer who was instrumental in the earl ier response and 
recovery phases. These actions are consistent with the basic operating 
policy of Fort Wayne. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
Fort Wayne developed an ambitious and aggressive plan of action to 
mitigate the effects of any future flooding and to help its citizens 
recover from the Great Flood of '82. Gi ven its hi story of fl oodi ng, 
however, it is surpri sing that so few of the elements of the current 
flood protection plan have been implemented. One reason for this 
failure to adopt long-term mitigative measures in the past was 
i dent ifi ed by the Phase II I Team as "compl acency." 
After the 1978 flood, as was true after earlier floods, no real 
effort was made to find an overall long-term solution to the flooding 
problem. Instead, existing protective structures were restored to their 
previous condition. A variety of attitudinal, political, and management 
factors seem to account for the apparent change in di rect i on fo 11 owi ng 
the 1982 flood. The administration in the city was highly sensitive to 
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the political and other ramifications of its actions. Given the 
administration's philosophy and the past failures to affectively 
mitigate floods, in 1982 the local public leaders emerged with an 
unusual, perhaps unique, approach to all phases of disaster 
management. All phases of emergency management were directed and 
coordi nated by a top 1 eve 1 pol icy group. Independent act ions by 1 i ne 
agencies were discouraged. Also, existing local government priorities 
were mod ifi ed to permit major shifts in duties for key personnel for 
significant periods of time. Where the needed expertise was not 
available in-house, experienced consultants were hired, notably for the 
longer-term recovery efforts. 
Fort Wayne's usual management approach emphasizes teams, 
flexibility, and problem-solving. The same approach characterized Fort 
Wayne's efforts throughout the 1982 flood emergency. Some of the flood 
response and recovery results to date appear significantly different 
from those often found in similar disaster settings, primarily due to 
the management approach of the 1 oca 1 pub 1 i c 1 eaders. Although 
inconclusive at the time of writing, these results may be instructive to 
other communities. They are summarized as follows: 
1) The flexible team approach enhanced effective policy 
direction and strengthened decision making in all 
emergency phases. 
2) This management approach is politically acceptable, and 
it is perceived locally to be effective, because it 
permits the citizens to see clearly that the government 
is using its own resources to the fullest extent in 
their behalf. 
3) The approach is results-oriented. The teams for each 
phase developed measurable goals and target dates for 
accomplishing them. At least one team was involved in a 
criti que of the respnse phase in an effort to improve 
future emergency operations. 
Use of the team approach for Phase III accelerated the 
mitigation effort--the city decreased the length of time 
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needed to establish mitigation goals and initiate 
efforts to obtain outside funding. 
Also, the approach allowed the local administration to 
capitalize on the community and political impacts 
created by the response efforts, particularly by the 
successful attempt to demonstrate local initiative. 
4) The management approach used by Fort Wayne may increase 
the likelihood of effective change and community 
betterment. By activating separate teams with 
overlapping schedules, the administration effectively 
reduced the time between response, mitigation, and 
recovery efforts, thereby preventing the "vacuum" that 
often occurs in postdisaster settings. 
The momentum produced by Fort Wayne's innovative approach may 
improve its miti gat i on and recovery chances. However, if the 
implementation of mitigation plans is limited by lack of "financial 
resources, the recovery process may be less comprehensive and take 
longer than planned. Despite the difficulties facing Fort Wayne, there 
appears to be a steadfast commitment to implementation of the proposed 
flood protection plan. The mayor and other local officials obviously 
have shown strong initiative. 
Update on the Recovery of Fort Wayne, Indiana 
About 18 months after the flood, and almost one year after the 
initial site visit, the project staff returned to Fort Wayne for a 
second look at the city's progress. The project team wanted to see how 
the implementation of Ft. Wayne's unusually ambitious mitigation program 
had proceeded. 
The 18-month milestone turned out to be especially appropriate for 
two reasons: 1) 18 months is the usual period FEMA allows for the 
completion of approved projects for public facilities repair and 
restoration; and 2) 18 months was the remaining time in the mayor's term 
of office, hence the period for which he could make commitments. Mayor 
Winfield Moses was re-elected in November, 1983. Consequently, it is 
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expected that the city's flood protection and mitigation implementation 
efforts will continue as planned. 
Recovery Activities 
About two months into the recovery period, the special assistant to 
the mayor and the consul tant ass i gned to the recovery pl anni ng effort 
gradua 11 y phased out of recovery act i vit i es and into other proj ects. 
the City Controller--who serves not only as financial manager, but also 
as emergency management coordi nator--gradua 11 y reduced hi s i nvo 1 vement 
in disaster-related activities as the months went by. 
Yet, at the 18-month point, the city's planning director and public 
works director still were significantly involved in flood recovery 
activities. Both said their workload had not yet returned to pre-flood 
status. 
In the aftermath of the disaster, the local public officials 
qui ck 1 y determi ned thei r pri orit i es for reconstruct ion, recovery, and 
mitigation and then made plans to implement them. In the short-term, 
the city had a Flood Protection Plan and also an 18-month Work Plan for 
flood recovery projects. A copy of the major projects in that plan, 
with notations about compl et i on by the time of the second vi sit, is 
appended as Attachment A. The city had made substantial progress in 
completing the SCheduled projects by the time of the second visit. 
For the longer-term, the city outlined its Flood Hazard Mitigation 
Plan for the years 1984-88. (The "White Paper #3B," issued by the mayor 
in September, 1983, is briefly outlined in Attachment B.) One of the 
proposed items in the city's Flood Hazard Mitigation Plan is the 
formation of a Conservancy District (CD), according to the procedures 
required under Indiana state law. The CD is a special taxing district 
whose responsibilities include flood protection for Fort Wayne and 
surroundi ng areas. Si nce the watershed areas cover almost the ent ire 
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county, the city's boundari es are too narrow for the flood protect i on 
measures needed in the long run. The CD also would allow for the 
maintenance of dikes, other structures, and green space in perpetuity. 
It could do so via its taxing power (e.g., $ .20 per $100 of assessed 
value), escrow tax, and sale of bonds. 
The CD also makes sense from a political standpoint. In an area 
where one political party tends to dominate politics in the city and 
another one in the county, the CD would provide a de-politicized 
environment where technical expertise and continuity would be likely. 
The advantages of using a CD for long-term flood protection are that the 
organization would have an 
powers, and its own budget. 
it should be self-sustaining. 
exclusive mandate, cross-jurisdictional 
With its own taxing and bonding authority, 
There are nearly 7D such districts in the 
state, but the use of one for along-term sol ut i on to fl ood protect ion 
may be unique. 
Financial 
The controller is not only the city's financial manager, but in 
effect serves as city manager on occasion. In case of a city-wide 
emergency, he/ she serves as the Emergency Management Coordi nator. The 
controller and his department were used to functioning in non-
traditional ways, which provided the flexibility and experience required 
to handle the flood response and recovery. According to the controller, 
his two major concerns immediately after the flood were to ensure that 
needed supplies and materials were made available, and proper record 
keeping and other details of expenditures were document~d, so that 
outsi de government ass i stance and grants woul d not be compl i cated or 
jeopardized. As the recovery continued, he added a third concern: the 
authorization and documentation of overtime labor. 
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Given the depressed economic conditions prior to the 1982 flood, 
the research team was especially interested in how those conditions 
would affect the recovery. According to the local public officials 
interviewed at the l8-month mark, neither the local government's 
financial condition nor the private sector were irreparably harmed by 
the flood. (An economic analysis was not part of this case study.) 
At the time of the second visit, the controller explained that 
among the financial assets available locally was a special local fund 
called the Endowment Trust Fund. The Endowment Trust Fund had not been 
specifically mentioned during the research team's first visit to Ft. 
Wayne. This fund, which derives its monies from leased city utilities, 
brings in $1.5 million of revenue annually. About $ .75 million is 
unencumbered each year. At the time of the fl ood, there was $3-4 
million in that fund; consequently, the controller was able to use those 
monies for response and recovery costs. Also, at the time of the flood, 
the city was about to issue water and sewer bonds; as a result of the 
fl ood, the city increased the tot a 1 amount of the bond issue by about 
10% to bring in additional monies for water and sewer repairs. 
OSRs/Record Keeping/Audit 
As has been true elsewhere, when key personnel have had previous 
experience with a federally declared disaster, they can anticipate the 
documentation and record keeping needed for public assistance from 
FEMA. In thi s case, both the city engi neer and the controller were 
experienced and saw to it that the records for the DSRs were correct and 
in order for the federal auditors. 
One city staff member, borrowed from the Economic Development 
Department, was given the full-time job of implementing the projects 
authori zed in the l8-month peri od foll owi ng the federal approval of 
public facilities repair and restoration. 
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According to the city 
officials, this care with record keeping and with tracking the progress 
of repair projects helped them to convince the FEMA officials to do an 
early auditand hence allow the flow of federal dollars to the city to 
proceed ahead of the usual public assistance reimbursement process. 
Under thi s speci al arrangement, FEMA performed a part i a 1 payment 
audit--the audit was done at the time the public facilities repairs were 
about 90% compl eted (although the paperwork was not yet compl eted) • 
FEMA aud i tors came into do the audit and wai ved the usual pri or state 
audit. FEMA agreed to reimburse the city for 75% of its share of the 
project, upon completion of the partial audit. The reason cited for 
this special audit was that despite city officials' efforts to deal with 
both flood recovery and fl ood protect ions, the city was havi ng seri ous 
cash flow problems. 
Interviewers' Observations 
Fort Wayne had an unusually positive relationship with the federal 
government and with FEMA in particular. The city officials were 
especially pleased with the efforts of two FEMA staffers--one who was on 
the Hazard Mi t i gat i on Team and the other who was the head of Oi saster 
Ass i stance in the Chi cago Regi ona 1 Offi ce--because of thei r wil i ngness 
to stretch to meet the needs of the flood-stricken community. For its 
part, the community had to adjust its attitude toward the Army Corps of 
Engineers, an agency which it had asked not to come into the area again 
after a major disagreement during the last major flood. 
The city's continuing commitment to long-term flood mitigation 
efforts and to the formation of a special district that could attend to 
such needs in perpetuity are commendable. 
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Attachment A 
FORT WAYNE-ALLEN COUNTY FLOOD PLAN 
18 MONTH WORK PROGRAM 
COST 
ESTIMATE 
I. FLOOD FIGHTING 
*A. 
"'B. 
C. 
*D. 
River Gages 
Flood Emergency Action Plan 
Early Warning System 
Floodproofing Program 
II. DIKES 
*A. 
*B. 
c. 
*D. 
Minor Repairs 
1. Bella Vista 
2. Waynedale Spot Fill 
3. Boat Ramp 
4. Leave Flood-Fighting Fill 
5. Oswego (North of Vance) 
Repair to Pre-Flood Condition 
1. Pemberton 
2. 14 Miscellaneous Sections 
B. Proof Rolling & Repair 
b. Tree Removal 
Increase Height 
*1. Nebraska (some acquisition) 
*2. Main to Clinton 
3. Spy Run/St. Joe 
4. Taylor Street 
5. Michigan Avenue 
6. Vesey Avenue 
New Construction 
1. Lagoon Dike 
2. Sewer Treatment Plant 
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$ 15,000 
N/A 
$ 90,000 
$ 10,000 
$ 5,000 
$ 15,000 
$ 1,400 
$ 3,000 
N/A 
$ 2,500 
$200,000 
$131,000 
$104,900 
$ 80,000 
$250,000 
$400,000 
$300,000 
$165,000 
$600,000 
$ 90,000 
$ 90,000 
$ 90,000 
$ 52,000 
$ 49,200 
POTENTIAL 
FUNDING SOURCE 
U.S. Geological Survey 
Dept. of Natural Resources 
City 
State of Indiana 
Community Development Block Grant 
FEHA 
City Budget 
City Budget 
City Budget 
City Budget 
City Budget/COE 
Public Law 84-99 
Public Law 84-99 
City Budget 
State of Indiana 
City Budget 
Park Bond 
City Budget 
State of Indiana 
State of Indiana 
State of Indiana 
State of Indiana 
City Utilities 
City Utilities 
Revised 6/83 
18 MONTH WORK PROGRAM (cont.) 
*111. BACKWATER GATES 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
Spy Run Creek 
St. Joe River 
St. Marys River 
Maumee River 
Fairfield Ditch 
IV. CHANNEL IMPROVEMENTS 
A. Confluence Area 
*B. Traders Point (MESA) 
C. Fairfield Ditch 
D. State Street 
V. ACQUISITION 
*A. Fairmount Place 
($350,000 over 6-year period) 
B. Ross-Michael 
*C. Rivergreenway 
V·I. PilllPING STATIONS 
A. Tecumseh and Morton Street 
and Emergency Pumping Wells 
VII. DMlAGE SURVEY REPORTS 
*A. 
*B. 
Utilities 
Civil City 
VIII. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
TOTAL 
*Complete or funded 
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COST 
ESTIMATE 
$ 135,000 
$ 400,000 
$ 131,000 
$ 200,000 
$ 120,000 
$ 300,000 
$ 190,000 
$ 140,000 
$ 93,000 
$ 200,000 
$ 1,334,900 
$ 364,200 
*$ 5,097.200 
$11.309,300 
POTENTIAL 
FUNDING SOURCES 
City Utilities 
State of Indiana 
Park Bond 
Allen County 
Allen County 
Community Development 
Grant 
State of Indiana 
State of Indiana 
Park Bond 
State of Indiana 
City Utilities 
City Budget 
Block 
FEMA (public assistance) 
1. Goal Statement 
Attachment B 
Excerpts From 
White Paper 38 
(pp. 2-3) 
"Flood Hazard Mitigation 1984-88" 
City of Fort Wayne 
September 1983 
The Fort Wayne community needs a single authorized agency to implement 
a comprehensive flood control solution. This agency must be relentless 
and timeless in the pursuit of this long-term objective. 
Program 
The creation and implementation of a conservancy district. 
2. Goal Statement 
The Fort Wayne community needs to expedite a long-term flood 
control solution that will provide the greatest degree of 
protection to the area's flooding ·problems. 
?rogram 
Congressional appropriations through the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers flood control projects to implement major public works 
flood control projects like the Trier Ditch diversion channel. 
3. Goa 1 Statement 
The Fort Wayne community needs to continue its efforts to achieve 
short-term solutions to the flooding problems that provide some 
degree of protection immediately. 
Program 
Develop additional Work Programs to compliment and extend the soon 
finished 18 Month Work Program. 
4. Goal Statement 
The Fort Wayne community needs to achieve wise use of flood hazard 
areas with the context of the built environment. 
Program 
Review, revise and update the existing floodplain zoning ordinance. 
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CHAPTER XV 
CARDINGTON, OHIO 
Background 
On June 13, 1981, a devastating tornado swept through the central 
bus i nes di stri ct of Cardi ngton, Ohi o. The twi ster hit the vill age of 
1,700 residents at 3:23 on a stormy Saturday afternoon; by 3:25, four 
were dead and nearly 60 were injured. Damage to the vi 11 age was 
extensive. The tornado buckled sidewalks, uprooted trees, toppled lamp 
posts, and cut gas, e 1 ectri c and telephone servi ce to much of the 
village. It also destroyed or seriously damaged 21 houses, 17 mobile 
homes, 15 apartments, both the fire and police stations, and 29 of the 
village's 32 downtown businesses. 
The damage was estimated at $4.2 million, an enormous loss for a 
village with an asessed real estatevalue of slightly less than $12 
mi 11 ion. Damage to pub 1 i c property exceeded $1 mi 11 i on and damage to 
residential and commercial property approached $3 million. The 
resulting loss in tax revenues was estimated at $1.4 million. 
The tornado of June 13 caught the residents of Cardington 
compl ete 1 y by surpri se. They had 1 ittl e warn i ng that the twi ster was 
approaching and virtually no time to protect their property. Moreover, 
35% of the houses, 65% of the businesses, and 90% of the mobile homes 
that were damaged or destroyed were not adequately insured against such 
a disaster. 
Response Phase 
Local officials. Minutes after the storm had passed, village 
officials began to mobilize. The first to respond was the chief of 
pol ice. He requested assistance from the Morrow County Sheriff; 
informed Columbia Gas of the ruptured mains; and, fearing explosions and 
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fi res from random sparks, prohi bited 1 oca 1 res i dents from us i ng 
gasoline-powered saws to clear debris. 
The chief of police was also responsible for establishing an 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and a Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) 
in the gym at the village high school. The gym had sustained only minor 
damage and was sufficiently large to accommodate the scores of people 
requiring aid.* The chief was assisted by a highly capable local 
merchant who remained at the EOC for most of the week following the 
storm. 
The mayor of Cardington played a significant role in the immediate 
response, as well. After assessing the damage, he established recovery 
pri orit i es: first, ensure the safety of village residents; second, 
protect commercial property; third, protect residential property. These 
priorities guided the response phase of the disaster. Having set 
pri orit i es, the mayor organ i zed a "C lea ri nghouse" for the hund reds of 
vol unteers who came to Cardi ngton to assi st with search and rescue 
operations and debri s removal. Located at the high school gym, the 
clearinghouse provided volunteers with specific work assignments and 
maps of the vi II age. It was later determi ned that 162 farmers and 
neighbors from the surrounding countryside responded to help village 
residents. Many brought tools and heavy equipment which were used in 
debris removal activities. 
On Saturday evening, the mayor ordered the chief of police to seal 
the village. He feared that unsupervise·' visitors might loot the damaged 
businesses and hamper the search for victims. Later that evening, the 
*The Morrow County Di saster Pl an desi gnated the Cardi ngton 
Methodist Church as the site for the GAC. The church, however, had been 
damaged by the storm and was not 1 arge enough to accommodate all of the 
disaster victims. Consequently, the EOC and the DAC were established at 
the high school gym. 
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mayor imposed a 9: 00pm-7: OOam curfew that remai ned in effect for 14 
days. The curfew was enforced by the village's auxiliary police, who 
were assisted by the National Guard, the State Highway Patrol, and 
pol ice from 18 neighboring towns that had mutual aid agreements with 
Cardi ngton. To avoi d confus i ng volunteer workers with peopl e i gnori ng 
the curfew, the EOC issued passes stamped wi th the hi gh school seal to 
all "authorized personnel." 
The mayor of Cardington was the principal architect of the 
immediate response, even though he is a part-time official with a full-
time job operating the local dairy. He met each day with key volunteers 
and members of the Vill age Council to revi ew and coordi nate response 
activities. On June 18, the Village Council unanmously approved 
Resolution 81-6, authorizing the mayor to act on behalf of the village 
in all matters concerning the disaster. Both the mayor and Council felt 
that the resolution would help the village to retain local control over 
response activities. Also on June 18, the Council adopted a resolution 
requiring the registration of all contractors soliciting business in 
Cardington. The resolution was suggested as a precautionary measure by 
an official from the State Office of the Attorney General. It, too, was 
passed unanimously. 
Cardington's fire chief also was involved in the immediate 
response. He partici pated in search and rescue operations, worked at 
the EOC, and encouraged fi re stat ions in nearby towns to send thei r 
pumpers as a precautionary measure. 
Nei ghbori ng towns and vill ages. Cardi ngton recei ved much 
assistance from towns and villages throughout the area. For example, 
Mt. Gilead, Ohio, organized a disaster "hotline" that handled more than 
350 i ncomi ny call s from concerned fri ends and rel at i ves of Cardi ngton 
residents. Other towns di spatched 1 aw enforcement offi cers and fi re 
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equipment, while still others sent food, volunteer workers, and monetary 
contributions. 
The State of Ohio. The State of Ohio responded quickly and 
dramati ca lly to the di saster in Cardi ngton. Withi n hours, Governor 
James A. Rhodes arri ved in the vil1 age to assess the damage. He 
declared a "state of emergency," told local officials to specify the 
kinds of assistance the village would need, and assured residents that 
the state would provide whatever was required to guarantee the 
community's survival. Although the governor returned to Columbus late 
Saturday evening, he was back in the village the following day. 
On Sunday, June 14, the governor began to mobil i ze the state's 
resources. A structural engineer from the Department of Economic and 
Community Development (DECO) was sent to help local officials determine 
which buildings were irreparably damaged. The Ohio Department of 
Transportation (ODOT) sent heavy equipment to begin clearing debris from 
the central business district. And the Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) sent scores of workers into the vi 11 age's res i dent i a 1 
areas. These state employees remained in Cardington for approximately 
ten days. The governor also mobilized the National Guard and the State 
Highway Patrol from Mansfield and Marion. 
On Sunday evening, Governor Rhodes requested a Presidential 
Disaster Declaration. 
Federa 1 offi ci a 1 s. Offi ci a 1 s of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) toured Cardington on Monday, June 16. The following 
morning, President Reagan issued a Disaster Declaration for Morrow 
County. Soon after the declaration was issued, Representative Bob 
Shamansky (D-Co1umbus) sent a member of his staff to the DAC to help 
village residents complete FEMA grant applications. FEMA also secured 
temporary housing in nearby towns for approximately a dozen residents 
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whose homes had been damaged by the storm. (Most of the displaced 
residents found shelter with friends or relatives.) 
After the disaster declaration, a FEMA official held an open 
meeting in Mt. Gilead, Ohio, to inform residents of Cardington about the 
availability of federal aid. The OOOT official also offered the village 
two mobile homes for use as municipal offices. The mobil~ homes arrived 
on June 20. 
Vol unteer organi zat ions. Volunteers from the Ameri can Red Cross 
arrived at the OAC less than two hours after the storm, bringing food, 
clothing, medical supplies, and other necessities. Remaining in the 
village for slightly more than a week, these volunteers prepared 
thousands of meals, coordinated the relief activities of various church 
groups, and provided shelter for residents whose homes had been damaged 
and who were waiting for assistance from FEMA. 
The Fri ends and Mennonite Oi saster Servi ces also responded with 
vol unteer workers. These peopl e from Ohi 0 and Pennsyl vani a cl eared 
debris from business and residential areas and completed pressing 
emergency repairs. The Salvation Army established canteens to help feed 
the volunteer workers, the Morrow County Squad Association transported 
injured residents to the Morrow County Hospital, and scores of civic 
organizations sent contributions to the newly created Cardington Tornado 
Relief Fund. 
Recovery Activities 
By the end of June, the people of Cardington were turning their 
attention from "response" to "recovery." Much of the debris had been 
cleared and public utilities were again functioning normally. On June 
19, OOOT, ONR, and most of the volunteer workers ~eft the village. 
Several days later, the mayor lifted the curfew. 
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Early in July, village officials worked with FEMA to complete the 
Di saster Survey Reports (DSRS) requi red by the agency. Offi ci a 1 s from 
Xenia, Ohio (a town that had been shattered by a tornado in 1974) helped 
to prepare federal grant appl i cat ions, and state offi ci a 1 s at the DAC 
helped local residents complete applications for SBA loans. 
Card i ngton recei ved add it i ona 1 ass i stance from the DECD Offi ce of 
Grants Management, which provided the village with an extremely 
knowledgeable, dedicated, compassionate, and competent representative 
who remained in Cardington almost full-time for several months. During 
those months, she enabled the village to secure a DECD grant for a new 
municipal building that would replace the firehouse, the police station, 
and the mayor's office, all of which had been destroyed by the tornado. 
In early August, the mayor organized a five-member Tree 
Committee. As its name suggests, the committee was charged with 
replacing trees splintered by the storm. Over the next several months, 
more than 120 trees were planted. Later in August, the mayor organized 
the Green Dump Committee. Staffed by four volunteers, it was 
responsible for disposing of the scores of felled trees that had been 
piled by ODOT and DNR on a privately owned seven-acre lot near the edge 
of the village. Ultimately, the committee decided to cut the trees into 
firewood and to sell it locally. Profit from the firewood was divided 
among the owner of the 1 and, the fi re department, and the Card i nyton 
Tornado Relief Fund. 
Once the immediate response was completed, the people of Cardington 
were primarily interested in replacing or repairing their personal 
property and piecing together their shattered lives. They were eager to 
put the tornado behind them. Consequently, there were relatively few 
recovery priorities that affected the entire community. In other words, 
Cardington's recovery was marked more by personal than by village 
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pri orit i es. Despite this emphasis on personal priorities, village 
offi cia 1 s confronted at 1 east one communi ty-wi de issue. It was raised 
at the end of June when the Vill age Council di scussed the need for a 
comprehensive land use plan for the village's central business district. 
The idea for a plan originated with several of the younger, more 
progressive local merchants who had visions of transforming Cardington 
from a crossroads village into a "regional attraction" for area 
shoppers. These merchants realized that many of the buildings destroyed 
by the storm were decayi ng remnants of past gene rat ions. They also 
realized that the tornado provided Cardington with an opportunity to 
revita1 ize its business district using state and fedra1, rather than 
local funds. In short, these younger merchants saw the tornado as a 
catalyst that would spark development and increase local revenues. They 
believed a plan was necessary to ensure that the business district was 
developed appropriately. 
Enthusiasm for a land use plan was not universal. In fact, a 
majority of the vi 1"1 age's older merchants opposedthe idea; they were 
interested in rebuilding and reopening their businesses as soon as 
possible, they objected to the imposition of building constraints, and 
they feared that any delay in demonstrating that Cardington had survived 
the disaster would result in the permanent loss of customers to 
competitors in other towns. 
These sentiments notwithstanding, the Village Council voted to 
request a DECO planning grant and to solicit bids fromp1anning firms 
throughout Ohi o. The request was made of the governor at a tel evi sed 
village meeting. During the week following the request, the governor, a 
state legislator, village officials, and several village residents 
discussed the need for the grant. Ultimately, the governor assented and 
persuaded the State Controlling Board to release $93,000. 
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Wi th the request for the pl anni ng grant approved, the mayor of 
Cardington selected "volunteers" for a 15-member ad hoc advisory 
commi ttee. The committee reported to the 1 oca 1 Pl anni ng Commi ss ion 
(which existed prior to the tornado) and concentrated its planning 
activities in five areas: the central business district, housing, parks 
and recreation, i ndust ri a 1 development, and capital improvements. The 
committee was also responsible for assisting the Planning Commission 
with the selection of a planning firm, with organizing the information 
the selected firm needed to complete the plan, and with ensuring that 
the plan adequately reflected local ideas and community preferences. 
Early in July, the Village Council issued a "request for 
proposals." Twenty-six firms responded, six were invited to a screening 
by the Planning Commission, and at the end of July, both the Planning 
Commi ss i on and the Advi sory Council recommended to the Vi 11 age Counc il 
that a firm from Cincinnati, Ohio, be selected. The firm was chosen, in 
part, because it was eager to involve local residents in data-gathering 
tasks. Earl yin August, the Vill age Council 1 et the contract to the 
firm in Cincinnati. It then organized a town meeting to explain to 
local residents the purpose of the forthcoming land use plan. 
The land use plan prepared by the Cincinnati firm was completed in 
June of 1982, months behi nd schedul e and fully one year after much of 
the village had been leveled. By then, more than a dozen merchants had 
already rebuilt and reopened their businesses, unwilling to wait for the 
plan's completion. In short, the carefully conceived and innovative 
plan was of little practical value because it was not completed in a 
timely fashion and was not widely supported by those who were ultimately 
responsible for its implementation. Moreover, the absence in Cardington 
of land use ordinances, local building codes, and zoning regulations 
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meant that local officials did not have the tools to slow or suspend 
rebuilding until the plan was completed. 
Several of Cardington's more savvy merchants supportd the planning 
grant request but realized before the request was approved that a land-
use plan had little chance of guiding the village's recovery. They 
supported the request bcause the grant would enable the village to hire 
the cl eri ca 1 personnel it needed to compl ete the enormous vol ume of 
paperwork required by FEMA. 
Less than a year after it was created, the 15-member ad hoc 
advisory council was dissolved and its functions delegated to the 
Community Improvement Corporation. Composed of local business leaders, 
the corporation existed prior to the tornado but had not been especially 
active. 
An Overview 
Cardington survived the tornado because a relatively small group of 
part-time officials and dedicated residents effectively organized the 
resources provided to the community by a variety of local, state, 
federal, and volunteer agencies. This tenacious group endured the 
frustrations of working with government bureaucracies, encouraging 
officials to deliver the assistance that was promised in a timely 
fashion. One example of that tenacity is seen in the scores of 
telephone calls from Cardington's fire chief to Govern0r Rhodes. (The 
governor had promised to replace the village's fire equipment. When the 
new equipment was slow to arrive, the chief made sure that the governor 
knew about it.) Moreover, Cardington's leaders clearly understood that 
their efforts to secure assistance should be directed at those agencies 
with tangible resources at their disposal. They recognized, for 
instance, that the governor, and not their congress member, had direct 
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control over the machines and personnel needed to respond to the 
emergency. 
A second explanation for Cardington's recovery can be found in the 
flood of support from individuals and organizations across Ohio. 
Hundreds of volunteers contributed time and labor to the immediate 
response, whil e hundreds of others contri buted money to the Cardi ngton 
Tornado Relief Fund. 
A third explanation for Cardington's recovery is the assistance the 
village received from the State of Ohio. For reasons that rem a in 
unclear, the governor took a highly personal, almost avuncular interest 
in the tiny village. He visited Cardington frequently, ordered members 
of hi s cabi net to provi de vi rtua 11 y all of the resources requested, and 
persuaded the State Controll i ng Board to authori ze funds for a vari ety 
of grants. Moreover, both the governor and the official from the Office 
of Grants Mangement continually reassured village residents that they 
were personally committed to the community's welfare. This level of 
commitment was probably a function of the personalities involved; it was 
not one of the state's standard procedures for handling natural 
disasters. 
Financial Assistance 
Since June 13, 1981, Cardington, Ohio has received nearly $1 
million in state and federal grants. Specifically, the village secured: 
• $269,000 from DE CD for a municipal building; 
• $29,000 from DECD for counseling and other mental health 
services; 
• $17,600 from DE CD for emergency police protection; 
• $300,000 from the HUD Discretionary Fund; and 
• $183,000 from FEMA for the replacement of public facilities. 
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Additionally, the village received low-interest loans from the SBA 
and more than $40,000 in unsolicited contributions which were used for 
i nd i vi dua 1 as s i stance grants and mi no r vill age proj ects • The vi 11 age 
took no extraordi nary measures--such as i ssui ng bonds--to fi nance the 
recovery. 
As of June 30, 1982, Cardi ngton had recei ved 100% of its state 
grants and 75% of its grants from FEMA. This relatively short 
reimbursement period, coupled with a preference to move slowly on 
several village projects, explains why the village has not experienced a 
"cash flow" problem. 
Local-State Relations 
As detailed above, Cardington fared unusually well in its 
postd i saster deal i nys wi th the state. Vi 11 age res i dents were grateful 
for and pleased with the assistance they received and continue to praise 
the efforts of most state officials. The only complaint registered by 
several village residents involved the leveling of the severely damaged 
businesses. These residents felt that the ODOT crews did not allow 
suffi c i ent time for removi ng personal property before thei r buil di ngs 
were demolished. 
Local-Federal Relations 
Village officials had few complaints about the assistance they 
received from FEMA. They were pleased with how quickly FEMA responded 
to their immediate needs and with the dollar amounts the agency approved 
for the DSRs. They also were pleased with the timeliness of FEMA 
reimbursements. 
Nevertheless, several officials commented that FEMA was insensitive 
to disaster victims; that FEMA paperwork was excessive; that the agency 
should have processed supplemental DSRs more quickly; and that temporary 
hous i ng was located too far from Card i ngton. In sum, it appears that 
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FEMA responded to the di saster in textbook fashi on, whi 1 e the state I s 
response was considerably more personal and compassionate. 
Recommendations 
Vill age offi c i al s had words of advi ce for thei r counterparts in 
other towns: 
1) Local official s should retain control of all recovery 
activities. Under no circumstances should state or 
federal officials be allowed to direct the recovery 
process. 
2) Requests for assistance should be as specific as 
possible. More general requests are processed less 
quickly and often result in assistance that is neither 
desirable nor appropriate. 
3) Requests for assistance should be addressed to agencies 
and organizations that have direct control over desired 
resources. (For example, it was obvious to officials in 
Cardington that state official s, and the governor in 
particular, had control over more of the resources 
necessary duri ng the immed i ate response than did thei r 
federal legislators. Consequently, village officials 
devoted much of their time to contacting the office of 
the governor.) 
4) Local offi cia 1 s must be pers i stent if they are to 
recei ve all of the ass i stance they have been promi sed. 
They should not be reluctant to inquire repeatedly about 
the status of specific requests. 
5) Local residents should 
deci sions, for citi zen 
improve the chances that 
effectively. 
be involved in all recovery 
participation is likely to 
decisions will be implemented 
6) Local officials should maintain detailed records of 
every expenditure. I ncomp 1 ete records will comp 1 i cate 
the local relationship with FEMA. 
7) Local officials should be aware of the ex officio 
authority they possess in extraordi nary ci rcumstances. 
This is especially important for officials responsible 
for the delivery of emergency services. 
8) Disaster plans should be reviewed annually by all 
9) 
relevant officials. Such a review would familiarize 
officials with their roles and responsibilities. 
Finally, the official responsible for orchestrating 
the response and the recovery should recognize 
importance of organizing available resources. 
Cardington, the clearinghouse for volunteers and 
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both 
the 
In 
the 
frequent meetings of the Vi 11 age Council suggest that 
local officials understood that the community's survival 
hinged, in part, on a well-organized response. 
Mitigation 
Although much of Cardington was destroyed by the tornado on June 
13, vill age offi cia 1 s seem unconcerned wi th mit i gati on. Few shelters 
have been built and no zoning or land use ordinances have been 
adopted. In fact, the only significant difference in the way the 
village looks now is the absence of three-story buildings. It should be 
noted, however, that the absence of these buil dings is due 1 ess to 
concern about another tornado than to the 1 imited funds avai 1 abl e for 
rebuilding. Also, the Village Council adopted an ordinance prohibiting 
trailers from locating in the central business district on lots 
previously occupied by commercial buildings. The motivation for this 
ordinance was purely aesthetic. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
More than a year after the devastating tornado swept through 
Cardington, the village had not recovered fully. Construction was 
visible throughout the business district, many of the structures 
destroyed by the storm had not been replaced, and vill age chil dren 
remained frightened by inclement weather. Moreover, most of the 
residents who were placed in temporary housing by FEMA had chosen not to 
return to Cardington. 
Nevertheless, many residents view the tornado as a "blessing in 
disguise," for it has left the village with a revitalized business 
district. Had it not been for the storm, many merchants would not have 
been able to replace thei r vi ntage structures with modern ones. The 
tornado also imbued the people of Cardington with a sense of community 
that previously did not exist. Although some claim that much of the 
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initial camaraderie is no longer present, most agree that village 
residents remain closely knit. 
The tornado has given Cardington a statewide identity. It has, in 
effect, made "Cardington" a household word. This delights village 
officials because they believe that such acclaim will encourage 
commercial developers to purchase land in the Car o1 ington Industrial 
Park, a large, mostly vacant tract of land that has not been developed 
because of a generally poor economy and a shortage of funds for bringing 
utilities to the area. 
Finally, the tornado of June 13 has left the village with a new 
generation of political leadership. Indeed, several of the residents 
who contri buted so mi ght i 1 Y duri ng the weeks and months fo 11 owi ng the 
storm are now elected village officials. Because these individuals are 
younger and more progressive than their predecessors, the Cardington of 
1990 will probably look very different from what it might have had the 
tornado touched down elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
PARIS, TEXAS 
Background 
Paris, Texas, a city of 26,000 people, is located approximately 120 
miles northeast of Dallas. Paris is a regional center serving 
agri cultura 1 interests in both northeast Texas and southeast Ok 1 ahoma. 
Paris has a diverse industrial base which includes Campbell Soup, 
Westinghouse Electric, and Babcox and Wilcox. As of August, 1982, the 
unemployment rate in Paris was an enviable 6.5%. Paris is the county 
seat of Lamar County. 
On the morni ng of April 2, 1982, the Nat i ona 1 Weather Servi ce 
issued a tornado watch for parts of northeast Texas, including Lamar 
County. The city of Pari s deployed Pub 1 i c Safety personnel as weather 
spotters around the city unt il about noon, when the watch was 
cancelled. At 3:00pm a tornado watch was in effect again for Lamar 
County, and by 3:20pm a tornado was spotted approaching Paris from the 
west. The city's warning plan was activated. Every municipal vehicle 
wi th a si ren was used to run predetermi ned routes warni ng res i dents of 
the danger. The warnings began at 3:44pm; each route was covered in six 
to ei ght mi nutes and then run a second time. At 4: OOpm, a tornado 
travelling at 50 miles per hour swept through the northern half of the 
city from west to east, leaving a path of destruction 1/2 mile wide and 
al most fi ve mi 1 es long. In 1 ess than fi ve mi nutes the tornado damaged 
or destroyed 1,329 homes, destroyed two businesses and damaged 35 
others. In addition, there were 12 deaths, 180 injuries, and damages 
totalling $50 million. 
As a result of the damage, 10% of the city's popul at i on was 1 eft 
homeless. Fortunately, the tornado passed north of the central business 
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district and spared all but two businesses (American Box Company and the 
Paris Lumber Company). The greatest impact was in the residential areas 
of the city. The tornado destroyed a large number of low-income, both 
owner-occupied and rental properties on the west side of the city and 
also some newer, more expensive homes on the east side of the city. 
There was little damage to schools and public facilities, but six 
churches were damaged or destroyed. The tornado just missed the city's 
water tower, the loss of which would have had a significant impact on 
the city's residents and workers. As an example, the city's largest 
industrial employer is campbell Soup, which employs 1,700 people and 
uses six million gallons of city water daily. 
Although this was the first time Paris had been struck by a 
tornado, Paris has been the scene of previous disasters. Two fires, the 
fi rst in 1877 and the second on March 21, 1916, severely damaged the 
city. The fire of 1916, known as "The Great Paris Fire," resulted in 
$15 million dollars in property damage and affected 270 acres in the 
downtown area. The pres i dent of the Chamber of Commerce di spl ayed a 
"smile" sign in the fire debris. Following the tornado, the Paris, 
Lamar County Chamber of Commerce displayed the original "smile" sign 
from the 1916 fire to foster the same spirit of recovery. Eleven months 
before the tornado in Paris, a tornado destroyed the town of Emberson, 
Texas, also in Lamar County. 
Response Phase 
As the tornado moved in an easterly direction out of the city 
limits, Public Safety units converged on the disaster scene. The city's 
Emergency Operations Center was activated in the court room located in 
the Police Department, according to the city's disaster plan. The 
Police Department did not lose power or telephone services. 
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The Fire Department encountered a number of difficulties in 
responding: the central fire station lost power, telephone service, and 
the use of their repeater-based communications system. Individual fire 
units responded spontaneously to the disaster scene and began search and 
rescue operations. The city fire units could have communicated on a 
simpl ex channel, but many units di d not switch channels. The response 
of the Fire Department was made easier by the fact that only one fire 
was reported and that one request for mutual assistance had been 
transmitted before utilities were lost. Fire, police, and ambulance 
units from as far away as Dallas responded to Pari s, inmost cases 
wi thout a request bei ng made. Search and rescue ope rat ions cont i nued 
into the evening of April 2nd. 
The Police Department secured the disaster site with the assistance 
of 80 Texas Department of Publ ic Safety (DPS) officers. The DPS had 
responded at the request of the local detachment. The DPS also 
requested assistance from the National Guard. As in other disasters, 
the National Guard interacted only with the State Police organization. 
This caused a personnel shortage because, by agreement, the DPS secured 
the east half of the diaster site while the Paris Police Department, 
wi th a total of 33 offi cers, was I eft to secure the west side. Thi s 
problem came to light when the city police chief asked the DPS commander 
for additional assistance to secure intersections in west Paris. The 
National Guard personnel were all on the east side with the DPS. When 
the imbalance was discovered, National Guard personnel were teamed with 
city offi cers to secure the ent ire di saster area. A lthough there was 
initial fear about looting, only two cases were reported. 
In order to secure the tornado-stri cken area, a pass system was 
instituted to allow the residents of the area to return to their 
homes. Although the pass system was incl uded in the city's emergency 
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plan, the system was not adequate considering the large disaster impact 
area. As part of its preparedness efforts, the city had printed 1,500 
passes, but as many as 12,000 were ultimately needed. The i ssui ng of 
passes required six to eight people who worked out of the City Water 
Office across from City Hall. On the evening of the disaster, a curfew 
was put in force. It lasted for one week, and was never officially 
repealed; enforcement was just eased until it was no longer needed. 
After search-and-rescue operations had been completed, the next big 
problem for the city was debris removal. The city was assisted by the 
local Army Reserve Construction Unit; all volunteers wishing to help 
with the clean-up were directed to the Army Reserve Center. The center 
became the staging area for personnel and equipment used in the initial 
debri s removal. Volunteer and city crews removed debri s not onl y from 
city streets, but also from private property when the owner would sign a 
release form. There was reluctance on the part of some homeowners to 
sign releases for fear that their houses would be removed. The fire 
chief, in an interview with the local newspaper, explained that only 
debris which the owner I isted on the release would be removed. By 
centra 1 i zi ng debri s removal ope rat ions at the Army Reserve Center, the 
city was able to separate its public works disaster operations from its 
normal activities. This division of functions was helpful to the city's 
public ~/Orks director. 
disaster operations. 
In thi s way he could contrul both normal and 
Recovery Activities 
As mentioned earlier, most of the damage was in Paris' residential 
areas. Both single and multi-family dwellings were damaged or 
destroyed. The array of recovery issues was significant. First, it was 
necessary to find shelter for the homeless. Although community shelter 
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facilities were made available, most of the homeless found shelter with 
relatives and friends. Mobile homes were brought in by FEMA following 
the Presidential Disaster Declaration on April 8, 1982. Other shorter-
term recovery needs were debri s removal, street and facil ity repai r, and 
coordination of the repair or reconstruction of damaged residences. 
Soon after the tornado hit, the City Council acted to prevent price 
gouging and to prevent unscrupulous contractors from taking advantage of 
the displaced homeowners who were anxious to rebuild their houses. 
Debris removal was a difficult task because it was necessary to 
obtain permission to enter property beyond the public right-of-way. The 
city initiated an emergency bidding process for this major task. By the 
time the contract for this work was let, the City Public Works 
Department already had completed a substantial amount of debris removal 
and made the necessary arrangements for dumping and disposing of the 
debri s. 
Debris removal was perhaps the largest single short-term task. The 
Pari s Ti mes of April 12, 1982, reported the volume of deb ri s to be 
approximately 300 thousand cubic yards--enough to cover a football field 
to a height of 15 stories. Disaster relief assistance for this task 
came from the Federal Emergency Management Agency under a 75%/25% 
funding arrangement. Street and minor facility repair work was done by 
the Public Works Department. Some of this work was scheduled as part of 
the proposed Community Development Block Grant proj ect approved by the 
Paris City Council at a special meeting on November 1, 1982. 
Reconstruction of residential areas began soon after the disaster, 
with the assistance of FEMA, the Red Cross, the Mennonite Disaster 
Services, and others. FEMA brouyht in 84 mobile homes and ten travel 
tra il ers to be used as temporary res i dences. These were in pl ace by 
April 27, 1982. At the time of writing, November, 1982, FEMA employees 
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were still in Paris administering this part of the assistance program. 
The Red Cross effort in reconstruct i on was s i ynifi cant: the Ameri can 
Red Cross spent $1,036,000 assisting families in the Paris and Lamar 
County areas affected by the tornado. Wi th the ai d of the Mennoni tes 
and others, the Red Cross bui It 30 homes, repa ired sub stant i a 1 damages 
on 13 homes, and repaired minor damage on more than 300 homes. It also 
purchased mobile homes, single-family homes, and repaired nine mobile 
homes. Most of the Red Cross assistance centered on the lower-income 
housing units on the west side of the city. Un 1 i ke most of the 
residents on the east side of Paris, residents of we~t Paris were not 
covered by insurance. The Red Cross was the major source of assistance 
for west Paris until the Interfaith Disaster Services organization was 
formed in May. 
Red Cross assistance in rebuilding was available only to 
homeowners, not to tenants. Assi stance was made on a case-by-case 
basis, permitting a variety of options such as rebuilding, 
rehabilitating, and add-on construction for persons planning to move in 
with relatives. This oryanization also provided occupational supplies, 
medical assistance, food, and clothing to homeowners and renters. As of 
November 1, 1982, Paris officials estimated that approximately 85% of 
the housing units that will be rebuilt or repaired are complete. 
In add it i on to federal, state, Red Cross, and other ass i stance such 
as a substantial amount of private assistance was made available through 
Interfaith, Inc., a non-profit organization established in May of 1982, 
to coordi nate the vari ous efforts to provi de thi s type of ass i stance. 
Ope rat i ng with a small full-t ime staff and a number of vol unteers, 
Interfaith Disaster Services of Paris and Lamar County (IDS) provided a 
full range of assistance services to diaster victims: repairs, clothes, 
heaters, blankets, food, utility payments, delinquent tax bills, and 
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counsel i ng. IDS worked cl osel yin the reconstruction effort with the 
Red Cross and other disaster relief organizations. Although the IDS 
budgeted $5,000 for crisis counseling, it is interesting to note that 
the money has not been spent because of alack of del,lilnd for counsel i ng 
services. 
As of October, 1982, the projected l8-month budget for IDS was 
$495,000. Nearly one-third of this was for home repairs, with other 
sUbstantial amounts budgeted for furniture and appliances, medical 
assistance, and business assistance (many small business operations were 
affected by the tornado). The initiative for establishing IDS came from 
a delegation of officials from Wichita Falls, Texas, which had 
experi enced a devastating tornado several years earl i er. The Wi chita 
Falls officials made themselves available to offer assistance and 
guidance shortly following the disaster. 
The most important long-term recovery issue was housing. Paris 
officials did not expect the conversion of the mobile homes from 
temporary to permanent residences; consequently, the tract on which 
these structures were placed was rezoned to acconunorlate them for one 
year. The preparation of a prospective award of a new Community 
Deve 1 opment Block Grant (CDBG) proj ect (from the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Ur.ban Development), coupled with the continuation and 
expansion of HUD's Section 8 program in Paris, is a significant effort 
for long-term recovery and community improvement. Worki ng with the 
Planning and Community Development officials of Paris, the Ark-Tex 
Council of Government developed a CDBG proposal for $800,000. Thi s 
proposed project would, if fully implemented, substantially improve the 
housing stock and public infrastructure in the community, particularly 
in the heavily damaged lower-income neighborhoods on the west side of 
the city. 
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The CDBG proposal identified eight major activities, summarized as 
follows: 
1) Rehabil itating 46 substandard units of owner-occupied 
housing, bringing the units up to city building code 
standards (which meet or exceed HUD program standards). 
2) Rehabilitating 20 units of substandard rental housing 
outside areas of minority and/or low-income 
concentrations. It is this proposed activity which will 
operate in tandem with the Sect ion 8 Exi st i ng/Moderate 
Rehabilitation Program previously approved in Paris. 
This activity also will focus both on the 
deconcent rat ion requi rement and ass i st i ng those persons 
displaced by the tornado. It also is expected that this 
act i ity wi 11 achi eve a favorable 1 eve rag i ng rat i 0 and 
via a loan mechanism will provide the local government a 
means of creating an on-going rehabilitation program. 
3) Emergency repairs to 30 units of substandard housing 
(grants). 
4) Demolition of 36 vacant dilapidated structures. This 
activity is part of the proposed project; itis to be 
funded by FEMA and 1 oca 1 funds. 
5) Code enforcement (reinstituted) of local codes in the 
area of tornado damage, with 1 oca 1 funds. 
6) Street and drainage improvements, primarily in the area 
along the north side of Paris. 
7) Installation of water and sanitary sewage lines to 
relieve service disruption due to tOr'f1ddu clean-up on 
existing lines. 
8) Project administration by the City of Paris; utilization 
of consulting services for housing program activities. 
Activities and 2 represent the largest commitment to community 
betterment; they account for more than half of the COBG funds requested 
and they require $120,000 of other funds. The community may be able to 
expand its housing stock by approximately 100 additional units with the 
Section 8 program, creating better housing opportunities for citizens 
who meet the program's eligibility requirements. Overall, the Ark-Tex 
COG manager for Existing Housing feels that the results of these 
coordinated efforts will provide "decent housing for folks who would 
never have had it •• 
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At one point, the loss of the American Box Company plant was 
expected to create some economic hardships for community residents, and 
the city officials contemplated pursuing federal funding to minimize 
this loss. However, the planned location of a larger plant by the 
Kimberly-Clark Corporation has made the loss of the box company plant 
much less of a hardship. 
In summary, community recovery in Paris is proceeding steadily, 
both in terms of the needs of disaster victims and the stabilization of 
the local economy. It should be emphasi zed that various vol untary 
groups have played the key role in shorter-term recovery. The city's 
efforts (along with the Ark-Tex COG) complement the short-term effort to 
restore and improve housing and the related public infrastructure. 
Mitigation Measures 
The tornado has been the driving force for recent local mitigation 
efforts. Although the city's emergency plan worked well, it was revised 
to eliminate problems that arose during the tornado response phase. 
Several major preparedness improvements are now underway in Paris, 
the most important of which is a new fixed-site siren warning system. 
The new five-siren system eliminates the need for public safety 
personnel to use mobile sirens to warn city residents of an approaching 
tornado. The system will not only increase the speed of warning but 
also lower the risk to public safety personnel and city emergency 
vehicles. The new warning system will consist of four directional 
rotat i ng-type si rens (each is rated at 135 dbc output) and one smaller 
directional siren (rated at 125 dbc output). Each siren will be mounted 
on a 55' to 60' pole. The four larger sirens will be positioned so that 
their output overlaps the densest parts of the city. The smaller siren 
will be located in the southeast, where the population is less dense. 
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The city emergency 'management coordi nator had budgeted for thi s new 
siren system twice in the past, but both times the City Council deleted 
the budget item. At budget heari ngs in June foll owi ng the tornado, a 
fixed warning system was approved. Bids were open in July which 
resulted in the city acquiring a five-siren system at a cost of 
approximately $90,000. 
A second enhancement to the warning system (which was also started 
before the tornado) is now fully operational. Warnings can now be 
immediately disseminated to all cable television subscribers by the 
emergency coordinator at the Emergency Operations Center or by the 
dispatcher at the Police Department. At both locations, tone control 
signa 1 s can be transmi tted over phone 'i nes to the cable transmitter 
site. These signals interupt normal cable programming and the warning 
is then transmitted directly from the Emergency Ope rat ions Center or 
Police Department to all cable subscribers. Although the television 
must be turned on to receive this warning, it is estimated that 90% of 
the city's population are cable subscribers, which increases the 
potential value of this system. 
The city's emergency response capability has also been enhanced by 
the relocation of the Emergency Operations Center from the Police 
Department building to the basement of City Hall. During the immediate 
response phase following the tornado, the pol ice building became the 
staging area for mutual aid law enforcement personnel. Consequently, it 
became difficult to limit access to the EOC. In addition, key 
department heads (fire chief, police chief, and public works director) 
indicated a preference for being in the field. On-the-scene control is 
necessary because of the small size of the municipal work force. 
Because of the lessons learned in the disaster response, the 
emergency coordinator decided'to move the EOC to the basement of City 
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Hall in space that was formerly occupied by a large holding cell. The 
area was renovated and communi cat ion equi pment was i nsta 11 ed at a cost 
to the city of $12,000. The new EOC is well-suited for access 
control. It will be used as a coordination center and individual 
department heads will work out of their offices or from the field. 
Another important mitiyation measure implemented by the emergency 
coordinator as a result of the tornado is a public dwareness campaign. 
Tornado awareness pamph1 ets wi 11 be d i stri buted to city res i dents and a 
city building inspector has been assigned to assist the emergency 
coordinator. The inspector's first assignment was to present a tornado 
awareness proyram in the city's school system. 
The state's 406 Plan prepared in response to the Presidential 
Disaster Declaration reviewed the above mitigation measures and also 
made recommendations to other localities within the county that had been 
stricken by the disaster. However, it only addressed tornado 
mitigation. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
Despite the fact that the coordi nator of emergency management in 
Paris is only a part-time position (the incumbent also is director of 
parks and recreation), the city has above-average emergency planning and 
management capability. The coordinator actively pursues improvement in 
the emergency management function and had an emergency scenario exercise 
planned when the tornado struck. After the disaster struck, the city 
provided local funds for an improved warning system and emergency 
operations center. 
Local public capacity has been somewhat improved by shifting 
emergency management personnel ass i gnments, but except for the warni ng 
system and emergency operations center allocations, no further resource 
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commitments appear likely. More effective utilization of existing 
personnel and other resources, particularly volunteers, may help 
stabilize this situation. In addition, the coordinator is undertaking a 
significant tornado public awareness program. 
In the wake of the April tornado, the only ad hoc group to emerge 
was the I nterfa i th Oi saster Servi ces. As expl a i ned, the formation of 
thi s organi zat i on came about 1 arge 1 y as the result of suggest ions from 
the officials of Wichita Falls, Texas. IDS, together with national 
disaster relief organizations, played the major role in providing 
assistance to individuals after the disaster. 
With the increasingly stringent requirements for obtaining a 
Presidential Declaration, and the narrowing scope of public assistnace 
made available by them, it would appear that voluntary agencies and 
emergent organizations may have to increase their contributions to the 
disaster recovery effort. 
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CHAPTER XVII 
ESTES PARK, COLORADO 
Background 
Estes Park is a summer resort com·nuni ty located at the gateway to 
the Rocky Mountain Nat i ona 1 Park, about 60 mil es northwest of Denver. 
Its permanent popul at i on of 2,700 persons depends pri rna ril y on touri sm 
for its income. The town receives almost half of its annual income 
between July 15 and September 1 each year. The permanent popul ation 
inside the town limits, with another 2,500 in the immediate valley, 
swell s to 4U ,OUU-50 ,000 persons a day in the summer. The town has a 
budget of about $9.5 million and about 75 municipal employees. 
Description of the Disaster* 
On July 15,1982, at about daybreak (5:30am), the privately owned 
Lawn Lake Dam, located within the Rocky Mountain National Park, 
failed. Constructed in 1903, the earthen dam was 24 feet high and had a 
storage capacity of 817 acre-feet. The dam was four air miles from the 
nee rest road, makin9 it difficult to reach for inspection. 
When the dam failed, the water flowed along the Roaring River into 
Fall River. After the water reached Cascade Lake, it caused a second, 
very small dam (the Cascade Dam) to fail. The flood waters then flowed 
into the Bi g Thompson River before enteri ng Lake Estes (about 13 mi 1 es 
downstream from the Lawn Lake Dam). Lake Estes is located one mi 1 e 
downstream from the heart of the resort community of Estes Park. 
*Thi s descri pt ion is deri ved from the excellent, detailed account 
contained in the report "The Lawn Lake Dam Failure; a Description of the 
Major Flooding Events and an Evaluation of the Warning Process," 
prepared by Wayne J. Graham and Curtis A. Brown, U.S. Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado, December, 1982. 
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There were few people at risk upstream from Cascade Lake Dam, but 
downstream there were several thousand people whose lives were in 
danger. There were 275 people camped in the Aspengl en Campground, one 
ha If of a mil e downstream from Cascade Dam. Downstream from Aspengl en 
Campground, more than a thousand people were at risk, including 
residents and tourists in cabins, trailer, and houses near the bank of 
Fall River. Many more were lodged in motel units, which are especially 
dense in the area near Estes Park. Motels, businesses, houses, mobile 
homes and other structures located on the Fall River flood plain were 
inundated with up to five feet of floodwater as a result of the failures 
of the two dams. 
The Estes Park Chief of Police estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 people 
could have been killed if the dissemination of warnings and the 
subsequent evacuation had not taken place. In fact, the flood claimed 
the lives of three people. 
The property damage resulting from the dam failures and floods was 
as follows, according to the Estes Park Trail Gazette: 
• Private Sector--$19 million (including economic losses) 
• Public Sector (state, county, and 10cal}--$4.1 million 
Town Disaster Damages: 
Public Works--$588,000 
Light and Power--$1.3 million 
Water Department--$57,000 
Rocky Mountain National Park (federal}--additional $5 
mill ion 
While the flooding was brief, lasting only a few hours, it was of 
unprecedented severity--greater than the 500-year fl ood. The flood 
waters washed away 18 bri dges, destroyed road systems, inundated 177 
businesses and 108 residences. Al so destroyed were a hydroelectric 
plant and a fish hatchery. 
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Response Phase 
The immediate response to the dam break included 1) detection of 
the dam failure, 2) dissemination of warnings, and 3) response to the 
warnings. The Lawn Lake Dam was unattended and contained no 
instrumentation which could be used to detect an impending or actual dam 
failure. Fortunately, a truck driver heard some noise at the Lawn Lake 
trailhead while colleting trash at that location, and he used an 
emergency telephone to report his observation to the National Park 
Service Dispatch Center. The decisions regarding when and how warning 
should be given and to whom were made by officials of Rocky Mountain 
National Park, Larimer County, and Estes Park. 
Residents of downtown Estes Park became aware of the dam failure 
from law enforcement officials, radio, friends and neighbors. Most 
peopl e recei ved alerts from ten mi nutes to one hour before the water 
reached downtown Estes Park. Prompt and appropri ate response to the 
warnings hel ped reduce the number of injuries and fatal Hies. Most 
individuals quickly evacuated the area. Howver, some ran toward the 
river to take photographs as the floodwaters approached. A few refused 
to leave when warned. "We were standing in the street, yelling at the 
dummi es to get out of there," a Larimer County sheriff sai d. "They saw 
the cars fl oat i n9 toward them and then they decided to move." 
An eva 1 uat i on of the warni ng proces, done by Graham and Brown, 
stated "early detection of the dam failure, coupled with alerts, 
warni ngs, and evacuat i on orders issued by 1 oca 1 1 aw enforcement 
officials and carried over Estes Park's only radio station, possibly 
saved hundreds of lives. Little time was available to reduce losses to 
tangible property." 
The following factors contributed to the success of the warning and 
evacuation. The distinction is made between controllable and non-
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controllable factors to show which conditions public officials could (or 
could not) influence or affect in this particular disaster • 
• Not Controllable: 
1) Time of day - the fl oodi ng occurred in the dayl i ght 
and reached Estes Park before work hours. 
2) Weather - clear and dry weather made the response 
easier. 
3) Topography - loud, turbulent flow on Roaring River 
a 11 owed the fl ood to be detected from a distance. 
Also, in Horseshoe Park, an uninhabited area slightly 
west of the Aspenglen Campground, the flood wave 
fanned out and slowed down somewhat, giving officials 
time to judge the magnitude of the event and prepare 
to warn the public. 
4) Communications - having a single radio station in 
Estes Park also helped. Telephone communications 
remained in operation until the flood hit the town. 
5) Building type - the clustered residences (motels, 
cottages) aided in effective evacuation. Warnings 
could reach people staying there more quickly than if 
people were spread out in many low-density 
campgrounds. 
6) Flood awareness - previous experience with the flash 
flood in the nearby Big Thompson Canyon in 1976 
probably enabled more efficient w~rnings and 
evacuation orders being issued and a more appropriate 
response among the pcopl e in the path of the 
fl oodwaters • 
• Controllable Factors: 
1) Early detection a number of fortuitous events 
~ccurred to facilitate early detection and warning. 
2) Multiple warnings - personal contacts, radio warnings 
and police warning efforts reached almost everyone who 
might be affected by the flooding. 
3) Method of warning - nearly every motel or resort 
complex owner/manager received a warning from a 
sheriff or police officer. Many of the warnings were 
issued face-to-face and by telephone. 
Loca 1 preparedness plan. Ouri ng the emergency, the town used the 
emergency pl an prepoared by Larimer County and coordi nated its efforts 
with the county emergency coordinator. In Estes Park, the police chief 
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serves as the emergency coordi nator. In Larimer County, the emergency 
preparedness coordinator is part of the county sheriff's department (the 
latter is an elected position).* 
Since the 1982 flood, the police chief has taken the lead role in 
IJreparing an all-hazards preparedness plan for the town in order to be 
better organized at the local level next time. Town-level preparedness 
planning had been urged by the disaster recovery manager, a position 
that will be explained later. The town's preparedness plan was near 
completion in July of 1983, the time of the field visit. 
Historical context. On July 31, 1976, a violent thunderstorm 
sta 11 ed and dropped more than ten inches of rai n over the eastern 
lJortion of Estes Park. The rain and run-off drained through the Big 
Thompson Canyon, which is northeast of Estes Park and within Larimer 
County. The unexpected summer flood struck after dark, causing numerous 
deaths and mass i ve destruction. Along a 20-mil e st retch where the 
canyon is narrow, the floodwaters and debris breached and mostly 
destroyed the interstate highway, clogged and destroyed bridges, wrecked 
hundreds of cars and campers, and kill ed 139 people. The speed and 
intensity of the Big Thompson Canyon flood, together with the hu~e wake 
of destruction, left an indelible impression on the county residents. 
Since the 1':176 Big Thompson Canyon flood, only the Estes Park 
public works director was new; all other key town personnel--the mayor, 
town administrator, finance director--were the same in 1982 as they were 
in 1976. Consequently, there were both personal and institutional 
memories in Estes Park of that very dramatic and destructive recent 
*Within Larimer County, there are four other municipalities in 
addition to Estes Park. While the town officials consider town/county 
coordination adequate, there do not seem to be regular meetings between 
them. The fi ve local emergency preparedness coordi nators withi n Larimer 
County do not meet routinely with each other or with their county-level 
counterpart. 
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flood in the county. The same county emergency coordinator was also in 
office in 1976 and in 1982. 
In addition to the town/county relationship, the town has a mutual 
aid agreement with the Rocky Mountain National Park, a relationship that 
comes into play most often for fire fighting. 
Recovery Activities 
The flood caused by the dam failure was relatively brief, lasting 
only a matter of hours. Because of the brevity of the event, the 
response and recovery phases began immediately. 
The inundation area for the flood resulting from the Lawn Lake Dam 
failure extended beyond the 500-year flood plain, catching many property 
owners without adequate insurance. At the time of the flood, very few 
flood insurance policies were in effect. Only about 20 people affected 
by the Lawn Lake flood were expected to be covered by flood insurance. 
Local Public Priorities 
The town officials quickly realized what the recovery process would 
entail. Their understanding was enhanced by memory of the paperwork and 
other requi rements in the aftermath of the 1976 fl ood, and offers of 
assistance from about 20 agencies (mainly federal) within a week after 
the event. As the town's public works director commented, the first 
meeting of the Hazard Mitigation Team brought home to him the fact that 
he could not perform his regular duties (which were at their peak in 
July) and be responsible for managing the disaster recovery. The town 
administrator and the finance director also realized that they would 
need special assistance to deal with the recovery process. The major 
initial recovery concerns included planning the reconstruction of the 
central business district, processing Damage Survey Reports (DSRs), 
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applying for state and federal assistance, and relocating residences and 
businesses out of the flood plain. 
To cope with the demands of the recovery process and to take full 
advantage of the federal assistance they were eligible for under a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration, the town decided to hire a person to 
work full-time as the disaster recovery manager. Robert Ki stner, an 
emergency management specialist/community planner who was newly retired 
from the FEMA Regional Office in Denver, was selected to be disaster 
recovery manager about six weeks after the f1 ood. Ki stner, who was 
hi red for a one-year peri od, worked directly under the town 
administrator. 
Kistner brought some very special expertise to the town, including 
knowl edge of and experi ence with federal agenci es, whi ch was 
particularly helpful to a small town in obtaining programs and funds 
which town officials ordinarily would not know about. Further, he had 
both the expertise and contacts to prepare the paperwork and 
subsequently land numerous grants. In the Estes Park Trail Gazette, one 
year after the flood, Kistner observed: 
Most communities simply don't have the expertise to 
apply for grants and do all the paperwork. Usually the staff 
and mitigation responsibilities lead to hating the feds, but 
I helped fill a buffer-liaison role, which enabled us to 
follow all items on the mitigation report, which was 
completed to everyone's satisfaction. 
Kistner, in his role as disaster recovery manager, was highly 
regarded and appreciated by all of the public and private sector 
representatives interviewed, according to the Estes Park Trail Gazette. 
Kistner's abilities were perhaps best illustrated by his 
success in obtaining a $400,000 'imminent threat' grant from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
reconstruct nine bridges along Fall River. • •• Not only 
was the grant the only one approved in the region, but it 
marked the first time in several years that anyone has been 
successful nationwide in obtaining 'imminent threat' status. 
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Additionally, Kistner helped obtain $425,000 worth of 
property acquisitions through FEMA for flood damaged 
propert i es whi ch were covered under the Federal Flood 
Insurance Program. 
A brief recap of the major sources of funds for reconstruction and 
recovery projects follows: 
• Share of Expenses: 
1) Federal--$1,517,H45 
2) State of Colorado--$200,000 
3) Town of Estes Park--$305,948* 
• Sources of Assistance: 
1) U.S. Housing and Urban Development (imminent threat 
yrant to construct nine bridges)--$400,OOO 
2) Colorado Community Block Grant--$60,OOO 
3) Federal Emergency Management Agency { property 
acquisitions)--$425,OOO 
An important consideration in the recovery period is the extent to 
which a community suffers major long-term effects as a result of the 
di saster losses. Thanks to the s i gnifi cant amount of federal man i es 
that Estes Park received, it did not have to reallocate program funds, 
defer any pI anned capital improvement projects, or postpone any 
maintenance or repair work. 
It should be pointed out that Kistner did not receive all of the 
external fundiny he appl ied for to aid the recovery. An appl ication to 
the state for Community Development Block Grant monies for $400,000 to 
remove some properties in order to create a riverfront park was pared 
back to $60,000. Kistner commented that the town's conservative {i.e., 
*The town's share will exceed this amount, if the hydroelectric 
facilities are rebuilt. The damage to the town's liyht and power 
facilities was estimated at $1.3 million. If the proposed hydro project 
is approved and the damage cost based on the cost of the repl acement 
facility, then the damages amount will increase substantially. 
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healthy) financial situation worked to its disadvantage in this 
instance. 
The 90-day report issued by the Hazard Mitigation Team (HMT) made 
numerous recommendations about mitigative steps, which were intended to 
be i nstrumenta 1 in assuri ng that federal recovery efforts were 
comprehensive, well-coordinated, and directed toward reducing the 
potent i a 1 for future fl ood losses in Estes Park. The report was far-
reachi ng and spec ifi c. More than 20 recommendations were presented 
under four main headings. A summary of those implementation measures is 
contained in Appendix A. 
Role of the Business Community 
The business community sustained the greatest damage from the flood 
and, as mi ght be expected, had a 1 arge rol e in the recovery process. 
The economy of this resort community is heavily dependent on retail 
sales during the summer months. The flood on July 15 was a serious 
setback to the local economy. Not only were many stores and motels 
closed because they were damaged, but touri sm in the entire area was 
down significantly for the remainder of the summer because potential 
vi s itors were fearful. Many had exaggerated not ions of the extent of 
the flood damage or of the potential for other dam breaks throughout 
Colorado. 
A relatively new business group--the private, non-profit Forward 
Estes Park Foundat i on--was interested in promot i ng and deve 1 opi ng the 
economi c base of the Estes Park area. After the flood, the group 
quickly pressed for action on its long-term agenda for the town. At 
least one of the leaders in this business group remembered the impact of 
the 1976 flood on the local economy. In his opinion, the governmental 
response in 1976 was too "laissez-faire" in taking care of business 
interests. Consequently, the 1982 fl ood had a unifyi ng effect on the 
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Foundation, providing it with the opportunity to press hard for the 
concerns of business owners. 
Immedi atel y after the flood, the foundati on hi red a consultant to 
represent their interests in various meetings with public officials, 
particularly the federal and local officials empowered to make decisions 
that would affect the business community. He was particularly 
i nstrumenta 1 in creat i ng a 1 oca 1 urban renewal agency. The foundation 
consultant discovered that under Colorado state law, 
expeditious procedures existed for establishing an 
authority in a community that has had a major disaster. 
spec i a 1, mo re 
urban renewal 
While the urban renewal agency already was an agenda item for the 
foundat ion, the ci rcumstances after the fl ood were appropri ate for the 
immediate creation of such an organization. The foundation played a 
major role in initiating and garneril1g support for an urban renewal 
ayency in Estes Park immediately after the disaster. One of the 
officials of the foundation estimated that the disaster chopped years 
off the urban renewal formation process of creating a local urban 
renewal agency. 
Role of the State 
The role and responsibilities of the state regarding the Lawn Lake 
dam failure and flood are a complicated tale. Certain aspects are under 
scrutiny in litigation that is pendin~ at the time of writing. 
The 80-year old, pri vate 1 y owned Lawn Lake Dam had been cited for 
pos sib 1 e seepage problems ina state ins pect i on conducted fou r yea rs 
prior to the break; and it had been the subject of complaints for 
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years.* Aside from the questions about the frequency and effectiveness 
of the state inspections, questions persist over who is financially 
liable for the total flood losses, estimated at around $30 million, when 
the dam owner was insured for only $1.4 million, with liability limited 
by state 1 aw. 
A vari ety of bi 11 s have been introduced into the Colorado State 
Legislature to allow Lawn Lake victims to sue the state. Because the 
dam was human-made, and because the scate is viewed as deficient in its 
dam inspection duties, feelings run high that the state is to blame and 
that the state should pay for property damage. Similarly, several legal 
efforts are pendi ng against the federal government-- in part because the 
privately owned dam was within Rocky Mountain National Park. Meanwhile, 
many uni nsured home and bus i ness owners who lost property due to the 
flood are attempting to find someone to sue for their financial losses. 
After the f1 ood, the state provi ded a s i ngl e 1 ump sum payment of 
$200,000 to the town of Estes Park for its share of the recovery effort. 
Local-Federal Relations 
Local-federal relations were exceptionally smooth, largely because 
the town's disaster recovery manager had been employed previously by the 
FEMA regional office in Denver. Town officials viewed relations with 
the federal officials as positive. Similarly, the federally initiated 
Hazard Mitigation Team report p\aised the efforts of the recovery 
manager. The disaster recovery manager was able to marshall a generous 
*The dam had been cited for poss i b 1 e seepage problems ina state 
inspection conducted in 1979. In fact, "complaints about the dam's 
safety reached state officials as long ago as 1951," according to an 
article in the Rocky Mountain News (Denver, Colorado) on July 16, 
1982. The Colorado State Leglslature passed a law in 1981 which 
exempted the board of directors, employees and shareholders of any 
private irrigation company from personal injury resulting from the 
failure of a dam or other facility. 
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amount of federal assistance, as was detailed earlier, which contributed 
to a hi~h rate of local satisfaction. 
Mitigation Measures 
The gO-day Hazard Mitigation Team report commented favorable on the 
hi~h implementation rate for the mitigation activities recommended in 
the 15-day report. It stated: 
A wide range of federal expertise was combined with the 
cooperation of local and state governments from the outset. 
Thi s mutual support and partici pation created an atmosphere 
of accomplishment that is reflected in the high 
impl ementat i on rate of the recommendat ions set forth in the 
15-day report. 
Further, the report noted that: 
••• the Team was able to concentrate on the kinds of 
activities that carried an immediate payoff in reducing 
future flood losses. 
The HMT report cited several major accomplishments: 
1) The Estes Park recovery effort has enhanced the status 
of hazard mitigation in the State of Colorado, among 
diverse federal agencies. It has also advanced the 
procedures for mit i gat i ng the effects of a dam- fa il ure 
event. 
2) The flood prompted numerous riverfront 
revita 1 i zat i on efforts that wi 11 st rengthen the economi c 
base of Estes Park while helping to protect the 
community from future fl ood di sasters. 
3) The local hiring of a Flood Recovery Expert fromthe 
ranks of the Hazard Mitiyation Team will help to 
guarantee a 1 ast i ng recovery. Thi sis one of the more 
positive steps ••• and assures that the high level of 
cooperation between the town and the Team will be 
perpetuated. 
Fi nally, the lSD-day report was unusually compl imentary, stating 
"Estes Park has been able to effect a quick and efficient recovery from 
the Lawn Lake failure and resulting flood." It claimed that was "due to 
the 'achievable' nature of the recommendations and was greatly 
facilitated by the hiring of a local flood recovery expert." 
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Interviewers' Perceptions 
This community provides an interesting and positive example of 
recovery. While significant credit is due to the disaster recovery 
manager. credit also should go to the town officials who created and 
supported that position high in the hierarchy of town government. 
It is interesting to note that the reasons for hiring a disaster 
recovery manager were all locally determi ned. Whil e there have been 
other local disaster recovery managers in the past (e.g •• at Lake 
Elsinore. California; and Johnstown. Pennsylvania). those positions were 
initiated and paid for by the federal government--under EDA's Title 
IX. All parties in Estes Park stated such a person should be locally 
se I ected and a part of I oca I government. As such she/ he woul d be a 
stronger advocate of local interests and would not feel confl ict when 
local. state. and federal interests differed. 
Kistner's presence in Estes Park as part of the Hazard Mitigation 
Team and his availability for local employment were fortuitous events. 
It is interesting to ponder what might have happened if the town 
recognized the need for help. but nu qualified person were on the scene. 
Estes Park is a relatively well-to-do community and one that is 
well-managed in normal times. which are plusses in time of crisis. 
Bringing in a recovery expert to handle duties considered extraordinary 
was a wise decision. not only because it facilitated recovery but also 
because it enabled town officials to du their regular jobs. 
Many of the persons interviewed said the town is better off than-it 
was before the flood. Everyone lamented the death and destruction there 
was. but from the standpoint of a renewed central business district. a 
new urban renewal authority. removal of b lighted and fl ood-prone 
structures. the town is better off. 
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Less positive predisaster conditions, such as lack of coordination 
among emergency coordinators in the five towns and the county, and lack 
of preparedness by the local Red Cross for a major disaster, did not 
prove to be critical problems, but they might have become so. Finally, 
it was just good 1 uck that the dam broke in dayl i ght hours, that an 
early warning was given, and that many lives were spared. 
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Attachment A 
A SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Recommendation 
IDENTIFICATION AND REGULATION 
A1 Flood Insurance restudy 
A2 Floodproofing guidance 
A3 Bridge Standards 
A4 Community Assistance (CAPE) 
AS Exchange dam information 
A6 Dam failure inundation mapping 
A7 Study Park Public use facilities 
A8 Corps of Engineers (205) 
A9 Dam owners handbook 
MINIMIZING FLOOD RECURRENCE 
B1 Acquisition of impoundment rights 
B2 Floodplain restructuring at hatchery 
B3 Debris removal 
B4 Park Debris removal 
HAZA~D WARNING AND EDUCATION 
C1 Frood warning system 
C2 Lenders/agents seminars 
C3 Disaster preparedness plans 
STRUCTURAL/NONSTRUCTURAL MEASURES 
D1 HUD SCBG funding (threat) 
D2 HUD SCBG funding (regular) 
D3 1361' Program 
D4 Mobile Home park relocation 
D5 River Front development 
Lead Agency 
FEMA 
FEMA 
Local 
FEMA 
FEMA 
FEMA 
N.P.S. 
Local 
State 
N.P.S. 
State/Local 
FEMA 
N.P.S. 
FEMA, et.al. 
FEMA 
Local 
Local 
Local 
FEMA 
Local 
Local/State 
gO-Day Status 
Partially implemented 
Fully implemented 
Fully implemented 
Fully implemented 
Fully implemented 
Partially implement~ 
To be accomplished 
Not implemented 
To be accomplished 
Partially implement~ 
Fully implemented 
Fully implfmented 
Fully implemented 
Not impl emented 
Fully implemented 
Partially implemented 
Fully implemented 
Partially implement~ 
Fully implemented 
Fully implemented 
To be accomplished 
Source: "Post Flood Recovery Progress Report; Lawn Lake Dam Failure and Fall 
River Flood," gO-day report, p. 9. 
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CHAPTER XVIII 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, AND ENVIRONS 
Background 
In a two-month peri od duri ng the spri ng of 1983, the most severe 
and extensi ve snow melt in the hi story of the state of Utah occurred. 
All seven major creeks in the Wasatch Front reached fl ood stage. Two 
factors that contributed to the flooding were an abnormally cold, rainy, 
snowy wi nter and spri ng, as well as unusually warm weather duri ng the 
end of Apri 1 and ear Iy May. In early Apri 1 weather had been unusually 
cold, with very little snow melt occurring. Then, in May, the 
temperature soared into the 90s befor~ cold weather hit once again.* 
The widespread flood and debris flow damage along the Wasatch Front 
struck the state's major population areas and damaged road systems and 
rail routes, homes and businesses, agricultural lands and public 
facilities. Accordiny to the Hazard Mitigation Plan,** damage and 
losses totaled almost $490 million. In the section of the Wasatch Front 
north of Salt Lake City, landslides and debris flows caused direct 
damage of more than $250 million. 
Public officials and residents were prepared for flooding; however, 
neither scientists nor emergency managers anticipated the widespread 
landslides and debris flows after a sudden thaw in May of 1983. At 
least 92 significant landslides devastated a 30-mile lenyth of the 
Wasatch Mountains, sending torrents of water and debris onto the 
*A related hazard in Salt Lake County is the Great Salt Lake. The 
unusually heavy rainfall plus the snow melt in 1983 contributed heavily 
to the high inflow to the Great Salt Lake. In the late spring of 1983, 
the lake increased six mil lion acre-feet in volume and 267 square miles 
in area. That was the greatest seasonal rise ever recorded. As of 
February 1, 1984, the lake stood at 4,2U6.3 feet above sea level, posing 
a continued threat to property and businesses on the shore. 
**Prepared by the Utah Department of Publ ic Safety in February, 
1984. 
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residential areas below. Additionally, there were more than 1,000 
landslides along the Wasatch Plateau. Still other massive landslides in 
Spanish Fort Canyon (in Utah County) created Thistle Lake, and in 
Twe 1 ve-Mi 1 e Canyon (Sanpete County), s I i des dammed a ri ver and sent a 
30-foot-high flash flood surging down the canyon. These floods, 
1 ands 1 i des and deb ri s flows were so extens i ve that 22 of Utah's 28 
counties were included in the Presidential Disaster Declaration. Three-
quarters of the state's poulation came under this disaster declaration; 
about 80% of Utah's popul at ion 1 i ves along he base of the Wasatch 
Front. The Presidential Declaration was the first in Utah's history. 
Salt Lake County, which includes Salt Lake City and 22 other 
municipalities, contains about 60% of Utah's population (about 1.5 
million). Salt Lake City has a population of about 163,000. Salt Lake 
County was the most severely hit by the 1983 floods, sustaining over $20 
million in damages and restoration costs. 
During the peak runoff period in Salt Lake City, debris in the 
water flow contributed to the flooding by clogging conduits. As planned 
by local public officials, public property (mostly str'eets) in Salt Lake 
City bore the brunt of the physical damage caused by tne flood. Public 
access to various parts of the city was disrupted seriously for almost 
one month as streets were used as drainage channels. Businesses also 
were disrupted throughout the city because of the use of major arterial 
roads as waterways. Nevertheless, phys i ca 1 damage to pri vate property 
was kept to a minimum within Salt Lake City. 
A total of 122 political subdivisions--cities, towns, and 
associations--were contained within the declared disaster counties. In 
this report, we will highlight Salt Lake City's unusual response 
activities and also the city of Farmington's (in Davis County) 
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substantial miti gation activities in the aftermath of the 1983 
disasters. 
From the standpoint of preparedness, city and county officials were 
fortunate in that the onset of the disaster was slow and carefully 
watched throughout the spring of 1983 by city, county, and state 
officials. Salt Lake City had an existing plan for a flood, and the 
plan was activated when the appropriate time came. 
Response in Salt Lake County 
The peak period of response activities in the Salt Lake County area 
was over the Memorial Day weekend in 1983. Salt Lake City planned to 
channel the run-off water down a predetermined set of streets in order 
to prevent di sastrous damage to the structures in the downtown area. 
Essentially, they flooded public property to spare damage to private 
property. The fi rst step, taken in mi d-May of 1983, was to trans form 
1300 South Street, a major city arterial, into a "river" to receive the 
overflow from two major creeks. A combination of city staff, 
contractors, and volunteers transformed that normally busy street into a 
temporary flood control facility. The second transformation came a week 
or so 1 ater when the city offi cia 1 s made the dec is i on to channel State 
Street, to avoid millions of dollars of flood damage in the downtown 
area. On a Sunday afternoon late in May, about 5,000 volunteers arrived 
to buil d the sandbag di ke needed on State Street. Si nce the rna in 
transportation routes downtown were severed by the "State Street River," 
two temporary vehi cul ar cross i ngs and several pedestri an bri dges were 
constructed across State Street to provide needed access to the downtown 
areas. The sandbag-edged di kes on South 13th and St~te Streets were 
needed for about ten days, after which time they were promptly removed. 
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The city's total operating costs were $8 million for a 30-day 
period. During that time, the city sustained $1.5 million in property 
damage, primarily to public property. No evacuation was necessary. The 
city officials estimate that if they had not used the streets as 
channel s for a "pl anned run-off," damage to downtown commerci a 1 and 
residential property would have been about $100 million. 
Local public officials took a calculated risk in using public 
roadways to avert damage to the downtown commerc i a 1 and res i dent i a 1 
structures. They wanted to minimize the disruption to local commerce 
and decided the city would build, and later clean up, the needed 
dikes. The mayor and chief administrative officer of Salt Lake City met 
with the downtown merchants on two occas ions to bri ef them about the 
plan for dealing with the run-off. Almost unanimous consent was 
achieved, but after the planned run-off, a few businesses filed suits 
against the city for business losses. 
Local Preparedness 
Salt Lake County 
management coordination. 
has the lead responsibility for emergency 
The Emergency Operating Center and operating 
procedures di d not funct i on as well as some city and county offi ci a 1 s 
would have liked. Additional planning activities have been undertaken 
since the'1983 flooding to improve the county's emergency management 
capability and also city/county coordination. 
In responding to the 1983 disaster, city and county personnel 
appear to have bypassed the emergency management offi ce, with fl ood 
control and public works personnel assuming a major role in the flood-
fighting activities. Throughout the spring of 1983, the hazards were 
kept visible by media coverage, and speeches by public officials at 
civic and service clubs. Citizen support for the flood mitigation and 
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preparedness measures was high; they wanted the county to hurry with its 
flood control efforts. 
The city of Salt Lake maintains an unusually high awareness of 
meteorologic and hydrologic conditions affecting it. The city has a 
hydrologist on the staff, and also provides raw data about local 
conditions to the National Weather Service. In its efforts to control 
the city's reservoir and the watershed along the Wasatch Front, 
technical experts kept the city officials apprised of the situation 
developing in early 1983. The main determinant of the flooding was the 
melt pattern. Had there been the "right" melt pattern in 1983, there 
would have been relatively little flooding. When the city's ability to 
drain the rapid run-off from the snow melt in May proved to be 
inadequate, a local state of emergency was declared. About a week 
1 ater, the county declared an emergency. The city-declared emergency 
was invoked before the actual emergency happened. The city used a 
mi 1 itary-styl e command and control system duri ng the emergency response 
phase. 
City-County Relations 
Generally, the city's main responsibilities were flood fighting and 
fl ood management. City offi ci al s served as advocates for community 
interests with the county regard i ng repa irs to damaged conduits. The 
county's responsibilities include the construction and maintenance of 
major structures and systems, which they maintain using revenues from a 
county-wide tax. 
In May of 1983, Salt Lake City handled many preparedness and flood-
fighting activities on its own. Other efforts, such as maintaining 
flood control structures and systems and construction projects were done 
by the county, in the County Flood Control and Water ()"a 1 i ty Oi vi s ion. 
For the recovery, the county has the 1 ead coord i nat ion rol e. For 
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example, most of the Damage Survey Reports (DSRs) are the county's 
responsibility. Also, the county is paying the local share of flood-
related projects, e.g., utility repairs. 
An unusual aspect of local public administration is that in 
counties in Utah, including Utah County and Davis County, citizens elect 
a surveyor. 
projects. 
The surveyor oversees the publ i c works and engi neeri ng 
One of the disadvantages of this arrangement is that 
coordination between counties for public works projects is difficult to 
achi eve. Salt Lake County has a Department of Pub 1 i c Works, whi ch 
handl es fl ood recovery matters separately from the el ected surveyor. 
Consequently, Salt Lake County was able to achieve better coordination 
than Davis or Utah counties. 
After the major di sasters, the county commi ssi oners in Salt Lake 
County 1) applied for federal assistance; 2) decided to prepare a bond 
issue; and 3) prepared to rai se taxes. A $33 mill i on bond issue was 
approved by the voters, about half of which was used for recovery 
projects during 1983. 
The county fl ood control di rector thi nks that in about one more 
year, the county may have accompl ished all that is possible for flood 
control measures. Addit i ona 1 investment will be needed for 
infrastructure, however, to keep up with new development and alsoto 
replace aging infrastructure, such as storm drains. For many western 
communities, the replacement of old infrastructure is a new experience. 
After the di saster, Salt Lake County dec i ded not to wa it for the 
federa 1 assessment of damages. It immedi atel y hi red a team of pri vate 
engineers to complete a report of public facilities and damages 
sustained. The county spent $300,000 on this report, which was 
published less than a month after the disaster declaration. The county 
wanted to be able to evaluate what a structure or system ought to be, 
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not what the FEMA standard would allow. Salt Lake County is spending 
about $22 mill i on on flood recovery and mit i gat ion proj ects, about $6 
mill i on of whi ch came from FEMA. The county fl ood control di rector 
thinks the $300,000 expenditure for planning and baseline data for a $22 
million expenditure is reasonable. He values the document for assisting 
with maintenance projects for the next 20 years. 
The county is processing about 100 DSRs, which amount to about $6 
million (including flood-fighting costs). 
Local-State Relations 
Among the state agencies involved in the disaster and its aftermath 
were the Utah Public Safety Department, National Guard, Comprehensive 
Emergency Management Offi ce, Department of Transportati on, Soci al 
Servi ces, and Natural Resources. The governor appoi nted a task force, 
which met every two weeks during the spring of 1983 (from early March 
through May). It worked out lines of communication and areas of 
responsibility among state organizations. 
While preparations had been underway for many months in early 1983, 
the state (and others) still were caught by surpri se by the number and 
magnitude of hazards that occurred in late May. After the disaster, the 
state legislature appropriated $30 million to assist local agencies in 
thei r recovery efforts. A one-half cent sa 1 es tax was used for flood 
recovery projects. The legislators knew that there was great local need 
for income to cover the disaster-related expenses. 
The Utah Disaster Relief Board was created by the Utah State 
Legislature in July of 1983 to specifically address the needs of local 
units of government. The governor and State Legislature recognized that 
the payment of an estimated $45 mill ion in damage costs, even with a 
high level of federal participation, would impose severe hardships on 
the financial capabilities of impacted counties and municipalities. 
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Although the State of Utah itself faced fi nanci a 1 diffi cult i es, the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1983 was passed, and the Division of Community 
and Economi c Development was di rected to admi ni ster the act-associ ated 
programs. 
Ten mill i on doll ars were authori zed and appropri ated to provi de 
disaster relief. The Utah Permanent Community Impact Fund Board (CIB) 
was designated by the Disaster Relief Board (DRB) to administer the 
funds appropriated in the act. Administration included reviewing 
applications for disaster relief grants and granting disaster relief 
funds for localized disaster areas. The amount of each grant was to be 
determined by the DRB in consultation with state agencies familiar with 
relevant considerations to each application and wit1in the limits set in 
the act. All grants must pass approval by the Utah Division of 
Comprehensive Emergency Management, which was represented on the 
Disaster Relief Board. 
Eligible applicants were counties and municipalities lying within 
federal or state-decl ared di saster areas. The DRB was authori zed to 
grant funds to eligible applicants to help repair, restore, reconstruct, 
or replace public facilities that were damaged or destroyed by flooding 
or mudslides. An eligible applicant would not be granted funds unless 
it or the county in which it lies first had levied a tax of at least 2 
mills or 50% of the local FEMA match, whichever is less, and applied the 
proceeds toward the costs of the flood or flood recovery. 
In March of 1984, the Disaster Relief Board reported on its 
projects and funds. Twenty-three counties received $3.4 million in 1983 
FEMA match funds; and 46 non-FEMA projects were funded at a total cost 
of $18.4 mi 11 ion. Salt Lake County recei ved the most funds in 1983: 
about $1 million in FEMA match funds and $6.2 million in non-FEMA 
projects. 
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In 1984, the governor requested an addit i ona 1 $38 mi 11 i on for the 
ORB from the State Legislature. The Legi sl ature appropri ated $20.8 
million, of which $13.4 million was for unmet flood needs in 
municipalities in 1983. 
Citizen Activities 
There was high citizen interest throughout the spring, both before 
and after the disaster event, and tremendous citizen involvement in the 
flood-fighting activities. Even after the disaster, citizen interest in 
the reconstruction and mitigation projects remained high. 
The city and county recei ved a tremendous amount of hel p from 
volunteers in 1983--the number was said to total 40,000. For the most 
part, the volunteers were not systematically organized. The main 
mechani sm used was contact with the 1 eaders of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS).* In the past year, local public 
I eaders have been work i ng wi th 1 oca 1 nei ghborhood groups to achi eve a 
better system for organizing and supervising future volunteer efforts. 
Some voluntary assistance has come from professional engineers. 
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) provided some voluntuy 
assistance in 1983. Since then, a more structured, professional 
volunteer response is being planned. 
Federal-Local Rel ations 
When FEMA personnel and the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team came 
into Salt Lake City two weeks after the declaration, there was little to 
see of the temporary measures. The HMT report notes that, fortunately, 
*For members of the LOS church, taki ng care of yoursel f and your 
family is a part of the religion. Mormons typically keep foodstuff and 
other essential products in their homes in case of emergencies. Their 
philosophy and personal preparedness were very helpful during the major 
disasters. Plus, the great willingness to aid their neighbors and the 
community as a whole were of inestimable value to the city and county 
governments. 
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the city prepared a 3D-minute videotape of the flood fighting and other 
preparedness and response efforts. 
City offi cia 1 s had not had any experi ence with FEMA because they 
had never before had a disaster of a magnitude that warranted a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration. The city officials did not gear 
their operational plans around FEMA, i.e., anticipating the federal 
requirements and processes for reimbursement. If the city officials had 
known what expenses are all owab 1 e by FEMA, they woul d have put more 
emphasis on contract labor rather than on city staff resources. Since 
the disaster, they are beefing up their inventory of contractual 
relationships with suppliers and now have more emergency contracts in 
place for future use. The city officials rented a helicopter during the 
response period, an expense not allowable by FEMA. Nevertheless, local 
officials thought it was invaluable and would do it again. 
Although local officials did not know what a Presidential Disaster 
Declaration meant before May of 1983, their experience with FEMA was 
pos it i ve. They apprec i ated the federal support and ass i stance. They 
also valued the advice about future events. After the disaster, county 
personnel compl ai ned that the frequent change of federal personnel, such 
as the Army Corps of Engineers representative, meant a lack of 
cont i nuity for seei ng recovery proj ects through to comp 1 et ion. A 1 so, 
they said there were not enough FEMA personnel available. At that time, 
FEMA personnel from the Denver Regional Office were handl ing several 
disasters. 
As is true in other communities, there was some argument over the 
DSRs, particularly project costs not allowable by FEMA. County 
officials said they tended to want to go the more expensive way in 
rebuil di ng. 
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From a financial standpoint, Salt Lake City started 1983 in the 
red; but it expects to have a $2 mill ion surpl us by the end of the 
year. A tax increase voted on after the disaster is the main reason for 
the expected surplus. The city told its citizens it had spent $10 
mi 11 ion in the fl ood response and it needed a tax increase. The 
citizens approved the increase. 
Response in Farmington 
About 20 mil es north of Salt Lake City, in the adj acent county of 
Davis, the small community of Farmington had some massive debris flows 
that devastated a residential cluster at the mouth of Rudd Canyon 
Creek. The deb ri s fl ows that descended on Fa rmi ngton on May 30 and 31 
were the result of 1 andsl i des on the steep slopes in the canyon above 
Farminyton. In addition, according to the Hazard Mitigation Plan, 
• a number of landslides shifted,. but did not mobilize to 
flow downslope to the canyon bottom. These partly detached landslides 
remain perched in metastable condition." 
A postdisaster study, conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey with 
funding from FEMA, found that a series of debris flows during the spring 
of 1983 deposited approximately 80,000 cubic yards of debris over 19.3 
acres at the mouth of Rudd Creek Canyon. The debri s flows damaged 35 
Farmington homes, 15 of them seriously. Estimated property damage was 
$3 million. The investigators also identified a large, partly detached 
land mass (estimated at 100,000 cubic yards) next to the existing 
scarp. Thi s mass poses a potent i a 1 threat to the same area gi ven the 
prospect of continued heavy precipitation. In addition, the 
investigators identified hundreds of existing detached sl ides in a 60-
mile study area. 
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The geological report suggested that Farmington City officials 
acquire 11 properties and construct a debris basin on the site of the 
expected slide. Since the estimated project cost of more than $1 
million was beyond the financial capability of the small town, outside 
help was needed. One of the behind-the-scene actors was the disaster 
recovery manager employed by the state's Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Division. His role in coordinating a multi-jurisdictional 
effort and in assisting localities with grant-writing activities was not 
known until after the field investigation was completed. 
Prior to the 1983 debris flow, the city had received a CDBG grant 
to construct a fire station. Local officials asked the state Department 
of Community and Economic Development to reprogram that grant to provide 
for property acquisition necessary to construct the debris basin. This 
was done. Also, the state approved an additional $200,000 for 
Farmington from the CDBG Jobs Bill. In addition, the Utah Disaster 
Relief Board provided $595,000 to Farmington for the project. The city 
contributed a public lot within the debris basin valued at $20,000. 
Further mitigation efforts in Farmington include a system for 
monitoring earth movements at selected sites and preparation of land use 
measures for 1 oca 1 enactment; that system was supported by a Di saster 
Review Board grant of $40,000 to the state university. One such measure 
is a mud flow ordinance that would require developers to obtain soil and 
engineering reports and topographic maps identifying existing conditions 
on project sites in mud flow areas. 
For the small community of Farmington, the extensive damages 
required prompt and expensive mitigation steps. Living beneath a 
partially detached land mass raises serious concerns. The small town 
was forced into a significant set of public works and improvements. 
Nevertheless, the city manager was able to direct the many activities in 
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a prompt and effective manner, using county, state, and federal 
assistance. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
Salt Lake City engaged in extensive preparedness measures and in a 
dramatic response to the snow melt and flooding in 1983. Recovery 
activities were minimal in Salt Lake City, since the county has 
responsibility for most of the flood protection infrastructure. 
The nearby community of Farmi ngton prov; des an i nteresti ng 
contrast. Since it was not able to anticipate the massive land and 
mudslides it sustained, Farmington was faced with many recovery 
decisions. The city encountered many immediate pressures to take 
mitigative actions and it did so during the recovery period. 
The weakness in emergency management capabi 1 i ty and the 1 ack of 
city/county coordination in the Salt Lake City area appear to be 
problems, although they were circumvented this time. In 1983, ad hoc 
response and recovery actions were sufficient, but it appeared that more 
permanent organizational arrangements would be needed for the 
anticipated run-off in spring of 1984 and in subsequent years. 
The active mitigation efforts of the many municipalities affected 
in 1983 paid off in 1984. In late spring of 1984, a repeat disaster was 
averted thanks to structural and nonstructural actions, weather (gradual 
snow melt), and luck. 
After reviewing thi s report, the county flood control di rector 
advised us that the City and County of Salt Lake had developed a closer 
coordination mechanism in the past year and that the 1984 flood fight 
went much more smoothly. "The organizational arrangements we made have 
been established on a permanent basis and they have provided the 
strength that your report suggests they would." 
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CHAPTER XIX 
COALINGA, CALIFORNIA 
Background 
Coalinga is a small, rural community (population about 7,000) 
located in southwestern Fresno County in the western part of the San 
Joaquin Valley. Fresno, the county seat, is 65 miles away. The 
community served as a railroad coaling station, hence its name, Coaling 
(Station) A. Later, the city was the center for oil exploration in the 
area. More recently, construct i on of the Cal iforn i a Water Proj ect (a 
major irrigation project in the state) has contributed directly to the 
expansion of agricultural activity into the west side of the valley and 
indirectly to Coalinga as a commercial center. 
On May 2,1983, an earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale 
hit about 9.5 miles northeast of the city of Coalinga, causing damage in 
a 25-mi 1 e radi us. Accordi ng to the expert team of the Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute, no foreshocks greater than 1.5 had been 
observed on University of California seismographs. The May 2 earthquake 
had a mean Richter magnitude of 6.7 and a maximum Modified Mercali 
intensity of VIII. The two largest aftershocks were 3 minutes (ML 5.6) 
and 80 days (ML 6.0) later. Although the main earthquake was of only 
moderate magnitude, ground motion was perceptible 200 miles to the north 
and south, in San Franc i sco and Los Angeles. The May 2 ea rthquake and 
its aftershocks were in the eastern Di ab 10 Range, about 18.5 mil es 
northeast of the San Andreas Fault. The location and nature of this 
fault caught even local geologists by surprise. 
In seconds, the earthquake of May 2 devastated Coalinga's central 
business district. Coal inga was the only community to suffer serious 
damage from the earthquake. While there were no deaths, 47 people were 
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injured. Nearly 2,000 homes and about 200 businesses were damaged. The 
centra 1 bus i ness di stri ct suffered al most total devastation because it 
contained many unreinfoced masonry buildings. The downtown streets were 
impassable, water mains were broken, telephone service was disrupted, 
communications towers collapsed, the city's gas distribution and 
e 1 ectri c systems were shut off, and sewer 1 i nes co 11 apsed • The total 
damage was estimated at $31 million, including almost $6 million damage 
to local public facilities. 
Coalinga is relatively isolated; the nearest town is 17 miles 
away, and the nearest 1 arge city is 50 mi 1 es aWilY, in another county. 
Since the effects of the earthquake were felt mainly in Coalinga, no 
other city had need of emergency resources. Neighboring communities and 
the Fresno County government quickly marshalled their resources to help 
Coalinga. Further, the highways that lead to Coalinga were not 
seriously damaged, so land transportation was not disrupted. Other 
local ambulance services and fire departments assisted the city. The 
County Sheriff's Department set up a command post in Coalinga within an 
hour of hearing about the earthquake. 
Coalinga's local economy comprises oil drilling and related 
services (about 50%), agriculture (about 30%) and retail sales and 
services (about 20%). All three sectors sustained damage. This 
diversified economic base, while growing relatively slowly, is steady. 
At the time of the quake, the city had a sma 11 surpl us of funds, due 
mainly to utilities income. In addition to providing the usual 
municipal services, the city also provides gas, water and sewer services 
to its homes and businesses. 
Local Response 
The sudden onset of the earthquake and the lack of local 
preparedness resulted in many problems. Several of the major problems 
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in the aftermath of the May 2 earthquake are documented in a report to 
the California Seismic Safety Commission, published about one month 
after the disaster: 
1) Although Coalinga had an emergency plan, the plan was 
considered impractical and not followed. • •• Lack of 
a practical emergency plan, and prior exercise of that 
plan, precluded optimum emergency response. 
2) A second, extremely serious problem was the lack of 
adequate communications. Telephones generally were 
inoperative and the city repeater on a nearby hill 
stopped functioning. City radio communications became 
limited to vehicle-to-vehicle, although some use was 
made of CB radios. Fire units could talk to other fire 
units on a limited basis and law enforcement ••• could 
ta 1 k to 1 aw enforcement . . • on a 1 imited bas is, but 
there was absolutely no communiciations system Direction 
and Control could use to effectively coordinate the use 
of the available resources •••• 
3) There were no previously designated alternate Emergency 
Operation Center (EOC) sites. After the decision was 
made that neither the fire station nor the police 
station could be used as an EOC, considerable confusion 
existed as to what to do. Approximately two hours after 
the initial shock, the California Highway Patrol office 
was selected to be the EOC and Command Post. 
4) The news media was [sic] an extremely disruptive 
influence. they frequently hindered response actions in 
their efforts to obtain camera coverage or to interview 
rescue workers, city officials, or other response 
officials. 
5) Once the decision was made to turn off the natural gas 
system, the peopl e des i gnated to take the act ion coul d 
not identify which valves to turn to complete the shut-
off. When the gas was finally turned off, all 
electrical power generated through natural gas was lost. 
6) A major problem was the influx of people into Coalinga 
(primarily news media, well-intentioned information 
seekers, and curious sightseers). This took 
considerable effort to control and actually impeded 
recovery efforts. 
7) Since the majority of buildings in the downtown area 
were considered unsafe, it became a serious problem to 
keep the businessmen from entering the area while 
reassuri ng them that thei r property was under 24-hour 
security and that they would be allowed entry at a later 
time. 
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Adding to the local response difficulties was the fact that while 
the City Hall building was intact, the interior furnishings had been 
tossed about. Many offi cers were unusable until the contents of book 
shelves, cabinets, and desks could be cleared from workspace. The 
Emergency Operating Center finally was established at the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) office at the edge of the city, after two earl ier 
choices were ruled out. At the CHP building, access and communications 
remained intact. 
Local officials, reviewing this list of problems about one year 
after the disaster, view things differently. First, the locality had an 
emergency plan, prepared in accordance with state yuidelines, but it was 
not practical (and hence not used) for the disaster. Second, local 
official s did not see the communications breakdown as the "extremely 
serious problem" noted. One person half-jokingly said, "When the 
telephone lines went down it was almost a relief." Third, since the 
town was small, and most agency heads knew what resources they had, they 
effectively used the resources they had. Similarly, a "quick look 
around" enabled local leaders to decide on an alternate locdtion for an 
EDC. In fact, there were several EOCs--the CHP bui 1 di ng was 
headquarters for the city manager, sheri ff, fi re chi ef and the CHP. 
Public Works operated out of City Hall, the county used the ElkS Lodge, 
the Red Cross used the college. Fourth, the local officials did not 
remember the news media being as discruptive (except at the local 
hospital) or the influx of curiosity seekers as bothersome as the 
observers did--thanks to check pOints on tho few roadways into 
Coalinga. Finally, the perimeter of the badly damaged downtown area was 
contro 11 ed at fi rs t by the County Sheriff's Department and 1 ater by 
local officials using rent-a-fence and rent-a-cop. The latter 
arrangement worked extremely well in the opinion of local officials. 
265 
After the quake, the city expected a loss of revenue, but it did 
not happen. The downtown businesses, which had borne the brunt of the 
structural damage, had provided only about 12% of the city's sales tax 
revenues. Because of the great increase in construction-related 
activities, including contractors seeking local licenses and purchasing 
building materials locally, revenues increased in the second half of 
1983. Overall, muni c i pa 1 revenues were up about 16% over those of the 
previous year. While funds from federal and state programs have been 
coming in slowly, the surplus in the city treasury prior to the May 2nd 
earthquake eased the usual cash flow problem in the aftermath of a 
disaster. At least in the short-term, the city's budget is not 
seriously out of balance. 
Recovery Activities 
After the May 2nd earthquake, government officials at all levels 
except local questioned whether the city could and should rebuild. Such 
indecisiveness about the recovery process did not arise in any of the 
other case studies. Major uncertainties about existing land uses in an 
area of high seismic activity are at the root of this indecisiveness. 
There may be similar uncertainties in connection with other natural 
hazards, but no parallel has been observed thus far. Among their 
concerns were 1) the many severe aftershocks; 2) the dearth of insurance 
coverage on most of the severely damaged structures, private as well as 
pub 1 i c; and 3) ant i c i pat i on of a 1 arge amount of indebtedness of both 
home and business owners. Local officials claim they never considered 
any option other than how to get back to normal as quickly as 
possible. As weeks went by, local officials and citizens were 
discouraged by the lack of federal assistance for recovery (especially 
for small businesses). 
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Many researchers and' other observers who vi sited Coal i nga shortly 
after the earthquake were initially pessimistic about the community's 
recovery, "but not the local politicians and bureaucrats," according to 
local public leaders who reviewed this report about one year later. 
Nevertheless, this research team observed in March of 1984 that Coalinga 
was not in danger of becoming a ghost town, although it was in danger of 
losing its businesses to a location outside of the central downtown 
area. 
In Coalinga, the number of buildings damaged, as compared with the 
total, was high. Of the approximately $31 million estimated total 
damages sustained, about one-fi fth were damages to 1 oca 1 pub 1 i c 
facilities. Through FEMA's public assistance program, monies were made 
available (on a 75% federal/25% local match basis) to aid the city in 
the repair and reconstruction of public facilities. Yet, in actual fact 
the local share amounts to more than 25%. The remaining $25 million in 
damage was mostly to structures and property not covered by insurance. 
The question of insurance coverage seems to have been seriously 
underestimated in the early months after the disaster. Payments by 
insurance companies had reached about $11-12 million dollars about 14 
months after the disaster. That amount had added significantly to local 
property owners' abil ity to recover. One shoul d keep in mi nd that 
Coa 1 i nga had a total city budget of $4.5 mill i on the year before the 
earthquake. Therefore, the $31 million damage estimate equals more than 
half a decade of municipal income. 
The almost total loss of the older, unreinforced masonry structures 
located in the downtown area has been viewed as "instant mitigation." 
That is to say, most of the structures that coul d not withstand the 
shaking from an earthquake showed obvious structural failure. 
Essentially, the earthquake singled out the older, vulnerable structures 
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and destroyed them. As a consequence, there were few deci si ons about 
reconstruction and possible retrofitting. After the earthquake, the 
structures stand i ng were the ones most earthquake-res i stant; they had 
been built in conformance with the more recent building code. 
According to the California Seismic Safety Commission, about two 
weeks after the main earthquake the city had: "1) enclosed the damaged 
area with a chain link fence, 2) begun demolition plans, 3) initiated 
contract negotiations for demolion, 4) reviewed a design for development 
of the central business district, 5) initiated negotiations for 
redevelopment financing with state and federal sources, and 6) decided 
to incorporate all of its special districts into the redevelopment 
planning process." The city is using its Regional Plan (General Plan) 
adopted in 1972 as the basis for land use planning in the redevelopment 
process and has developed a pl an for the reconstruct i on of the central 
business district. Among the changes in that pl an made after the 
disaster were the provision of more area for multi-family housing. 
At the local level, recovery planning has been led by 1) the city 
manager (who is also the city engineer); 2) the city's public works 
director, who as the official responsible for the municipal 
infrastructure and the ut il it i es hand 1 ed the DSRs and the effort to 
restore the utilities; 3) the City Council members, primarily in their 
roles as directors of the City Council and of the Redevelopment 
Authority, and 4) the Coalinga Industrial Development Council (CIDC) and 
Chamber of Commerce, which are spearheading the business sector 
recovery. 
In addition, FEMA and the California Office of Emergency Services 
brought together federal and state agency offi ci a 1 s to meet wi th city 
and county officials, social service agency representatives, and 
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developers. At the federal level, FEMA and SBA official s were key 
actors in the recovery planning process. 
Prior to the disaster, the city had a Redevelopment Authority in 
place. At that time, the agency had a limited mission, that of focusing 
on three specific sites for redevelopment in the city. After the 
disaster, the decision was made--after local consultation with county 
and di stri ct offi ci al s--to expand the boundari es of the redevelopment 
area to cover vi rtually the enti re city and to use the agency to 1 ead 
the reconstruction and recovery efforts. The advantages of using the 
redevelopment agency include 1) its powers of emminent domain, 2) its 
ability to use tax increment financing for construction projects, 3) its 
usefulness as a vehicle for coordinating the redevelopment, and 4) its 
appropri ateness for recei vi ng federal grant money. With tax increment 
financing, property tax revenues on any assessed talue above that on May 
4, 1983, may be used by the redevelopment agency. This mechanism means 
the county wi 11 recei ve 1 ess income, but Fresno County agreed to allow 
Coalinga to use this mechanism to aid its recovery. 
In the postdisaster period, a development and building policy was 
estab 1 i shed by the Ci ty Council at the recommendat i on of the Pl ann i ng 
Commission. The buildings that are going up since the earthquake adhere 
to those new building standards. Occasionally, variances are allowed, 
such as a waiver for setback. 
The sector of the local economy that sustained the most destruction 
was the retail business communi ty. The merchants located in the nea rl y 
totally destroyed central business district were provided with space at 
the local college gym for a flea-market type operation during the summer 
months. By fall, when the school term was to begi n, the 1 oca 1 Chamber 
of Commerce had managed to raise funds to acquire trailers, which were 
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rented out at reasonable rates to bus i ness owners. The trail ers were 
parked on lots in the central business district. 
City and county offici al s prepared grant appl i cati ons to several 
federal agencies for assistance with business relocation. About 
$900,000 were secured from the Economic Development Administration (EDA) 
of the Department of Commerce. The EDA support included about $600,000 
for the two commercial buildings; about $200,000 for a revolving loan 
fund; and about $50,000 for technical assistance. The latter was to be 
used for technical assistance and a consultant was hired to provide it. 
In the two EDA-supported commercial buildings that are planned for 
the downtown area , rental space will be offered at reasonable rates to 
merchants who were operating prior to the disaster. Estimated 
completion date of the buildings is fall of 1984, which will mean about 
1.5 years of business disruption for many Coalinga merchants. 
One problem that occurred periodically was that the press and 
groups of citizens assumed that it was the responsibility of the city to 
rebuild everything as it was. The municipal officials were, in fact, 
quite limited in what they could do for the local merchants. Indeed, 
because 1 oca 1 merchants pai d as 1 itt 1 e as $ .07 to $ .20 per square foot 
for commercial space prior to the disaster, finding new locations that 
were affordable was a difficult task. Very few federal or state 
programs exist that could assist with the restoration of wrecked 
commercial enterprises. Many merchants suffered from more than 
structural losses; some lost furnishings, inventory, and even essential 
records (such as accounts payable). 
Ironically, Coalinga's geographic isolation works in its favor in 
that patronage of 1 oca 1 busi nesses conti nued--even through the 
disruptions--because alternative shopping locations are many miles away. 
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Role of Business Community 
The Coalinga Industrial development Corpordtion (CIDC), a non-
profit organi zat i on dedi cated to business and i ndustri a 1 development, 
emerged to coordinate the private sector's interests in rebuilding the 
central business district. After a change in leadership (the former 
president was named to the City Council) and an expansion of its board 
from 9 to 15 members, the ClOC assumed an active role in promoting 
business interests during the recovery. The CIDC formed three 
commitees: Business and Industry Attractions, Long-Term Recovery, and 
Short-Term Recovery. The ClOC also conducted a survey of local needs 
and a commun ity aud it. The ClOC provides a public forum to review 
design concepts for reconstruction projects. 
During the recovery period, two different business philosophies 
were expressed: one group wants businesses restored to the way they 
were and wants no or slow growth; a second group sees the disaster as an 
opportuni ty to rebuil din a way that will allow for infrastructure 
extension, business growth, and the attraction of shoppers to Coalinga 
from surrounding areas. Commercial restoration planning is complicated 
by the fact that a popul at i on of about 7,000 does not provi de the 
"critical mass" necessary to sustain many businesses. Also, as is true 
in many other cities, businesses are locating in shopping centers 
outside of the center city. 
With assistance from the Fresno County Community Development 
Department and the State Economi c and Busi ness Development Offi ce, the 
city applied to the federal Economic Development Administration (EDA) 
for assistance in rebuilding the commercial structures. The ClOC also 
was involved in the city's grant application. 
Local accounts and perceptions vary about why local business 
relocation plans went from a quick, temporary means of providing 
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commercial space to the permanent, substantial structures subsidized by 
the EDA grant for whi ch the bid was accepted in March of 1984. The 
permanent buildings agreed upon are expected to make space available to 
existing businesses in the fall of 1984, for a rental cost of 20 cents 
per square foot--but with a rapid escalation of 35% a year--as compared 
to the 65 cents per square foot cost in private buildings in Coalinga. 
Private Sector (Professional) 
According to post-action reports provided to the California Seismic 
Safety Commission, " ••• the mobilization of the volunteer forces was 
faster and more complete than expected. This was the result of 13 years 
of work by the Structural Engineers' Association of California, and two 
years of assistance and coordination by the Seismic Safety Commission's 
Task Force on Earthquake Preparedness." Local officials cite the Red 
Cross, Salvation Army, a locally formed Christian Response Group, and 
private business donors for prompt, voluntary assistance. In addition, 
much-needed pl umbers (100 of them from throughout the valley) 
volunteered. Additional valuable assistance came from the California 
Conservation Corps and the Mennonites. 
Another important source of assi stance was the Paci fic Gas and 
Electric Company (PG&E). Although the city owns the gas utility company 
within the city limits, PG&E assisted the city (in part under contract 
and in part voluntarily) in testing all of the gas mains and in 
res to ri ng se rv ice to 1 oca 1 homes and bus i nesses • The ut iIi ty company 
was very supportive of local recovery efforts. 
Other serend i pitous offers of help were made to the city. An 
aeri a 1 photography fi rm offered to take aeri a 1 photos needed by the 
Public Works Department. Ultimately, the company donated services worth 
about $20,000 to the city. In addition, major oil companies with local 
commerc i ali nterests donated money to the city. Texaco, for exampl e, 
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contributed $10,000. Chevron helped purchase a new ambulance, and Getty 
hel ped purchase a new communi cat ions system. Much of the cash went to 
the Red Cross and Salvation Army for disbursement. 
CitY-County Relations 
The earthquake shows the importance of the county government in the 
immediate response phase. Given the magnitude of the earthquake and the 
extent of the damage, the small city was overwhelmed. The county 
provided almost immediate police and other public safety assistance 
(such as sanitation and health inspectors). Also, two members of the 
County Board of Supervisors went to Coalinga to see first-hand what was 
needed, a gesture appreciated by Coalinga officials and residents. When 
special needs arose, such as for gargabe crews to collect debris, other 
cities in the area provided the city with the requested support. The 
county and the state provided road clearance equipment. Additionally, 
the county provided inspection teams; sheriff's inspections was one of 
the city's greatest needs. 
While Coalinga had had some experience with FEMA (after a flood 
disaster decl aration in the spring), and some experience with federal 
grant writ i ng (wi th EPA for a new sewage treatment pl ant), the city 
officials were not prepared for dealing with a federally declared 
disaster and the attendant grant writing for a large-scale event. 
Fresno County assisted the small city in many ways. One of the most 
notable county actions was the allocation of a disproportionate share of 
existing program monies, such as COBG and Housing Assistance and 
Rehabilitation, for Coalinga. In the recovery planning process,the 
county, the state economi c development agency, and consultants work i ng 
with the city and county helped identify all possible sources of federal 
aid the city might pursue to aid its recovery. Regarding the 
identification task, FEMA had been a big help to the city. 
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The county assistance was gratefully acknowledged by the city 
officials. Before the earthquake, many Coalinga residents had long been 
dissatisfied with Fresno County government; an effort had been made some 
years ago to secede from Fresno County and form another county. Despite 
the di stance, the city got prompt and generous assi stance from the 
county duri ng the response and recovery phase. Ci ty-county re 1 at ions 
are probably at an all-time high since the earthquake. 
City-State Relations 
Disaster response assistance was provided by the California Office 
of Emergency Services, Highway Patrol, National Guard (paid for by the 
Red Cross), the California Transportation Department, Emergency Medical 
Servi ces Authority, and Cal iforni a Conservat i on Corps. The Offi ce of 
Emergency Services (OES), together with FEMA, coordinated all social 
service, lending, and regulatory agencies into a one-stop shop, which 
was helpful to local officials. 
Whil e Coal i nga di d not have the benefit of a federal interagency 
hazard mitigation team, it did receive some advice and assistance from 
the California Seismic Safety Commission. A SCEPP Assessment Team 
visited Coalinga shortly after the earthquake and prepared a Team 
Report. It is interesting to note their preliminary assessments of the 
recovery process at that time: 
1) The emergency response and recovery operations in this 
earthquake have limited application to catastrophic 
earthquake events as projected for Southern California. 
2) Thi s event brought out the si gnifi cant rol e pl ayed by 
the county government in the immedi ate emergency 
response and recovery phases of major e~rthquakes •••• 
3) Pre-earthquake planning, plan testing and personnel 
training are critical for effective response and short-
term recovery. 
4) The private sector throughout the county and state 
responded with great generosity to the situation. 
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5) Coalinga is taking advantage of all its existing plans 
to speed up the short-term and long-term recovery. 
6) The recovery process in Coalinga is likely to be 
prolonged because of the lack of insurance coverage and 
the resulting dependence on federal disaster assistance 
programs. 
7) Initial observations point to the city's need for 
technical assistance in both the d~velopment of a 
reconstruct i on and rei nvestment pl an, us i ng state and 
federal aid, and in managing the actual reconstruction 
process. 
City-Federal Relations 
The city was not prepared for either a major earthquake or the 
massive infusion of help and resources needed during the response and 
recovery phases. The city, assisted by county and state agencies, 
prepared an application for a Presidential Disaster Declaration; the 
county itself later filed for a declaration. FEMA and DES took the lead 
in obtaining federal assistance for response and recovery activities. 
County staff helped prepared economic assistance and other grant 
applications. The city's public works director handled all DSRs for the 
city. 
Shortly after the Presidential Disaster Declaration was received, 
representat i ves of federal agenci es convened in r:oa 1 i nga and descri bed 
the recovery programs available to aid the city. By all local accounts, 
the promises were extravagant and the ability to deliver limited. This 
session caused a lot of hard feelings in the ensuing months. A major 
frustration experienced by local citizens was that while displaced 
residents could get rent-free trailers, displaced businesses were not 
eligible for any temporary relocation or rebuilding assistance. 
Individual businesses were eligible for SBA loans, but no assistance was 
available for dealing with aggregate business planning or relocation. 
Among the federal programs considered for business-related 
relocation were UDAG, EDA, and Farmers Home Administration. Given the 
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local preferences, as well as federal program availability, EDA programs 
provided the most assistance. SBA was the single biggest program. 
Local officials remain disgruntled about the lack of delivery by 
federal agencies and by the limitations of a Presidential Disaster 
Declaration. The mayor expressed his frustrations in testimony to a 
U.S. Congress committee, as follows: 
The promi ses fi zzl ed, a few sputtered away but they 
still went out. Hopes were extinguished. FEMA assistance 
has never been clear. We believe that it is as follows: 
To provide mobile homes, but not the sites for them. 
To provide funds to render the devastated area safe, but 
not to put back together. 
To provide assistance in bringing in other federal 
agencies to assist. 
We do not believe this is enough, and we would doubt any 
Legislator or private citizen would believe that this is what 
is meant by a Presidential Declaration of a disaster. 
Interviewers' Perceptions 
In Coalinga, the citizens have a conservative philosophy about 
government and they are extremely independent and self-sufficient--
probably because of the relative isolation of the city. Initially, they 
did not expect assistance from any 1 eve 1 of government. In fact, they 
were reluctant, if not resistant, to accept individual assistance. 
Special efforts were made to get individuals who were eligible to apply 
for SBA loans. 
Fortunately for the small city, the county was highly supportive in 
terms of providing emergency services and money from existing program 
funds (CDBG, home rehabilitation monies). Nevertheless, the extent of 
damages, the very limited amount of insurance payments, and the 
relatively limited external resources are among the reasons the recovery 
is slow in Coalinga. 
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From the standpoint of physical appearance and infrastructure, 
Coalinga is better off after the earthquake. The older, unstable, 
deteri ori at i ng structures are gone; the gas system has been carefull y 
checked and brought up to current standards; some additional water and 
sewer capacity has been put into place, allowing a needed trailer park 
and providing possible expansion capability to city infrastructure; and, 
finally, the central business district will be modernized and 
revitalized. 
On the other hand, there wi 11 be a hi gh 1 eve 1 of indebtedness of 
both homeowners and business owners for many years to come. The fact 
that so few losses were covered by insurance means that most of the cost 
will fall directly on the individuals stricken by the disaster. There 
remains plenty of emotional devastation as well. About 30 people move 
out of Coalinga each month (up from an average of 20), even though the 
total population is increasing. 
Earthquake damage is different; it is more difficult and expensive 
to deal with in that structural damage from a quake may be subtle. 
After an earthquake, it is necessary to have an engineer doing building 
inspections to certify occupancy. In Coalinga, the public works 
director was the only municipal employee qualified to do building 
inspections--obviously not a good use of his time in the aftermath of an 
earthquake. The county provided the additional assistance needed. 
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APPENDIX A 
YEAR III CASE STUDIES 
FIELD REPORT OUTLINE 
I. Background * 
A. Description of the disaster 
1. Type of disaster agent (e.g., hurricane or tornado) 
2. Nature of impact (e.g., high winds, water damage) 
3. Extent of damage 
a) magnitude of event 
(1) lOO-year flood, hurricane-of-the century, or 
"average American disaster" 
[leading to ad hoc or special organizational 
response vs. ready accommodation]** 
(2) as percentage of physical stock and population 
b) impact on each major sector of locality (residential, 
commercial/industrial, public property, farmland or 
open space, etc.) 
c) extent of damage to private property and to public 
facil ities 
[leading to availability of public assistance vs. 
greater difficulty and more diffused process of 
obtaining funding assistance for private homes or 
businesses] 
d) relative impact of event on community as a whole 
4. Immediate response 
a) public sector response 
b) general public 
c) business community 
d) others 
5. Local preparedness plan: 
disaster, obtain a copy. 
used during the disaster, 
satisfactory it was. 
(all levels of government) 
If plan existed at time of 
Ask about whether plan was 
to what extent, and how 
* Include maps and other graphics, as appropriate. 
** Guidance for field interviewers on topics to probe is enclosed in 
brackets. 
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6. Size of city and resources available 
a) professional, in-house personnel 
b) local public resources 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
financial and material 
existence of and use of community 
development or economic development plan 
application of resources to disaster 
recovery vis-a-vis local public financial 
capability 
to meet recovery costs in impacted area, 
what trade-offs, reallocation or diversions 
of resources were made? 
c) local private resources 
d) other resources (e.g., military base) 
B. Historical context 
1. Recent and older disasters from same disaster agent 
(e.g., flood history and hurricane record) 
2. Public and private leaders' memory of disaster recovery 
experience 
o present and previous local/state/federal 
relationship 
[probe regarding past experience and prior attitudes 
about mitigation] 
279 
3 
II. Recovery Activities 
A. Ask about transition from response to recovery phase: change in 
functions, change in actors, etc. 
B. Array of recovery issues and problems arising during the aftermath 
1. In the shorter-term (patch-up, repair) 
2. In the longer-term (reconstruction, betterment projects) 
C. Local public priorities (as derived from (B) above) 
[probe for details of local decisionmaking regarding priorities; 
compare and contract local priorities with those of Federal Hazard 
Mitigaiton Team.] 
D. Role of business community; public/private interaction 
E. Local business/industrial community priorities 
F. Functions and activiteis dealing with priority issues and problems. 
For each item listed, provide details on: 
1. Who was involved? 
2. What did they do? 
3. When did they do it? 
4. Why did they do it? 
5. With what monies did they do it? 
-- federal -- local 
-- state -- private 
Cover all appropriate 
actors--at each governmental 
level and in private sector 
(business and citizen groups) 
6. With what other resources/assistance did they do it? 
-- federal -- local 
-- state -- private 
7. Description of grants applied for or used 
[leading to grantsmanship skill] 
8. Issues regarding local authorities, powers, enabling 
legislation; home rule, charter considerations 
[pursue with state and federal interviewees] 
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III. Mitigation Measures 
A. In the shorter-term (e.g., floodproofing and sea walls) 
B. In the longer-term 
1. Major structural measures (e.g., dams and bridges) 
2. Major nonstructura1 measures (relocation of a neighborhood) 
3. Community betterment projects 
[leading to how deep and far-reaching is the commitment 
to mitigation] 
C. A written plan 
[Is mitigation included in local emergency management 
plan? Is mitigation planning a noticeable activity 
~ fact, if not in writing, at the local level?] 
IV. Interviewer's Perceptions 
A. Of the local public posture (i.e., attitude and actions) on 
recovery process in terms of: 
1. Local emergency planning and management capability 
2. Local public capacity (personnel and dollars) 
3. Commitment to long-term mitigation measures, particularly 
measures requiring SUbstantial changes 
B. Need for, emergence of, and role assumed by ad hoc groups 
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THE 
GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 
APPENDIX B 
Program 0/ Policy Studies in Science and Technology / Washillg/oll, D.C. 20052/202-676·7380 
March 1984 
The Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology at the George 
Washington University needs your help! 
The Program is conducting a major nationwide study of community 
recovery from natural disasters. The purpose of the study, which is 
funded by the National Science Foundation, is to examine local public 
planning and management decisionmaking during the disaster recovery 
process. 
Please take a moment to complete this brief questionnaire. Be assured 
that all of your comments will be held in strict confidence and that 
your participation is vital ·.to the success of the project. 
For the purposes of this study, a community is said to have recovered 
from a natural disaster when all of its rolitical, economic, and social 
systems are functioning at least as well as they did before the disaster 
event. Please keep this definition in mind as you answer the questions 
on the following pages. 
Thank you. 
c..ta.w. '8 . 'Q.L 
Claire B. Rubin 
Director 
Natural Disaster Research Center 
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We are interested in learning more about your recovery priorities 
following the May 1983 earthquake. We are especially interested in the 
period when most of the immediate human needs had been met and the town 
began to consider long-term recovery issues. To help us understand your 
priorities during that period, imagine that the total amount of disaster 
assistance available from all sources was $100. Indicate how you 
personally would have allocated that assistance to each of the---rrcromains" 
listed below. (Of course, your allocations mayor may not differ from 
the actual distribution of recovery assistance.) 
Allocation 
$100 
Domain* 
RESIDENTIAL, including the repair or reconstruction 
of houses, the repair or replacement of home fur-
nishings, cars and trucks; the settling of insurance 
claims for damage to personal property; and the per-
manent resettling of displaced residents. 
BUSINESS, including the repair or reconstruction of 
economically viable commercial, industrial, and re-
tail establishments; and the return of retail sales, 
business-related tax revenues, and employment to 
predisaster levels. 
PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES, including the 
resumption of water, sewer, electric, telephone and 
other basic services, the restoration of public 
transportation, parks, and recreational areas; the 
repair or reconstruction of public sidewalks, 
schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics, police 
stations, fire houses, and other municipal build-
ings; and progress on community projects that were 
planned or under construction prior to the disaster. 
GENERAL POPULATION, including the return of certain 
social indicators (such as birth, death, and crime 
rates; alcoholism, child and spouse abuse; and also 
welfare payments) to at least predisaster 
levels; and the implementation of other programs 
designed to restore or improve the quality-of-life 
for local residents. 
MITIGATION, including measures which will reduce 
future losses such as the preparation or revision 
of a disaster plan; the construction of levees, 
dikes, breakwaters, and rip rap; the implementation 
of projects such as the relocation of persons living 
in high-risk areas; the purchase of disaster-related 
insurance; and the passage of land use ordinances 
and building codes. 
Total disaster assistance available from all sources. 
* The items describing each domain are illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
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We now would like to know how satisfied you are with the outcome of 
the recovery activities that followed the earthquake. Question 1 
addresses your general or overall level of satisfaction, while the 
remaining questions focus on the five "domains" described above. 
Please note that all of these questions ask about the results of 
activities, rather than the performance of particular agencies or 
individuals. Feel free to refer to the description of the domains 
when answering questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
1. As of today, how satisfied are you personally with the overall 
outcome of the recovery activities that followed the earthquake. 
Would you say you are: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Somewhat dissatisfied, or 
4. Very dissatisfied 
2. How satisfied are you personally with the outcome of the 
recovery activities that were directed primarily at the 
RESIDENTIAL domain? Would you say you were: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Somewhat dissatisfied, or 
4. Very dissatisfied 
3. How satisfied are you personally with the outcome of the 
recovery activities that were directed primarily at the 
BUSINESS domain? Would you say you are: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Somewhat dissatisfied, or 
4. Very dissattsfied 
4. How satisfied are you personally with the outcome of the 
recovery activities that were directed primarily at the 
PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES domain? Would you say you 
a~: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Somewhat dissatisfied, or 
4. Very dissatisfied 
5. How satisfied are you personally with the outcome of the 
recovery activities that were directed primarily at the 
GENERAL POPULATION domain? Would you say you are: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Somewhat dissatisfied, or 
4. Very dissatisfied 
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6. How satisfied are you personally with the outcome of the recov-
ery activities that were directed primarily at the MITIGATION 
domain? Would you say you are: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Somewhat satisfied 
3. Somewhat dissatisfied 
4. Very dissatisfied 
Thank you for answering our questions. 
We appreciate your willingness to participate in 
this important research. 
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